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1
Introduction
Gendered Nationalist Movements 
in Southeast Asia
Susan Blackburn
There is quite an extensive literature on gender and nationalism but less on women in nationalist movements, particularly from a bio-
graphical perspective, and very little on either of these in relation to 
Southeast Asia.1  Th ese are gaps that this book seeks to address.
 Th is introductory chapter opens up discussion of some of the 
concepts and questions that are central to the chapters that will follow. 
Th ey relate to gender and nationalist movements, and the special con-
tribution that is off ered by the biographical approach. Th e Introduc-
tion refl ects on what is specifi c to Southeast Asia from the point of 
view of women in nationalist movements. A brief overview of the 
chapters is also provided.
Gender and Nationalist Movements
“Nation” and “nationalism” are contested terms. Nationalism involves 
the identifi cation of a people with a place and a community, to which 
they refer as a nation and to which they feel a sense of belonging and 
loyalty, and which confers rights and commands obligations. What 
forms the core of that identifi cation, how it emerges, the discourse of 
nationalism and how people are mobilised behind it constitute some 
of the key questions exercising the minds of scholars of nationalism.2  
For most of our Southeast Asian protagonists, living in the fi rst half of 
the 20th century, fi ghting to free the land and society in which they 
lived from foreign colonial powers was something obvious and worthy 
of their pursuit. For them, nationalism entailed the responsibility to 
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struggle to liberate the nation from foreign domination and establish 
their own nation-state. Yet this seemingly straightforward agenda 
concealed a number of tensions and contradictions that could not be 
ignored as time went on.
 Even in the course of the anti-colonial struggle, it was clear that 
nationalists were divided by class, ethnicity and religion that led them 
to pursue diff erent visions of the nation. Once the colonial yoke had 
been thrown off , the nation was openly revealed as lacking solidarity, 
however hard nationalist leaders worked to conceal it. One of the 
most intractable problems was the issue of ethnicity and how it was 
to be negotiated in Southeast Asia’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
societies. Some ethnic groups envisaged the nation as the place where 
they could preserve and sustain their own cultures and religions, 
which would otherwise be subordinated or even annihilated in a state 
dominated by other groups. Relatively few in Southeast Asia saw the 
nation in liberal terms as conferring rights on its citizens, including 
multicultural rights.
 Nationalism posed problems of ethnic and religious identity for 
a number of the protagonists featured in the chapters that follow. As 
women they also found that gender was added to the mix, and their 
lives reveal considerable tension at times between the social construc-
tion of gender and the obligations they felt they owed to the nation. 
Th e notion of modernity and the need for nationalists to come to 
terms with it emerged early in the history of Southeast Asian nation-
alist movements. Ideals associated with both modernity and national-
ism, such as equality and personal autonomy, challenged practices of 
traditional politics as well as well-established gender relations and the 
vested interests associated with those practices. How compatible with 
a modern nation, therefore, were customary approaches to gender 
relations? Did a modern nation confer equal rights on men and 
women? What role were women to play in nationalist movements? 
While some women expected that a modern nation would open new 
doors to them, men  —  and other women  —  were not always so ready 
to welcome social transformation. Should that transformation have been 
deferred until aft er national independence was won? Or, alternatively, 
was it acceptable for women to undertake unconventional roles during 
the struggle for independence but once that goal was achieved to 
retreat back to what were considered to be “normal” gender relations 
in that society? As we shall see, women have had to engage with 
diff erent answers to these questions in Southeast Asia.
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Th e Signifi cance of Gender in Southeast Asian 
Nationalist Movements
For Southeast Asians, being seen as a nationalist, at least within the 
dominant group, has oft en been a way of acquiring prestige  —  and it 
may even be a path to power. In Southeast Asia in the past, nationalist 
movements have been viewed in a romantic light as struggles against 
imperialism, and many people associated with such movements have 
been elevated to the position of national heroes. Th ey are seen as the 
founders of the nation-states of Southeast Asia today, since all the 
countries of the region, barring Th ailand, were colonised by Western 
powers (Dutch, English, French, Spanish, Portuguese and American). 
Th ey won their independence aft er World War II, during which the 
whole of the region was occupied by another colonial power, the Japa-
nese. Th e leaders (usually male) of the winning form of nationalism 
were seen in the most positive light, and it is interesting to see what 
share of that hero worship was bestowed upon women and why.
 Some decades aft er independence, however, nationalism has been 
viewed more ambivalently, for several reasons. First, the much vaunted 
struggle for independence was followed by far less heroic years in 
which several Southeast Asian countries, led by famous nationalists 
such as Sukarno of Indonesia, did not live up to the expectations of 
those who had sacrifi ced themselves for the sake of independence. 
Serious reassessment of the longer-term outcomes of nationalist move-
ments began. Most relevant to this work, questions such as “What has 
independence done for women?” began to be asked. Minority ethnic 
groups oft en also felt that independence had favoured majority groups 
and neglected their interests. Even at the stage of anti-colonial strug-
gle, and certainly once the goal of nationhood had been achieved, 
questions arose about the rights of citizens, about the kind of nation 
that should command loyalty. Looking back to the anti-imperialist 
nationalist movements themselves, can we fi nd the roots of those 
problems in the ways those movements treated women (and minority 
ethnic groups)? In the case of women, did the movements campaign 
for the recognition of women’s rights before independence? If so, to 
what eff ect? Our book will pursue such questions.
 A second reason for the growing ambivalence about nationalism 
is that some Southeast Asian governments have used nationalist his-
tory for their own purposes, which has served to discredit it, or at 
least to discredit the offi  cial version. Authoritarian regimes in Burma, 
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Indonesia, Vietnam and elsewhere have instilled a particular interpre-
tation of their nationalist movements in their people, with carefully 
selected national heroes. Such offi  cial versions of history have largely 
ignored women, or presented only a few sanitised female nationalists 
for public consumption. Th is has done a disservice to the pluralism of 
most nationalist movements and the role of women in them.
 Th ird, nationalist movements did not disappear once the new 
Southeast Asian countries took form aft er the Western colonial 
powers withdrew. Th e region, one of the most diverse in the world, 
is well-known for continuing separatist movements driven by ethno-
nationalism, as various ethnic groups seek to carve out nation-states 
for themselves. Burma is the country most aff ected: groups such as 
the Shans, Karens and Chins claimed the right to their own states 
separate from the Burman majority. In Indonesia, East Timorese, 
Acehnese and Papuan struggles for independence from Jakarta’s rule 
have proved to be “pebbles in the shoe” of government, as an Indo-
nesian foreign minister once put it. In Th ailand and the Philippines, 
Muslim minorities have kept up resistance struggles for independence. 
Nationalism has thus turned to bite the nationalists, who have in 
turn been accused of behaving as colonialists. Since many of these 
separatist movements have involved armed struggle, they pose parti-
cular issues in relation to gender: what place do they accord to 
women, and how have women been involved in practice?
 A fi nal reason for the recent growing scepticism about nationalism 
is that some separatist movements have been associated with Islam 
and have featured in the international discourse on the “war against 
terror”. Th e Moro liberation struggle in the southern Philippines is the 
best-known of these Islamist rebellions, but the Pattani movement in 
Southern Th ailand and Acehnese separatists in Indonesia have been 
tarred with the same brush. Just as to French colonialists in Vietnam 
nationalists were terrorists, so now in other parts of Southeast Asia 
nationalists who might once have been seen as freedom fi ghters are 
now regarded much more suspiciously. Since Islamist movements are 
particularly male-dominated, the role of women within them is espe-
cially problematic.
 Th us, analysts of Southeast Asian political history are forced to 
grapple with diff erent views of nationalist movements. In this volume 
we take an inclusive approach, accepting that nationalist movements 
are of many kinds and are not limited to the colonial period. In some 
cases Communist movements can be considered nationalist, if they 
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claim to liberate the nation from colonial/imperialist/neo-colonial 
domination and if their followers see them in that light. Religion too 
may be inextricably entwined with nationalist aspirations. Our book 
features women who have been involved in nationalist movements of 
diff erent kinds and at diff erent periods, thus allowing us to explore 
the signifi cance of these variations for our subjects. Obviously an early 
20th-century struggle against colonialism occurred in a very diff erent 
context from a current ethno-nationalist struggle in a world that is 
wary of the destabilising eff ect of ethno-nationalism but embraces a 
belief in human rights. What particularly interests us is how women 
have perceived nationalism in its various manifestations, and how they 
have negotiated the mixed agendas that nationalist movements adopt 
and the mixed reactions they receive internationally. Conversely, how 
have those movements treated the women in their ranks? Do diff erent 
kinds of movements take diff erent views of gender relations, and how 
do they constrain or direct the way women act within them?
 Th e notion of “movement” deserves further clarifi cation, parti-
cularly as it aff ects women. A nationalist movement is a particular 
form of social movement (that is, it consists of a collectivity of some 
sort working to promote change) that makes a claim for territorial 
sovereignty.3  While social and political movements have a core of 
leaders and formal organisations, the notion of “movement” implies 
something wider, encompassing a mass base. Th e base includes adher-
ents undertaking many roles, including attending rallies, raising funds 
and providing other material support, and spreading the movement’s 
ideas through the media or in schools, families and community 
groups. When we consider women’s roles, it is especially necessary 
to take this wider view of nationalist movements. It is usually male 
leaders and male-dominated nationalist parties that monopolise atten-
tion, yet women may play very diverse and essential supportive and 
even innovative roles.4 
Th e Biographical Approach
Taking a biographical approach to women’s roles in nationalist move-
ments allows us to see the true diversity and importance of women’s 
contributions, and the impact of those movements on the lives of 
individuals. Contributors to this volume were asked to write chapters 
exploring views and roles of the chosen women as actors in the 
nationalist movement rather than full biographies.
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 In Southeast Asia there are very few biographies of women 
nationalists. In some countries, such as Indonesia, selected individuals 
are designated as offi  cial National Heroes, whose lives, in very abbre-
viated and sanitised form, are celebrated and studied by school-
children. A small minority are women. In large part this is due to 
a restricted identifi cation of nationalist movements with leaders and 
formal parties, which, as already stated, are almost entirely dominated 
by men. Until fairly recently, moreover, Southeast Asia lacked a strong 
biographical tradition, partly because it was unusual to single out 
individuals for attention as distinct from the collectivity to which they 
belong  —  the kinship, religious group or ethnic group. In the past 
autobiographies were even rarer, for similar reasons.5  With the expan-
sion of the publishing industry in the region biographies are now 
quite popular, but they still rarely feature women as nationalists. Our 
contributors will say more about their countries’ historiography in 
relation to women nationalists.
 Th is book presents a number of examples of women in nationalist 
movements and asks various questions about them, intended to illu-
minate their experiences and signifi cance. Why did they identify with 
a nationalist movement, and what did nationalism mean to them? 
Th e intention is to probe the origins of their identifi cation with the 
nationalist movement, with its gendered dimension. If the nation was 
an “imagined community”, and undoubtedly in many Southeast Asian 
countries the very notion of nationhood had to be invented from 
scratch, how did women imagine it? How were they aff ected by the 
gendered ideas of their nationalist movement, for instance the notion 
that women were guardians of tradition? Did they attempt to include 
the rights of women within the agenda of their nationalist movement 
—  and if so, to what eff ect? What were the cultural, social and poli-
tical factors that made them more or less successful? Did women 
nationalists tend to come disproportionately from particular social 
classes and ethnic groups? What role did modern education play in 
their attraction to nationalism, as against, for instance, the infl uence 
of friends and family? Our authors address such questions.
 A distinct advantage in taking a biographical approach is that 
it enables us to escape the more common focus on “how nationalist 
movements envisage gender relations”, in which women are treated as 
objects of nationalist discourse, which in turn is dominated by men.6  
We concentrate on individual women as actors carving out their 
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own niche in nationalist movements. Of course there are restrictions 
imposed on them by the gendered nationalist discourse, but in sur-
prisingly many cases these women manage to evade or circumvent the 
restrictive impact of such discourse. How do these women deal with 
it? If the perceived bias of nationalist discourse on gender is reinforced 
by dominant religious or ethnic norms, is it insurmountable, or does it 
unexpectedly off er new opportunities for some women? By examining 
the agency of these women, we gain a sense of the constraints posed 
by the wider social and political structures on them, and what it was 
like to live in their given time and space. Th e particularity of their 
experience of struggle in their movement enriches our understanding 
of the spectrum of possible responses improvised or devised by these 
women within their respective socio-cultural contexts. Insofar as our 
knowledge of women’s role in some of the nationalist movements 
remains defi cient, the lives of these women off er us illustrative  —  if 
not always representative or comprehensive  —  cases of their gendered 
experience.
 Th e unifying theme among these women is their participation in 
the struggle for national autonomy. Yet the nationalist organisations 
they joined oft en competed with alternative ones in the same time and 
place. Th rough the life histories of the women, we wish to explore 
the statement made by Ranchod-Nilsson and Tétreault that “there is 
no single ‘woman’s view’ of the nation” and that “there is no un-
ambiguous ‘woman’s side’ in nationalist confl icts”.7 
 Th ose who recognise that nationalist discourse is gendered in 
ways that privilege men oft en resent women’s “exploitation” by nation-
alist movements. Th ey inveigh against the ways in which women are 
used and then cast aside once independence is achieved.8  Th is may 
or may not correspond with the subjective views of women actors in 
nationalist movements. Like Marxists criticising conservative workers 
as having false consciousness, there is among some feminists a view, 
going back to the famous 1938 pronouncements of Virginia Woolf,9  
that women are deceived by nationalism and should rather be fi ghting 
for their own rights, which nationalist leaders have no intention of 
recognising. On the other hand, Jill Bystydzienski argues that nation-
alism has “empowered millions of women. It has created pride in 
indigenous cultures, a demystifi cation of innate superiority of foreign 
oppressors, and a recognition of community.”10  Moreover, a book 
edited by Lois West (1997) argues that there can be such a thing 
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as “feminist nationalism”, which combines the struggles for women’s 
rights with the right to national self-determination. By taking a bio-
graphical approach, we want to understand women’s political involve-
ment from their own perspective. Did they feel “used”? Alternatively, 
did they themselves personally benefi t from their involvement in a 
nationalist movement? How did they understand the meaning of their 
engagement and experiences? How did they exercise their agency as 
social actors in their own right? Did they manage to pursue women’s 
rights within the nationalist movement, producing a kind of “feminist 
nationalism”? If so, were they able to infl uence the male-dominated 
mainstream nationalist movement? Each contributor applies her per-
spective as a scholar to assess these issues in relation to the experience 
of the woman in question.
 In her pioneering work on feminism and nationalism, based on 
Th ird World country studies, Kumari Jayawardena has critiqued the 
limitations of feminist struggles fought in the context of bourgeois-
led nationalist movements. She observes that women’s struggles were 
destined to be “subordinate to the political struggle and to the male 
groupings in political parties”.11  On the other hand, she is more posi-
tive towards “revolutionary movements” involving female peasants and 
workers, which were able not only to transform society but also to 
improve the position of women.12  Our studies include women who 
operated within both “bourgeois-led” and “revolutionary” nationalist 
movements, so we are in a position to test the validity of Jayawardena’s 
distinction, at least as it relates to some individuals’ experiences. 
Obviously we need to be cautious and discerning in treating their ex-
perience as representative of other female colleagues. Th ere is nothing 
like biography for making one aware of how special every human 
being is, and our chapters certainly reveal a collection of extraordinary 
women.
 Another attribute of nationalist movements that may well be 
pertinent for gender relations is the salience of armed struggle. Th ere 
is certainly a case for arguing that nationalist movements that pre-
dominantly pursue violent methods are least likely to give prominence 
to women and their concerns. Cynthia Enloe has stated that “milita-
rization puts a premium on communal unity in the name of national 
survival, a priority which can silence women critical of patriarchal 
practices and attitudes”.13  Yet those who take up arms for the nation 
are oft en later treated as heroes, so this may be a route to national 
recognition for those women who become combatants. Our book 
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contains examples of women who have actively participated in armed 
struggles, so we are in a position to discover how such nationalist 
movements have treated them.
 Th is treatment relates also to the way in which history has 
treated women nationalists more generally. Have their contributions 
been recognised? If so, how, and if not, why not? As we shall see in 
the chapters that follow, although women have received little attention, 
there are some exceptions  —  and it is instructive to account for them 
too. Th ey shed light on the continuing nationalist discourse, the 
shaping of citizens’ thinking about gender and nation.
Why Is Southeast Asia of Interest?
Colonialism shaped Southeast Asian nationalist movements. Its impo-
sition of new state borders helped homogenise some ethnic groups 
into new nation-states (what Anthony Reid has called “imperial 
alchemy” 14 ) and antagonised others, oft en with lasting eff ects. Th e 
region thus includes many ethnic groups that almost miraculously 
came to identify with a nation that had never existed previously, and 
ethnic groups that were excluded or did not wish to be part of the 
new nation. Our authors provide examples of women who followed 
both routes.
 As already noted, little has been written about women in South-
east Asian nationalist movements, despite the ubiquitous and diverse 
nature of those movements in the region. Th is neglect is surprising 
too in view of the common assumption of historians and anthropolo-
gists that women have had a high status in Southeast Asia, especially 
when compared to other regions of Asia where there have been egre-
gious instances of discrimination against women (such as foot binding 
in China and widow burning in India). In large part this positive 
impression is based on economic factors. Visitors to Southeast Asia 
have long noted the way in which men and women work side by side 
in the fi elds and women dominate local markets and petty trade (Reid 
1988).15  Th e idea that women are the fi nancial managers of the house-
hold is widely accepted in the region. Anthropologists16  also refer to 
kinship systems as accounting for the greater autonomy of women: the 
prevalence of bilateral kinship and neolocal or matrilocal marriages 
strengthens women’s position in relation to in-laws and provides 
support in cases of marital discord or break-up. Th e high incidence 
of divorce in Islamic Southeast Asia is sometimes interpreted as evi-
dence of the independence of women.17 
Intro (1-22)   9 7/10/13   2:11:14 PM
10 Susan Blackburn
 Yet it is obvious that such evidence of women’s relatively high 
status in Southeast Asia does not translate into political prominence. 
Women may be very visible publicly in the economic and social 
spheres, but in politics women have been as under-represented in 
Southeast Asia as in most parts of the world, despite a few high-profi le 
women leaders such as Corazon Aquino, Megawati Sukarnoputri and 
Aung San Suu Kyi. As in other regions, politics is seen as a man’s 
domain. Of particular interest, then, is the involvement of women 
in nationalist movements, an overtly political activity. Taking a bio-
graphical approach, as our contributors do, sheds light on the way 
in which individual women negotiate these tensions. It may also help 
us to understand why women are frequently overlooked as part of 
nationalist movements, since their roles are oft en not interpreted, by 
themselves or others, as being political. Th ey are presented rather 
as being involved in women’s movements or religious or social 
movements, which are not seen as connected to the nationalist move-
ment. In the following chapters we will see that this is oft en far from 
the truth.
 Scholars have oft en grappled with the vexed question of what 
shapes Southeast Asia as a region. Th e question is particularly diffi  cult 
to answer because of the ethnic and religious diversity of Southeast 
Asia, its fragmented past, and the way in which its nations have been 
shaped and divided by colonialism. While the “status of women” factor 
is held up as a regional indicator, this too can be questioned. Our 
contributors illustrate considerable diversity in relation to women’s 
roles in nationalist movements.
Our Choice of Subjects
Th e biographical study of Southeast Asian women is in its infancy. 
In inviting people to contribute to this book we could not call on 
scholars who had written biographies of women nationalists, for we 
knew of none. Rather, we were limited to our knowledge of people 
who had studied both Southeast Asian women and nationalist move-
ments. We aimed to include a range of countries, types of nationalist 
movements, and women who had diff erent roles in those movements. 
Th is avoids the “celebratory” style that assumes that anyone who 
participated in a nationalist movement is to be admired for their loft y 
goals and self-sacrifi ce. We are more interested in how (and why) 
individual women thought and acted. Th e resulting stories are bound 
to be as diverse as individuals are. Th ese are people who identify not 
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just with their nation’s cause but with other competing identities such 
as member of a particular ethnic or religious group, mother, wife, 
daughter, and worker. Over their lifespan they may feel pulled in dif-
ferent directions. One woman’s life obviously cannot give rise to new 
generalisations, but it may challenge some already in vogue.18  Th is 
publication is just the fi rst step towards what we hope to stimulate: 
a much more substantial exploration of women’s roles in nationalist 
movements in Southeast Asia. Our aim is to gain insights and raise 
new questions for further research.
Th e Chapters
Each chapter of the book focuses on one or a maximum of two 
women active in nationalist movements, covering the whole of the 
region with the exception of Th ailand, Singapore, Cambodia and 
Brunei. Although nationalism certainly exists in all of the countries we 
have omitted, we knew of no one able to write a biographical study 
of a woman in those countries who could be said to have taken a role 
in a nationalist movement. Th e omission is again indicative of the 
early stage such studies are at.
 Th e order of the chapters is roughly chronological, depending on 
the period in which the woman was active. In total, they illustrate 
women’s activities in nationalist movements ranging from the 1920s 
to the present day. Although it may well be possible to group our 
chapters in some other way, such as according to women who resorted 
to violent methods of pursuing nationalist goals as against those who 
took more moderate paths, there are advantages in taking a chrono-
logical approach. Earlier nationalist movements in Southeast Asia 
were aimed at ending European colonial rule, which gives the women 
actors of this period some things in common, such as their responses 
to modern education, which was new to the region at that time. In 
recent times nationalist movements have encountered a very diff erent 
international environment, with greater support for movements such 
as those in East Timor and Burma, which can make a case for sym-
pathy on human rights grounds. Moreover, the source materials for 
writing about women in the earlier period are rather diff erent from 
those of the later chapters. Our authors have not had the chance to 
interview women subjects who are no longer alive, whereas the last 
three chapters of the book make ample use of contemporary inter-
views, especially those conducted by the authors. Indeed, the issue of 
sources in writing biographies is a controversial one in its own right, 
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and our authors have had to wrestle with the limitations of their 
sources, as I will comment in my summary of the chapters that follow.
 In the fi rst chapter, Chie Ikeya has chosen to write about Daw 
San, one of Burma’s best-known women nationalists, who was active 
in the anti-colonial movement in that country from the 1920s to the 
1950s. Her education, based both in Buddhist Burmese tradition and 
in British schooling, clearly raised many tensions that she worked 
through in a strongly nationalist way. Claiming to be committed to 
both nationalism and feminism, Daw San (1887–1950) was a well-
known journalist and editor, and a leader in women’s organisations of 
the time. In her latter role she had links with the nationalist move-
ment in adjacent India, since Burma was treated as part of Britain’s 
South Asian empire: the Indian example provided her with inspiration. 
Th e nationalist movement in which she participated was the main-
stream movement that gave rise to the fi rst government of the inde-
pendent nation in 1948. Nevertheless, she has received almost no 
offi  cial recognition for her activities. In this way her treatment has 
been very similar to that of Suyatin Kartowiyono in the following 
chapter on Indonesia. As a writer, Daw San has left  a good legacy 
for historians such as Chie Ikeya, and her publications make clear 
her identifi cation with the Buddhist Burman ethnic majority and her 
lack of sympathy for the minority ethnic groups that splintered the 
nationalist movement in Burma. In this way the chapter on Daw San 
forms a background to the later one on Zipporah Sein, which presents 
the viewpoint of the Karen nationalists who found they could not live 
in a Burman-dominated country.
 In the following chapter, Micheline Lessard focuses on Nguyen 
Th i Giang (1906–30), a member of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party 
in the 1920s. Th e party modelled itself on the Chinese Nationalist 
Party (Guomindang) of the time, and was best known for its organisa-
tion of the failed Yen Bay Mutiny in 1930. Nguyen Th i Giang played 
a remarkably prominent role in preparations for that mutiny, aft er 
which she committed suicide. She suff ered a double eclipse in Vietna-
mese historiography: not only was she a woman in a country where 
women’s political activities have received little recognition, but she 
supported a party that represents a historical failure, since the Com-
munist Party subsequently dominated the Vietnamese nationalist 
movement and has written its history as the winner. For these reasons, 
and because Nguyen Th i Giang lived under a harsh French colonial 
regime that made secrecy imperative for nationalists, very little is 
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known about her and Lessard has had to reconstruct a biography 
largely from French colonial sources, involving much “reading against 
the grain”. As a result there are gaps in our knowledge about Nguyen 
Th i Giang’s social background (we know little more than that she was 
from the majority Kinh ethnic group and came from the rural north 
of the country) and about her views on gender relations, and it is 
diffi  cult to probe her motivation for taking the risks she did in joining 
a radical nationalist organisation. Nevertheless, there is no doubt 
about her courage and her passionate opposition to foreign domina-
tion. At that time, Vietnamese nationalists had little choice but to 
take risks.
 Suyatin Kartowiyono (1907–83), the subject of my chapter, off ers 
the historian a unique source: she is the only Indonesian woman to 
have written an autobiography about her political activities. It is an 
engaging document that reveals her as a strong-minded feminist who 
nevertheless chose to keep her private life largely out of sight. Th is 
and other writings by Suyatin provide good evidence that she saw 
herself as a nationalist just as much as a leader of the women’s move-
ment, which is how she is now remembered, if at all. Being a Muslim 
Javanese, from the largest ethnic and religious group in Indonesia, 
Suyatin felt so confi dent in her ethnicity that she readily criticised 
what she saw as “feudalist” aspects of Javanese culture and took a 
sympathetic interest in other religions and cultures. Her tolerance and 
openness could be seen to result not only from her European-style 
education but also from a lack of dogmatism in Javanese religious 
tradition. By implication, she preferred to envisage a nation that would 
recognise the rights of people of many diff erent backgrounds, and 
subsequently she was disillusioned with the shape the nation took 
under autocratic leadership. As a secular nationalist, she strongly sup-
ported the anti-colonial movement in Indonesia and helped organise 
women to provide food to pro-Republican forces and their families 
during the Revolution of 1945–49. Although the subsequent history 
of Indonesian nationalism has been dominated by the viewpoint of 
secular nationalists, it has taken a narrow perspective focusing on 
male-dominated nationalist parties and has ignored the sacrifi ce and 
contribution made by the women’s movement and its leaders such 
as Suyatin. Aft er independence Suyatin played an important role in 
literacy campaigns in Indonesia and as a leader of women’s organisa-
tions, but never sought to enter political life.
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 Rasuna Said (1910–65), the subject of Sally White’s chapter, was 
a contemporary of Suyatin in the Indonesian anti-colonial movement. 
She was exceptional in becoming a leading fi gure in a radical male-
dominated Islamic nationalist party (Permi) in the 1930s, the fi rst 
woman to be tried and jailed by the Dutch colonial authorities for 
her defi antly anti-imperialist speeches. Th e reasons for her prominence 
are interesting and include her ethnic background (she was a Minang-
kabau from the strongly Islamic and yet matrilineal society of West 
Sumatra). Th e religious and political ferment in West Sumatra in the 
early 20th century inspired her, like a number of prominent male 
leaders, to join the nationalist movement. Having entered the political 
arena, she went on to become a member of parliament aft er indepen-
dence. In Indonesian historiography these events have earned her a 
place as an offi  cially recognised “National Hero”, ignoring some of 
her less orthodox activities relating to left ist politics and feminism. 
Rasuna’s overtly political career makes her biography diff erent from 
that of her compatriot, Suyatin. Unfortunately there is no autobio-
graphy or good biography of Rasuna Said, but her speeches, newspaper 
reports and colonial surveillance allow us to see the broad outline of 
her life, if not her private thoughts.
 Daw San, Suyatin and Rasuna all participated in nationalist orga-
nisations that gained independence for their countries and formed the 
new political establishment. Th e Philippine example brings us back to 
the realm of parts of a nationalist movement that “failed”, plunging 
their protagonists into obscurity. In this way Salud Algabre (1894–
1979), the subject of the chapter by Maria Luisa Camagay, has some-
thing in common with Nguyen Th i Giang in Vietnam. She was the 
only female member of the Sakdal, a peasant movement that chal-
lenged the mainstream nationalist movement in the Philippines by 
launching a peasant revolt in 1935 against US rule and the Philippine 
landlords who collaborated with the Americans. With the quick sup-
pression of the revolt, Salud and her fellow revolutionaries faded from 
historical memory, although Salud did not consider their struggle 
as futile, as revealed in two lively interviews with her later in life. 
(Unlike Nguyen Th i Giang, she had the advantage of experiencing a 
much more lenient form of colonialism, and she had a long, if ob-
scure, life aft er independence.) From central rural Luzon, the main 
island of the Philippines, she does not appear to have thought about 
other ethnic groups: she identifi ed herself with the modern secular 
nationalist movement that began in Luzon in the 19th century and 
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with which her family had been involved. But her family’s loss of land 
infl uenced her to side with the peasant class, thus alienating her from 
mainstream nationalist leaders in the Philippines. Th e scant evidence 
we have reveals nothing about her views on gender relations, although 
she herself was obviously very independent-minded and had recog-
nised leadership qualities.
 Moving southwest of the Philippines, we have two chapters 
focusing on women who took part in anti-British nationalist move-
ments in the part of the world we now call Malaysia. Th ere was never 
a Malaysian nationalist movement, but there were separate nationalist 
movements in the components that came to make up that federation 
in 1963. Focusing on British Malaya (now West Malaysia), which in 
1957 became the independent Federation of Malaya, Helen Ting com-
pares two Malay women, Shamsiah Fakeh (1924–2008) and Aishah 
Ghani (1923–2013), who came from similar backgrounds but ended 
up in diff erent streams of the Malayan nationalist movement. Both 
their families sent the girls to get a Muslim education in neighbouring 
Sumatra, where their story overlaps with that of Rasuna Said, since 
they went to the same school at which she taught and which in-
fl uenced both of them in their opposition to colonialism. Shamsiah 
Fakeh started her political career with the left -wing Malay Nationalist 
Party and then switched to the Malayan Communist Party, joining an 
all-Malay regiment in the jungle when the party was outlawed by the 
British. While Aishah Ghani also briefl y joined the Malay Nationalist 
Party, she subsequently shift ed to the conservative United Malays 
National Organisation and became the leader of its women’s wing 
aft er independence. Clearly they had diff erent conceptions of what an 
independent Malayan nation should be like, particularly in relation 
to the place of non-Malays. Th e chapter uses published memoirs and 
interviews with both women to unravel why they took divergent paths. 
Fortunately these sources also enable us to perceive their views about 
gender relations within the nationalist movement. Given the unsuc-
cessful armed struggle of the Malayan Communist Party, Shamsiah 
was relegated to the margins of Malaysian history, while Aishah re-
ceived little more recognition in male-dominated published accounts.
 While the political activities of Malay women on the peninsula 
are better known, Welyne Jeff rey Jehom’s chapter sheds light on the 
struggle of an unusual “Malay” woman who participated in the ob-
scure anti-cession movement in Sarawak in 1946, a movement that 
resisted the handing over of that territory by its White Rajah into 
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the hands of Britain aft er World War II. Lily Eberwein (1900–80), 
the subject of this chapter, was a leader of the women’s wing of the 
Malay party that championed this movement. She was special in being 
a Western-educated Eurasian who converted to Islam and adopted the 
Malay cause: her life suddenly changed aft er the death of her Eurasian 
father, and she began to identify with her Malay mother’s community. 
As an educated woman who worked in positions not previously taken 
by Malay women in Sarawak, she knew more about the world than 
most Malay women and was able to reach out to the Iban community 
for the cause. A lack of sources, common among supporters of “failed” 
movements, makes it diffi  cult to uncover Eberwein’s motivation and 
activities. Although we know little of her views, and she saw herself 
as an educationalist rather than as engaging in politics, she took on 
unconventional roles for a woman at that time and was perceived by 
others as a role model.
 Moving into the more recent period, Vatthana Pholsena presents 
two women who were active in the Pathet Lao guerrilla movement in 
its anti-imperialist struggle in Laos in the late 1950s to early 1970s. 
Manivanh (mid-1940s–2007) and Khamla (b. middle to late 1950s) 
belonged to ethnic minority groups but identifi ed with a nationalist 
and Communist cause dominated by the Lao majority. Th ey make an 
interesting case of how the mainstream nationalist movement treated 
ethnic minority women. Th e nationalist movement reached their 
remote mountain area because guerrilla leaders needed the coopera-
tion of ethnic minorities: the whole area became a war zone of stra-
tegic importance, leaving the minority villagers with few options. It 
appears that these young women joined the nationalist movement partly 
in the hope of gaining an education that was not available in their 
area, yet their years spent in guerrilla struggle equally deprived them 
of schooling. Aft er the victory of the Pathet Lao, the two women 
were expected to continue to work to retain the ethnic minority 
groups’ loyalty to the regime. Th e chapter is based on interviews 
with the two women, in which they had almost nothing to say about 
gender relations in the movement, partly because they were not ques-
tioned on the subject.
 Sara Niner also researched a woman involved in a guerrilla 
nationalist struggle, this time in East Timor (now offi  cially Timor-
Leste). Rosa de Camara (b. 1963), better known as Bisoi, was part 
of the armed movement from the 1970s to the 1990s. Like the two 
Laotian women of the previous chapter, she was from a poor, illiterate 
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rural background and was encouraged by her uncle to join the 
nationalist struggle. Although her cause triumphed in the winning of 
independence for East Timor, she was bitter at the lack of government 
recognition of and support for female armed combatants like herself. 
Th e chapter is largely based on interviews with Bisoi, who spoke 
frankly about the diffi  culties facing women in rural society, in the 
nationalist movement, and in post-independence Timor-Leste. Th ose 
who had been combatants had missed out on the education so impor-
tant for advancement.
 Finally, Ardeth Maung Th awnghmung and Violet Cho present a 
female leader of an ongoing nationalist struggle in Burma. Zipporah 
Sein (b. 1955) is the fi rst female general secretary of the Karen 
National Union, which has long waged an armed campaign for an 
independent Karen State. She comes from a prominent Karen rebel 
family, her father being one of the leaders of the armed movement, 
yet her own expertise has been mainly in education and in organising 
women. Using extensive interviews with Zipporah, this chapter sheds 
light on the challenging task of reorientating a movement in view 
of changing international and national environments. Unlike anti-
colonial movements of the early 20th century, the Burmese opposition 
movement has found some degree of support internationally, due 
to the widespread condemnation of the oppressive behaviour of the 
Burmese junta, yet few outsiders are willing to condone armed resis-
tance. Th e international community off ers support for diplomatic 
negotiation and gender equality, which has favoured Zipporah Sein. 
Th e chapter illustrates well the problems faced by a female civilian 
leader in a movement dominated by soldiers, and investigates the 
reasons why Zipporah took on this challenge. With this last bio-
graphical study we have returned full circle to Burma, a nation riven 
by competing nationalisms. While the nationalist movement that Daw 
San joined had no place for female leaders, by the 21st century it 
was possible for a woman to become a leader of the Karen nationalist 
organisation that had long conducted an armed struggle for indepen-
dence from Burma.
 Th us, our chapters cover 12 women from 7 diff erent countries 
and 9 ethnic groups and from diff erent religions (Muslim, Buddhist 
and Christian). Th eir ethnicity and religious affi  liation in most cases 
strongly aff ected their vision of the nation. While most of them were 
from moderately well-to-do families and received a modern education, 
the women from Laos and East Timor were exceptions. It is noticeable 
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that those from wealthier and better-educated backgrounds were able 
to play more prominent roles, while the uneducated were relegated 
to relatively subservient positions and were more susceptible to being 
discriminated against. Although they did not all join a nationalist 
movement from entirely patriotic motives, they soon became com-
mitted nationalists and their commitment dominated at least part of 
their lives. It is not possible to know whether all 12 women addressed 
gender issues in their nationalist movements: while a few of them 
(Daw San, Suyatin, Bisoi and Zipporah) openly embraced feminism 
and contested discrimination against women, others either identifi ed 
rather less strongly with the cause of women or had a very diff erent 
understanding about gender relations (Rasuna, Shamsiah and Aishah). 
In the cases of Nguyen Th i Giang, Salud Algabre, Lily Eberwein, 
Manivanh and Khamla, there is no evidence that they refl ected on 
what it meant to be a woman in a nationalist organisation. Th is may, 
of course, merely refl ect the lack of available data. Unless the source 
materials contained interviews that directly posed questions about 
gender, it is unlikely that some women would broach the topic.
 Six of the women joined armed resistance movements, which 
placed them at considerable risk: one lost her life in the course of the 
struggle. Th e other fi ve suff ered from spending years in the jungle: at 
the very least, their family life and education prospects were aff ected. 
Although the nationalist organisations that at least four of them 
joined cannot be said to have achieved their aims, there is no indica-
tion that these women regretted their involvement. Very few of them 
could be said to have gained personally from their involvement in 
a nationalist movement, and only one of them (Rasuna Said) has 
received offi  cial recognition for her contribution to a nationalist cause. 
Yet only Bisoi and Zipporah openly voiced complaints. Th ere may 
be a psychological dimension to this stoicism: perhaps the kind of 
woman who took the unusual and adventurous step of participating in 
a nationalist movement had a positive outlook on life that protected 
against disappointment.
 Because our chapters focus on individual women, it is hard to 
generalise from them about women’s participation in nationalist move-
ments. However, it is worth noting the diff erent capacities in which 
women participated. As mentioned before, social movements are broad 
and can accommodate many activities. In this book we fi nd women 
acting as journalists, members of clandestine armed organisations, 
leaders of women’s organisations, providers of support for armed 
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combatants, and leaders of mainstream nationalist parties. Armed 
confl ict, so oft en a reason for women taking on unconventional roles, 
proved very important in the recruitment of more than half of our 
subjects: Nguyen Th i Giang, Salud Algabre, Shamsiah Fakeh, Khamla, 
Manivanh, Bisoi and Zipporah. Some of them, such as Rasuna and 
Zipporah, gained considerable media attention for their nationalist 
roles; others worked in greater obscurity necessitated by state oppres-
sion or by male leaders or through their own choice. While they rarely 
claimed to be participating in politics, that is precisely what they were 
doing by joining the nationalist cause. Th us they have contributed 
their experiences to a neglected fi eld of study in Southeast Asian 
gender relations. Women may not have been so inactive in politics 
as is sometimes claimed: observers have just not been looking in the 
right places.
Conclusion
Th is introduction serves to raise questions that we have thought worth 
pursuing about women and nationalist movements. Why have women 
joined nationalist movements? How have they envisaged the nation? 
What roles have they played in nationalist movements? How have 
they negotiated gender relations within those movements? What have 
they gained or lost by such involvement? Because our contributors 
have been asked to address such questions from a biographical 
perspective, by the end of the book we will be in a position to draw 
together the diverse threads that emerge from an analysis of 12 lives. 
In the last chapter Helen Ting off ers some refl ections by way of the 
Conclusion, drawing out comparisons between the personal expe-
riences of the women into whose lives as nationalists we have gained 
some valuable insights.
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chapter 1
Th e Life and Writings of a 
Patriotic Feminist: Independent 
Daw San of Burma
Chie Ikeya
Introduction
Throughout Southeast Asia, the 1920s and 1930s witnessed a marked intensifi cation in reformist, anti-colonial and nationalist 
activities. In Burmese history this period of late colonialism marks 
a watershed, when disparate political developments  —  party politics, 
university boycotts, labour strikes and nonviolent protests  —  emerged 
to signify a new kind of nain ngan yay (politics) and the birth of the 
wunthanu (protector of national interests) movement. In 1920, a fac-
tion led by young members of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association 
(YMBA), the most famous and infl uential lay Buddhist organisation 
in colonial Burma,1  formed the General Council of Burmese Associa-
tions (GCBA), the fi rst organisation with explicitly political goals that 
focused on securing representative political rights. Within a few years, 
the GCBA had 12,000 branches throughout Burma.2  Buddhist monks 
also involved themselves in political activity and played a key role 
in the formation of wunthanu athin or village-level “patriotic associa-
tions” that advocated non-cooperation with the British government 
in various forms, such as refusal to pay taxes, defi ance of orders of 
the village headmen, boycott of foreign goods, and use of indigenous 
goods. Despite government attempts to suppress the activities of poli-
tical monks throughout the 1920s, wunthanu athin developed into 
infl uential political institutions in the countryside, as demonstrated by 
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the central role they played in the Saya San Rebellion of 1930–32, 
the largest peasant uprising in Burmese history.3  At the same time, 
left ist student activism in the 1930s led to the formation of Dobama 
Asiayone (Our Burma/Burmese Association), modelled aft er the Sinn 
Féin Party in Ireland.4  Th e Dobama Asiayone was known popularly as 
the Th akin Party, and members titled themselves thakin (master) as a 
symbol of the idea that the Burmese people, not the British, were the 
rightful masters of Burma and as an expression of their goal to trans-
form Burma into a classless society of only masters. Dobama Asiayone 
served as the umbrella organisation that linked the rapidly expanding 
number of nationalist youth groups in urban and rural Burma.
 Th e 1920s and 1930s also saw growing participation of Burmese 
women, for the fi rst time, in organised politics, university boycotts, 
labour strikes and anti-colonial protests. Yet, the nationalist meta-
narrative in Burma, written by and about leading nationalists (all 
men) who became elite political fi gures in independent Burma, has 
either ignored this or relegated the historical past of women to a foot-
note. While some accounts mention the participation of women in 
nationalist movements, they merely “insert” women into the national 
epic for the purpose of glorifying the anti-colonial struggle led by the 
Burma Independence Army, the predecessor of the current military 
regime.5  Such narrow analyses off er little, if any, insight into how 
women themselves experienced, perceived and shaped the political 
landscape of colonial Burma.
Daw San in the late 1940s. Photo from 
Sape Beikman 1967, p. 53
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 Th is chapter begins to fi ll this gap in the historiography of colo-
nial Burma by examining the relationship of one particular woman, 
Independent Daw San (1887–1950),6  to the Burmese nationalist 
movement. Th e founder and editor of the popular weekly newspaper 
Independent Weekly, published during the 1920s and 1930s, Daw San 
was a prolifi c writer known for political and social commentary. She 
was also a leading member of the Burmese Women’s Association, an 
elite women’s organisation established to reinforce the activities of the 
GCBA as well as to protect and advance the intellectual and spiritual 
growth and well-being of Burmese women. Th rough an analysis of her 
writings and her involvement in the Burmese nationalist and women’s 
movements, I explore how she viewed, experienced and articulated 
the complex relationship between feminism and nationalism. Th e 
mounting nationalist eff orts in the 1920s urged the participation of 
women in the anti-colonial movement, albeit in supporting roles.7  
Women’s associations were not autonomous but were subsidiary 
branches of the main political organisations under male leadership. 
Yet, the subsidiary position of a women’s group in a male-dominated 
nationalist movement should not lead us to underestimate the femi-
nist content of the women’s movement.8  In her examination of the 
relationship between nationalism and female subjectivities in early 
20th-century China, Joan Judge has shown that the conjoined nature 
of “the national question” and “the woman question” “enabled women 
to reposition themselves (or to be repositioned) in pre-existing webs 
of cultural relations”, even as this existing cultural matrix informed 
national feminine identities that were subsequently fashioned.9  For 
Daw San, also, the project of “protecting the interests of the nation” 
was inextricably intertwined with the “woman question”: her emanci-
pation from subordination within the patriarchal structure of family 
and society. Th e inseparability of the wunthanu and women’s move-
ments necessitated and facilitated her role simultaneously as a nation-
alist and a feminist.
Early Childhood and Education
“Daw San” was the pen name of Ma San Youn,10  who was born in 
February 1887 in Mandalay, just two years aft er the third and fi nal 
Anglo-Burmese War (1885) ended with the defeat of the last Burmese 
dynasty (Konbaung dynasty, 1752–1885), the exile of the last Burmese 
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Map 1.   Burma/Myanmar
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monarch and his immediate family to the western coast of India, the 
desertion and desecration of the royal palace in Mandalay, and the 
beginning of British colonial rule over Burma.11  (See map 1 for places 
mentioned in this chapter and in chapter 10.) Th e oldest of fi ve chil-
dren, Ma San Youn was born into a well-to-do family that specialised 
in the craft  of shwe chi hto or gold thread embroidery: tapestry fea-
turing gold, silver and coloured threads; sequins; semi-precious gems; 
and colourful cut glass. For generations, the family had produced 
intricate embroidered works including clothing and regalia for mem-
bers of the royal family, ministers and high-ranking offi  cials. Daw 
San’s mother, Daw Shu, grew up socialising with the children of the 
chief queen, which contributed signifi cantly to her knowledge and 
appreciation of Burmese and Buddhist literature. Wanting to raise her 
children to be similarly learned, Daw Shu instructed them extensively 
in grammar, traditional Burmese metaphysics, history, poetry and 
Buddhist scriptures since their early childhood. Daw Shu probably 
saw this Burmese Buddhist education as a necessary supplement and 
corrective to the formal education her children were receiving under 
the British.
 Over the course of the 19th century, Buddhist monastic schools 
gradually lost their prerogative as the chief providers of education; 
privately and governmentally supported lay and mission schools that 
off ered a vernacular, Anglo-vernacular and English co-educational 
system of public instruction increased in number.12  With the support 
of grants-in-aid administered by the colonial administration, Christian 
missionaries made headway especially in the area of female education, 
which Buddhist monastic schools in Burma did not provide.13  As a 
result, an unprecedented number of women gained access to educa-
tion, leading to a rise in female employment. Women employed in 
the professions of public administration, law, medicine, education and 
journalism increased by 33 per cent (from 17,760 to 23,588) during the 
1920s, with a notable 96 per cent increase (from 3,332 to 6,540) in 
the fi eld of medicine and 64 per cent increase (from 2,955 to 4,857) 
in the fi eld of education.14 
 Ma San Youn belonged to this rapidly expanding generation of 
educated women. She was enrolled in a vernacular school; and in 
1900, the year her father  —  U Pein  —  passed away from illness, she 
completed the seventh grade with honours. She was 15 years of age 
when she received a state scholar prize to attend the Morlan Lane 
Normal School in Moulmein and began her training to be a teacher 
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at the Christian school. Upon passing the teachers’ exam, she was 
assigned to a normal (teachers’ training) school in Toungoo to be a 
teacher of Burmese bādā (language and literature), a subject in which 
she excelled.
Becoming “Daw San”
Ma San Youn’s life in Toungoo had a promising start. Th ough she re-
ceived a meagre salary, teaching was clearly her passion and a source 
of joy. When she was approximately 20 years old, and aft er teaching 
at the primary level for three years, she was promoted to teach in 
the secondary grades. Ma San Youn met and married U Kywet, a 
fellow secondary grade teacher. By all accounts, the marriage was 
a happy one and the couple had one daughter and three sons. But 
the marriage was tragically cut short. Aft er the last child was born, 
U Kywet was transferred to administer a school in Singu. Not long 
aft er his move, he contracted malaria and passed away at the young 
age of 26. Ma San Youn’s grief over the loss of her husband was soon 
compounded by the death of her two younger sons barely a year 
aft er she was widowed. While mourning the death of her loved ones, 
Ma San Youn sought solace in writing, which led to her fi rst major 
publication, Khin Aye Kyi.
 Th e story, which was published in 1918 in Th uriya Magazine as 
the winner of the monthly’s short fi ction competition, is titled aft er 
its Buddhist heroine. In this semi-autobiographical story, Khin Aye Kyi 
is born to a wealthy Buddhist couple in Moulmein. When Khin Aye 
Kyi comes of age, the couple reluctantly enrol her in an American 
Baptist mission school, fearful on the one hand that their daughter 
will be converted to Christianity, but anxious on the other that she 
obtain an education. Fortunately, due to her Buddhist upbringing by 
her devout parents, the girl is not swayed by the proselytising eff orts 
of her missionary teachers. As in the case of Ma San Youn, Khin Aye 
Kyi completes the seventh grade shortly aft er her father, U Ee, passes 
away and goes on to attend a teachers’ training school where she 
specialises in Burmese bādā. She grows into a beautiful woman and 
a learned teacher single-mindedly committed to the teaching of bādā, 
the propagation of sāsana (teachings of the Buddha), and the educa-
tion of women. She remains utterly uninterested in love and marriage, 
until one day she narrowly escapes abduction by a lecherous man 
named Maung Pe Nyun thanks to her friend Maung Th ein Pe, who 
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has been courting Khin Aye Kyi unsuccessfully. Th e story concludes 
with Khin Aye Kyi’s happy marriage to Maung Th ein Pe, her saviour, 
with the blessings of her mother, Daw Kyi.15 
 Th is story, published under the pseudonym Buddha bādā myan-
mar ma (a Buddhist Burmese woman), encapsulates what turned out 
to be an important and lifelong cause for Ma San Youn: feminist 
nationalism. Th e story is about a “protectress of national interests” 
who believes that all Burmese people should respect and honour their 
bādā and sāsana as she does. It is no coincidence that at about this 
Burmese Nationalist Movement, 1917–49 
1917 Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) passes political 
 and anti-colonial resolutions
1919 Formation of Burmese Women’s Association (BWA), Young 
Women’s Buddhist Association (YWBA) and Wunthanu 
 Konmaryi Athin (Patriotic Women’s Association)
1920 Establishment of General Council of Burmese Associations 
 (GCBA); fi rst university boycott
1920s Proliferation of wunthanu athin (village-level patriotic 
associations)
1930 Formation of Dobama Asiayone; fi rst anti-Indian riots
1930–32 Saya San Rebellion
1936 Second university boycott
1937 Separation of Burma from India
1938 1300 Revolution; second anti-Indian riots
1939 Establishment of Communist Party of Burma (CPB)
1942–45 Japanese occupation
1945 Formation of Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL); 
British reoccupation of Burma
1946 CPB is expelled from AFPFL
1947 Panglong Agreement; assassination of Aung San; formation 
 of the Karen National Union (KNU)
1948 Burma gains independence from Britain; armed insurgency 
 by CPB; mutinies in the army
1949 Armed campaign for an independent state by KNU
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time, organised politics in Burma and the wunthanu movement were 
beginning to take shape, as in colonial Lanka, in the form of Bud-
dhist revivalist movements and the related campaign for Buddhist 
education.16  Just one year before the publication of Khin Aye Kyi, the 
YMBA passed resolutions of a political and anti-colonial nature that 
included, most famously, a strong protest against Europeans’ wearing 
shoes in pagoda precincts, contrary to Burmese custom.17  And only a 
few years thereaft er, the GCBA and its affi  liated women’s organisations 
urged women in Burma to defend the sāsana by abstaining from 
marrying non-Buddhist men. Th e wunthanu movement in Burma 
was formulated from the beginning for the protection and revival of 
Buddhism.
 Bādā also served as a rallying point for the “national education 
movement”  —  an outcome of the 1920 student strike at Rangoon 
University  —  to establish “national schools” as alternative and inde-
pendent educational institutions where “love of country and love of 
nation are no less assiduously cultivated and nurtured” through “the 
invaluable services of Burmese literature and Burmese history”.18  As 
the motto of the Dobama Asiayone shows, bādā continued to be a 
pillar of the wunthanu movement in the 1930s:
Burma Is Our Country
Burmese Is Our Literature
Burmese Is Our Language
Love Our Country
Cherish Our Literature
Uphold Our Language19 
Khin Aye Kyi was an early  —  perhaps the earliest  —  feminine model 
of wunthanu and dobama. It was not until the 1930s that the thakin 
articulated a coherent notion of the dobama; nor did discussions of 
the myo chit may (female patriot) become popular in the Burmese 
media until the late 1920s. Long before such feminine representations 
of patriotism emerged, Ma San Youn fashioned a “Buddhist Burmese 
woman” who cherished and loved the language, literature and religion 
of the Burmese people.
 It is worth stressing that in Khin Aye Kyi, Ma San Youn goes 
to great lengths to emphasise the necessary relationship between “the 
national” and “the woman’s” question. Accordingly, Khin Aye Kyi pro-
poses: “if women could contribute alongside men, but in their own 
and separate way, ideas, suggestions, and plans on how to make the 
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a myo (nation),20  bādā and sāsana prosper, then I don’t think Bur-
mese men would be oppressed and subjugated by the British.” Th e 
importance of female education to the nationalist struggle of colonial 
Burma was repeated again through Khin Aye Kyi’s father, U Ee, during 
a conversation with his wife about whether or not to enrol Khin Aye 
Kyi in the American Baptist mission school: “It’s because young women 
have little education that we Burmese people fi nd ourselves under 
colonial rule. Future generations of Burmese will be able to better 
govern society and the country if young girls like Khin Aye Kyi are 
given an education. You know very well why women are so impor-
tant right now.” Ma San Youn off ered the colonial experience of 
humiliation and subjugation as a painful but edifying lesson in the 
indispensability of female education, framing the issue of female edu-
cation in nationalist discourse. In this instance, the experience of 
colonisation was perceived to “enable women to doubt the hegemonic 
patriarchal discourse of their own society” and “lead to a desire to 
develop new possibilities”.21 
 To the extent that the “conditions of women” had become the 
scale for measuring the readiness of a country for national self-
determination, the gender disparity in literacy and education repre-
sented a national problem. Yet, to argue in 1918 that women needed 
to not only get educated but also educate others for the sake of the 
a myo was to take a radical stance. Here, the descriptive “a Buddhist 
Burmese woman” that Ma San Youn used to publish Khin Aye Kyi 
is instructive. Was the self-identifi cation as “a Buddhist Burmese 
woman” a strategy to defl ect criticism of the story  —  specifi cally, its 
determined promotion of the intellectual and vocational aspirations of 
young Burmese women  —  as the work of a Westernised woman who 
had been indoctrinated by a Christian and colonial modern education? 
Ma San Youn must have anticipated that her support for female edu-
cation might be construed as support for the Christian missionary 
and/or the colonial project. In all likelihood, she positioned herself as 
Buddhist and Burmese to contend with the question of whether she 
would be rendered a collaborator with the colonial project. Th e con-
sequence of this strategy, however, was the conjuring up of a limited 
community of “Buddhist Burmese” compatriots, which rendered the 
identifi cation by minority groups, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, 
problematic.
 Khin Aye Kyi was nothing short of groundbreaking. Th e acclaimed 
“patriot-writer” Saya Lun (1876–1964), for instance, wrote a lay gyo 
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(four-stanza poem) praising Ma San Youn as a rare literary genius 
who surpassed some of the most celebrated women court poets from 
the Toungoo and Konbaung periods. Such recognition by a man de-
scribed as “the single most revered literary fi gure in modern Burma” 22  
no doubt boosted Ma San Youn’s reputation as a woman of letters. Ma 
San Youn soon found herself writing short stories and essays regularly 
for Th uriya Magazine under the name “Daw San”.23 
From Daw San to Independent Daw San
Daw San’s entry into Burmese literary circles resulted in her second 
marriage  —  to somebody who had also lost a spouse, U Ba Th an, 
then an editor for Th uriya Magazine. In 1922, Daw San resigned from 
her teaching position in Toungoo and joined U Ba Th an in Rangoon 
(Yangon). Her decision to resign, remarry and relocate may have been 
facilitated by the fact that at around this time, the British administra-
tion issued a decree that all schoolteachers must apply for permission 
from the commissioner of education to write in newspapers and 
magazines. She chose to resign and to start a new life in Rangoon.
 Her second marriage lasted only a few years, due apparently to 
U Ba Th an’s alcohol addiction, and Daw San made yet another attempt 
at a fresh start. In 1925 she divorced U Ba Th an, moved with her 
children to a new home, and set up her own paper, tellingly named 
Independent Weekly. Daw San explains that the name of the paper, 
which was inspired by the Irish nationalist paper the Irish Independent, 
signifi ed her desire for Burma’s freedom but also her “determination 
to never return to the shackled life of a salaried worker or a married 
woman”.24  Th is rejection of colonisation, wage labour and matrimony 
as analogous forms of subjugation and exploitation presented a radical 
critique of marriage  —  which functioned in this context as a meta-
phor for gender norms and relations  —  at a time when the family and 
the home were still very much defi ned and naturalised as the primary 
responsibilities of a woman. Independent Weekly symbolised Daw San’s 
conjoined nationalist and feminist aspirations. Mirroring her endea-
vour to be independent, Daw San single-handedly ran the paper, not 
only authoring the editorials, headline news and all of its various 
columns, such as “Kwa Si e mhattan” (Mr Kwa Si’s Journal), “Ma 
Shwe e diary” (Miss Parrot’s Diary) and the ladies’ column “Yuwadi 
kye hmoun” (Young Ladies’ Mirror), but also managing the day-to-day 
operations of the press.
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 At about this time, Daw San also emerged as a leader of the 
fi rst women’s organisation in Burma, the Burmese Women’s Association 
(BWA), established in 1919.25  Th e BWA played a supporting role to 
the anti-colonial struggle of the GCBA. Critical of the British govern-
ment’s economic policy for undermining local industries and im-
poverishing the Burmese common folk, the GCBA advocated the use 
of local goods, the boycott of imported products, and the picketing 
of stores that sold imported items. Accordingly, the BWA condemned 
the use of imported goods and promoted wearing blouses made of 
pinni (light brown, homespun cotton) and longyi with local yaw de-
signs originating in the western hill tracts of Burma.
 In addition to discouraging Burmese women from marrying men 
of religious faiths other than Buddhism in the name of sāsana, the 
group campaigned assiduously for legislative reforms to ensure that 
a Burmese woman who married a non-Buddhist did not lose her 
Buddhist spousal rights. Th ough the Special Marriage Act of 1872 
provided the forms and procedures for Buddhists and non-Buddhists 
to contract valid marriages, women in such marriages were not pro-
tected under Burmese Buddhist law.26  As a result of the persistent 
lobbying by the BWA, the colonial government draft ed the Buddhist 
Marriage and Divorce Bill in 1927; and the BWA continued to push 
for the bill until it fi nally went into eff ect in 1939. Th e BWA was thus 
a protector not only of Buddhism but also of Burmese tradition. To 
signify their role as bearers and wearers of tradition, members of the 
BWA, including Daw San, wore scarves woven with a design of a 
peacock, the symbol of the last Burmese dynasty, on top of pinni and 
yaw longyi.
 Th e association was also an advocate of female education, believing 
that “women’s rights” had less to do with suff rage and more to do 
with education.27  In support of its educational mission the BWA 
opened a library  —  one of the few in the country  —  for its members 
immediately upon its inception.28  Aware of the reluctance of Burmese 
parents to send their adolescent daughters to school unaccompanied, 
the association advocated successfully for women-only sections in 
city trams for the transportation of female students to school. Daw 
San and other members of the BWA chaperoned young women to 
and from school in their endeavour to reassure wary parents and 
encourage them to allow their daughters to pursue higher education.29 
 Th at the feminist struggle was no less pressing than the wunthanu 
movement for Daw San is also clear from a 1927 demonstration in 
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support of women’s rights to vote and to stand for parliamentary elec-
tions that she led with Daw Mya Sein (1904–88), another prominent 
member of the BWA.30  On the morning of 3 February 1927, Daw San 
and Daw Mya Sein led a group of more than 100 women on the 
premises of the Rangoon Municipal Hall and the legislative council 
to show support for a proposal  —  scheduled to be debated in the 
council the same morning  —  to abolish “the sex-disqualifi cation 
clause” that prohibited women from running for parliamentary posts. 
Th e demonstrators shouted out the following chant:
Burmese women, don’t be afraid
Wait and see what will become of the act
Banning us women from ministerial positions
Burmese women, be watchful and active
In Britain, women have attained seats in the parliament.31 
Th is endeavour to engender legislative reforms might be attributed 
to similar initiatives of Burmese male politicians to establish a fi rm 
footing in electoral politics and to obtain greater Burmese representa-
tion in the legislative council. According to Daw Mya Sein, the women 
demonstrators were well aware that any attempt by Burmese women 
to be elected to the council would be construed as nationalist, but 
she stressed that the demonstrators objected to the sex-disqualifi cation 
clause primarily as feminists.32  As the protesters’ chant suggests, what 
prompted the demonstration were the concurrent struggles in England 
and India by women to remove sex disqualifi cation on voting and to 
attain posts in supreme legislative bodies. Th e demonstrators strove 
in unison with international feminist associations such as the Inter-
national Alliance of Women for Suff rage and Equal Citizenship and 
the British Commonwealth League, which urged the British govern-
ment “on behalf of the women of the Empire” to grant Burmese 
women the right to run in elections for the legislative council.33 
 Th e connection between these early women’s movements in 
Burma and similarly urban, elite and middle-class international 
feminist movements is not surprising given that the 1920s and 
1930s represented “the high tide of internationalism” for the women’s 
movement.34  In fact, the 1927 demonstration was featured in Stri 
Dharma (Woman’s Duty), a well-known women-run journal in India 
that had emerged in the 1920s and 1930s as “an international feminist 
news medium targeted at Anglo-Indian, Indian, and British women 
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readers”.35  And, according to Daw Mya Sein, the 1927 demonstration 
had been sponsored by the National Council of Women in Burma 
(NCWB),36  which had a mixed membership of British, Indian, Anglo-
Indian, Anglo-Burmese and Burmese women, of which Daw San was 
also a member. Established in 1926 and led by mostly British women, 
the NCWB was an affi  liate of the National Council of Women in India 
and a local branch of the International Council of Women, which 
claimed to represent 36 million women by 1925.37  What little docu-
mentation exists on the NCWB indicates that it was concerned with 
improving the lives of women and child labourers in Burma in 1929, 
well before thakin and other politicians turned their attention to the 
plight of the working class.38 
 Subsequently, in 1931, Daw San along with other Burmese mem-
bers of the NCWB formed the Myanmar Amyothami National Council 
(Burmese Women’s National Council), described by some scholars as 
a splinter organisation established by those who had “come to feel 
that the NCWB was too international in outlook, and did not ade-
quately address the nationalist aspirations of its Burmese members”.39  
Again, little is known about the goals and activities of the Myanmar 
Amyothami National Council apart from the fact that it contested 
writings on Burmese women in foreign newspapers that the council 
deemed harmful to Burmese women.40  According to Ba Khaing, the 
author of one of the earliest Burmese-language books to chronicle the 
history of nationalist movements in Burma, the members of the group 
were “wives of government offi  cers or wealthy men”, “out of touch with 
the ordinary women”, who refrained from political activities because 
they “could not aff ord to oppose the government”.41 
 Many aspects of Daw San’s involvement in local and translocal 
women’s movements would suggest that she was a conservative and 
elitist feminist. As the examples discussed above illustrate, Daw San’s 
role and authority as a pioneering leader of women’s movements 
seems to have rested on the suff ering and then salvation of exploited 
and “helpless” women, not unlike British imperialist-feminists and 
Indian nationalist-feminists who endeavoured to rescue their power-
less  —  and mostly non-Western  —  sisters who suff ered from various 
forms of “enslavement” such as lack of education, employment in 
prostitution, polygamy, and child marriage.42  Yet her writings in 
Independently Weekly, which she continued to use throughout the 
1930s as a platform for participating in and supporting anti-colonial 
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and nationalist movements, demonstrate that she was a vociferous 
critic of both the “pro-government” and anti-government political 
elites in Burma.
 Th e editorial in the 29 June 1935 issue, for instance, discusses 
the well-known political feud among three prominent members of the 
legislative council43  and chastises council members for allowing poli-
tical infi ghting to hinder them from fulfi lling their duty to safeguard 
the welfare of their country and to assist the poor and the needy.44  
Th e column “Mr Kwa Si’s Journal” in the same issue of Independent 
Weekly similarly reinforced Daw San’s critique of the political elites, 
rebuking Burmese ministerial offi  cials for “not giving a damn about 
their poverty-stricken country men and women and their hardships. 
Instead, they are demanding a raise.” Mr Kwa Si compares the 
Burmese ministers to Mahatma Gandhi, describing the latter as “a 
true national leader” who does not spend more than 10 pya45  a day 
on himself and dedicates himself to the aff airs of his country, and 
concludes: “When people who emulate the likes of Gandhi appear 
in Burma, only then will our ministers feel ashamed of their own 
behaviour.” 46 
 In the editorial of 26 March 1938, devoted to a discussion of the 
Burma oilfi eld strike, Daw San again lambasted the ministers for their 
hypocrisy and lack of patriotism. Th e oilfi eld workers’ strike was the 
pivotal event in the “1300 Revolution”, the fi nal act in the political 
upheavals in pre-war Burma.47  It began in January 1938 with a strike 
by workers from the Burmah Oil Company in Chauk who were pro-
testing low wages and other oppressive measures taken by the oil 
companies. It culminated in a countrywide general strike by the entire 
workforce in Burma, with 34 concurrent strikes involving an estimated 
17,645 workers in foundries; dockyards; public transportation; civil 
service; and the oil, rice, cotton, match, rope and rubber industries.48  
Th e editorial sharply criticises the political leadership: “Th e ministers 
claim to sympathize with the plight of the oil fi eld workers as they 
[ministers] take their 15 kyat daily stipend, sit in cool meeting rooms 
under fans, and accuse the supporters of the strike for embezzling 
money that they collected on behalf of the poor strikers.” 49 
 Th e articles express Daw San’s frustration with the political elites, 
a feeling shared by many members of the Burmese public. As Robert 
Taylor points out, the majority of Burmese peasantry and youth be-
came increasingly disillusioned with and suspicious of the political 
elites and “did not look to the elected legislators as their leaders, 
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spokesmen or protectors”.50  Th e articles also show that far from being 
absorbed in elite and legislative politics that had little connection 
with  —  or signifi cance for  —  popular nationalist and labour movements, 
Daw San sought to make the government and the political elites ac-
countable to the masses.
More Trials and Tribulations
Daw San worked hard to keep Independent Weekly running. Initially, 
she insisted on managing the paper on her own. Her children recalled 
that they were basically raised by their maternal aunts while Daw San 
devoted herself to her paper and political activism.51  Th at Independent 
Weekly lasted for over a decade  —  a remarkable feat considering the 
speed and frequency with which papers came and went at the time 
—  attests to Daw San’s abilities both as an editor and a writer. Ill 
fortune struck, however, and her printing press was destroyed in 
the three-month-long anti-Indian riots of 1938.52  Independent Weekly 
never recovered.
 It was not until aft er World War II that Daw San resumed 
writing. Yuwadi Journal (Young Women’s Journal), a journal written, 
edited and managed entirely by women, was founded in 1946 by 
Dagon Khin Khin Lay (1904–81), a literary prodigy. Daw San was a 
founding member of the editorial board of Yuwadi Journal. She re-
vived the “Kwa Si” column for the journal, except she wrote as Daw 
Kwa Si or “Auntie Kwa Si” whereas she had previously written as 
Mr Kwa Si. Her continued dedication to the promotion of female 
education, authorship and readership is evinced not only by her con-
tributions to Yuwadi Journal, but also by her role as the vice-president 
of the Burmese Women Writers Association, another brainchild of 
Dagon Khin Khin Lay, established in 1947.53 
 Her writings in Yuwadi Journal show that Daw San remained 
deeply concerned about the fate of her country in the post-war years. 
She frequently urged the people of Burma to rally behind the cause of 
nation building and to ā masho, or “don’t let up”, so that “it shan’t be 
long before Burma gains independence”.54 
 Another recurrent theme in the “Auntie Kwa Si” column was 
that of national unity, the subject of the column published in the 18 
May 1947 issue. Daw San begins by referring to the looming partition 
of India. She explains that Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim 
League are talking of creating a Muslim nation called Pakistan because 
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they cannot agree with the visions and policies of the Indian National 
Congress, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, adding that “princes and rajas 
have joined the bandwagon and are asking for their own independent 
nation called Rajasthan”. Daw San notes that such talks of partition 
are not taking place in India alone:
In Kwa Si’s Burma as well, the Rakhines are saying that they don’t 
want to live alongside Burmans and are demanding an Arakanistan. 
Chins, Kachins, and Shans are already asking for the right to one 
day secede from an independent Burma and form their own states. 
And don’t even talk about the Karens. Th e Karens have already 
gone to Britain to ask for their own sovereign nation, Karennistan. 
Th e kabya (mixed population) too. Th ey cooperated with Burmans 
for independence, but on the eve of independence, they say they 
can’t mingle with Burmans, that they will live separately. Th ey have 
apparently already mapped out their own sovereign territory.55 
Ironically, the Panglong Agreement of 1947, which secured, in prin-
ciple, the allegiance of the leaders of the “hill tribes” and the Shan 
states to the Union of Burma and the Rangoon-based government led 
by the predominantly Burman Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League 
(AFPFL) under the leadership of Aung San, had been reached only 
a few months prior  —  in February. Nonetheless, and for reasons dis-
cussed in the chapter on the Karen nationalist Zipporah Sein in this 
volume (chapter 10), there was, on the one hand, enduring mistrust 
of minority ethnic groups as untrustworthy British collaborators and, 
on the other, a growing perception that the AFPFL had neither the 
willingness nor the capability to address the concerns of the ethnic 
minorities, particularly the Karen Christian community. Concurrently, 
the rivalry between the Communist and non-Communist leaders of 
the AFPFL only intensifi ed on the eve of independence. Not sur-
prisingly, Daw San warned that Burma was on the brink of disintegra-
tion: “If people here secede and people there secede, leaving Burma a 
tiny entity, and if that tiny Burma splinters into many separate asso-
ciations and societies that follow disparate goals and ideologies, then 
how can Burma have any strength left ?” According to her, the solu-
tion to political discord was not separation but cooperation; she was 
evidently reluctant or unable to envision a Burmese nation without 
the Shans, Karens and other indigenous ethnic groups.56  She remi-
nisced about times past when people in Burma “worked together in 
unison” to empower the nationalist movement. Having reminded her 
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readers of the political effi  cacy of unity and cooperation, she suggested 
that people in Burma would be better off  “splitting the gold instead 
of the land”.57  As it turned out, these were prescient warnings. Barely 
half a year aft er independence, the Burmese government was facing 
armed insurrections by the Communist Party of Burma and Karen 
separatist groups. (For a more extended discussion of the armed ethnic 
struggle in Burma, see chapter 10 by Ardeth Maung Th awnghmung 
and Violet Cho in this volume.) By 1949, more than half of the army 
had mutinied.
 Th rough the column “Auntie Kwa Si”, Daw San sought to impress 
upon her readers the exigency of nation-building eff orts and to edify 
the public on how to serve their country and fulfi l their patriotic 
duties. She likewise utilised her weekly talks on Burma Broadcasting 
Services  —  which she started in the late 1940s  —  to expound on 
urgent political and social issues raised by Burma’s independence. No 
doubt she would have carried on her lifelong endeavour to advance 
and “protect the interests of the nation” and her countrymen and 
women, had she not discovered that she had cancer. She was only 62 
years of age when she succumbed to the illness.
Refl ections on the Life of a Forgotten Heroine
Th e prominent writer Daw Khin Myo Chit has argued that it was due 
to the growth of nationalist movements “that women were encouraged 
to come out from the narrow precincts of their homes and contribute 
towards the national cause”.58  Nationalists in colonial Burma certainly 
encouraged Burmese women to contribute actively to public life, and 
many Burmese women did in fact do so, particularly through their 
participation in organised politics. Yet the growing visibility of politicised 
and organised women in colonial Burma must be understood as having 
been shaped by both wunthanu and feminist eff orts to mobilise women. 
Th ere is widespread belief even today that Burma has simply never needed 
feminism and that “no legislation in modern times has been considered 
necessary, as customary laws ensure for women a position suitable to 
present-day concepts of equality”.59  As this brief biographical account 
of Daw San has shown, contrary to such views, some people in Burma 
perceived the need to mobilise against gender discrimination and took 
organised action to intervene in the suff erings of Burmese women.
 Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that the wunthanu 
movement itself sought to alter the position of women. Scholarship 
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on Th ird World feminism has suggested that nationalism thwarted the 
feminist aspirations of women’s movements in the Th ird World and 
that although women’s movements in many Asian countries achieved 
offi  cial political and legal equality, they were unable to alter women’s 
subordination within the patriarchal structure of family and society.60  
Th e case of Burma reinforces this argument. Nevertheless, the task of 
spreading a feminist nationalist programme was paramount to many 
patriotic women such as Daw San. Members of the early women’s 
associations promoted liberal reforms such as female education and 
suff rage alongside political tactics that relegated women’s activism to 
morally bound and symbolic critiques of colonialism. Under the na-
tionalist banner, they pursued agendas that benefi ted Burmese women 
—  especially their less privileged Burmese sisters  —  and confi rmed their 
feminist identity. Daw San was a patriot and a feminist, jointly and 
simultaneously, and articulated her critiques of political, social and 
economic inequities and oppressions from the location of a femi-
nist nationalist.
 Despite her stature as one of the pioneering and leading women 
nationalists and rare women editors, and the staunch political and 
nationalist stance of her paper, barely a few references are made to 
Daw San in nationalist histories of Burma; and only a fraction of her 
voluminous writings has been preserved for posterity. Th e obvious 
explanation for this historical amnesia is what Barbara Andaya has 
described as the “hegemony of the national epic in Southeast Asian 
historiography”, a phenomenon that has privileged the writing of 
metanarratives that are centred around the lives of male individuals 
“to whom evolution or liberation from foreign control is attributed”.61  
Historians of Burma have accorded little importance to accounts by or 
about women, or to women’s and gender issues. I also suspect, how-
ever, that the reason behind the forgetting of Daw San concerns the 
fact that she was an unconventional woman who challenged existing 
gender norms and expectations and fl outed in many ways normative 
notions of femininity. She aspired to be an independent and autono-
mous woman, to such a degree that she renounced marriage. A single 
widow and divorcee without a college degree, and yet she dared to 
publicly criticise the exclusively male political elite.
 I have elsewhere critiqued the notion of the “traditional” high 
status of women in Southeast Asia and the prevalent representations 
of Burmese women as historically independent and equal to men.62  
What claims about the freedom and independence of Burmese women 
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disregard is that the active role of women as economic agents  —  the 
very attribute that gave women their autonomy and power  —  had 
paradoxically subordinated them to men socially, spiritually and poli-
tically. As in other Buddhist societies in the region, literati and experts 
on medicine, arithmetic and astrology were traditionally monks or 
former monks.63  Administrators and communal authorities were prin-
cipally men.64  Female authority and leadership in the sphere of ad-
ministration and governance were virtually unknown until the late 
colonial period.
 Th e posthumous treatment of Daw San belies the frequent evoca-
tions of the image of the unfettered and independent Burmese woman. 
It points to the uneasy relationship that women in Burma have 
had  — and continue to have  —  with authority and autonomy in the 
religious, political and cultural spheres. In life and aft erlife, the patriotic 
and feminist Daw San sheds light on the diffi  culties that women have 
faced in struggling to become producers, arbiters and transmitters of 
knowledge, and to increase their presence and infl uence in the poli-
tical arena.
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“I Die Because of My Circumstances”: 
Nguyen Th i Giang and the Viet Nam 
Quôc Dan Dang
Micheline Lessard
On 17 June 1930, at dawn, a young woman by the name of Nguyen Th i Giang, disguised as a peasant woman, stood on the edge of 
a fi eld near the town of Yen Bay, northwest of Hanoi. (See map 2 for 
places mentioned in this chapter.) Standing quietly beside a number 
of onlookers, she watched as a man by the name of Nguyen Th ai Hoc, 
along with 12 of his fellow “co-conspirators”, was marched into a 
nearby fi eld in order to be executed by French colonial authorities. 
Hoc and the others had been arrested and convicted of organising the 
Yen Bay Mutiny, one of a number of unsuccessful uprisings planned 
by the Viet Nam Quôc Dan Dang (VNQDD), the Vietnamese Nation-
alist Party.1  According to some newspaper accounts, French colonial 
authorities had kept the exact date of the executions secret. In order 
not to attract too much attention, the 13 condemned to death had 
been transported by special train only the night before from Hanoi.2  
Hoang Van Dao, author of a history of the VNQDD, claims that 
Nguyen Th i Giang learned from a fellow revolutionary that Nguyen 
Th ai Hoc and the 12 others had been taken to Yen Bay. Wishing to 
make her way there without detection, she boarded a train apparently 
“helped by comrades who  …  disguised themselves as coal burners and 
mechanics”.3  It is not clear what Nguyen Th i Giang may have been 
thinking as she watched the fi rst 12 releases of the guillotine blade 
and as she waited for the fi nal execution, that of Nguyen Th ai Hoc. As 
she stood quietly watching the grisly spectacle of her lover’s execution 
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by guillotine,4  no one, not even French colonial authorities present, 
suspected that the young woman in peasant clothing was Nguyen 
Th i Giang, herself wanted in conjunction with the organisation of 
the Yen Bay Mutiny and for her numerous revolutionary activities as 
a member of the VNQDD. Noting that Nguyen Th ai Hoc had been 
“calm” at the moment of his execution, the chef des services de police 
et de sûreté au Tonkin (the French police chief and head of the Surete, 
the secret police, in Tonkin) simply noted that the execution had been 
witnessed by approximately 60 people, “mostly women and young 
people”.5  Nguyen Th i Giang had managed, as she had countless times 
before, to elude French police offi  cers who had been looking for her 
for quite some time.6 
 Following her fi ancé’s decapitation on the orders of the French 
colonial administration and at the hands of a Vietnamese executioner,7  
Th i Giang left  quietly, undetected by authorities. Two days later, in 
Dong Khe (also sometimes written as Dong Ve),8  Nguyen Th ai Hoc’s 
native village, a peasant discovered the body of a young woman in a 
nearby rice fi eld. Th e woman, dressed in mourning clothes, had appa-
rently died of a self-infl icted gunshot wound to the head.9  Two letters 
found in the young woman’s pocket allowed offi  cials to identify her as 
Nguyen Th i Giang. One of Th i Giang’s sisters, Nguyen Th i Tinh, was 
also called upon to identify the body. In one of her letters, Th i Giang 
explained her suicide, stating that she could not bear to live following 
the execution of her husband, and that she wished to “follow him into 
heaven”.10  In order to reach her beloved once again, Th i Giang had 
used the revolver Hoc himself had given her. Nguyen Th i Giang had 
allegedly asked Nguyen Th ai Hoc to allow her to carry the pistol “so 
that if he should meet a fatal end, she would use it to kill herself ”.11 
 Th e tragic deaths of these two Vietnamese patriots, oft en re-
counted in highly romanticised terms, point to a number of serious 
problems in the writing of Vietnamese women’s history. First, with 
respect to Nguyen Th i Giang, historians  —  Vietnamese and non-
Vietnamese alike  —  have focused mainly on her suicide and on her 
admission that life without Hoc would be intolerable. As such, she 
has become one more in a pantheon of Vietnamese woman patriots 
to choose suicide.12  According to Vietnamese historians, in the fi rst 
century of the Common Era the Trung sisters chose suicide over 
capitulation before Chinese forces. Two centuries later, another woman 
willing to take up arms for the national cause, Ba Trieu, also chose 
suicide over surrender. She too had led an armed insurrection against 
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Chinese troops. Th e Trung sisters and Ba Trieu may not have opted 
for suicide because they could not conceive of life without their loved 
ones, but their decisions to take up arms were nonetheless considered 
to be motivated by a desire to avenge the deaths of their husbands 
and their fathers at the hands of Chinese invaders. In each of these 
cases, these women are depicted as devoted daughters or wives. Devo-
tion to nation and devotion to the men in their lives are depicted 
as synonymous, as equally heroic, the family but a microcosm of the 
nation. And in spite of their outstanding achievements as patriots, 
their fi lial piety is what has made their forays outside the “inner 
quarters” acceptable and even respectable. For historians, such an 
interpretation not only shift s the focus away from that of the women’s 
accomplishments, but it is also anachronistic. Th e historiography of 
the Trung sisters and Ba Trieu attributes to them Confucian ideals 
and qualities that had yet to reach Vietnam at that point.
 Th e Trung sisters and Ba Trieu are an essential element of Viet-
namese historiography and Vietnamese national identity. Th e willing-
ness of Vietnamese women to take up arms when the nation was in 
danger highlights Vietnam’s numerous independence struggles against 
enemies who were oft en much more militarily powerful, struggles 
that therefore required the use of all available resources, including 
women.13  Within the specifi c context of the period of French colonial 
rule in Vietnam (1858–1954), the focus of historians studying Vietna-
mese women has been on the development of a women’s movement, 
and almost exclusively on those women who participated in anti-
colonial resistance within the confi nes of the Indochinese Communist 
Party (ICP). One striking example of this historiographical phenome-
non is the fi rst serious study on Vietnamese women, Mai Th i Th u and 
Le Th i Nham Tuyet’s Women of Vietnam.14  In their study the authors 
depict the heroic acts of Vietnamese women in the 19th century and 
then skip to the creation of the ICP in 1930, thereby ignoring the 
hundreds of women who participated in anti-colonial movements and 
activities between 1900 and 1930. Furthermore, the story also links 
the development of women’s emancipation movements with that of 
the creation of the ICP even though the VNQDD itself had called 
for the emancipation of women and had created a women’s section as 
well as women’s groups and cells.
 Nguyen Th i Giang’s place in Vietnamese history has therefore 
been dictated largely by the overwhelming emphasis placed on the 
ICP. Nguyen Th i Giang, as a member of the VNQDD, engaged in 
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revolutionary activities similar to those of her counterparts in the ICP, 
and yet she has mostly been ignored (as has the VNQDD). While 
revolutionary women who belonged to the ICP, such as Nguyen Th i 
Minh Khai and Nguyen Th i Dinh, have been the subject of numerous 
memoirs, biographies and scholarly studies, Nguyen Th i Giang’s 
attempts to free Vietnam of French rule have hardly been examined. 
Since victors oft en command historical analysis, those movements or 
parties, such as the VNQDD, not present at the moment of success 
tend to be relegated to the background, present but very much out of 
focus. Women like Nguyen Th i Giang, whose political activities pre-
ceded the founding of the ICP, are absent from the historical narrative. 
It seems that “within this framework, Vietnamese women’s political 
consciousness appears virtually non-existent before the formation of 
the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930”.15  In addition, much of 
what is written about her follows a Marxist line and yet focuses pri-
marily on a “love story” rather than on her participation in anti-
colonial activities. Ironically, the Marxist interpretation and focus 
depicts Nguyen Th i Giang as an idealised Confucian widow rather 
than the fi erce nationalist she happened to be.
 What has been lost in this approach to the study of Nguyen Th i 
Giang specifi cally is the fact that her actions were not merely those of 
a lovelorn woman. She was, by all accounts, an important and infl uen-
tial member of the VNQDD. Memoirs and historical accounts have 
grossly ignored her contributions to this nationalist movement in two 
signifi cant ways. First, Nguyen Th i Giang’s adherence to the VNQDD is 
attributed to the fact that she was the fi ancée of one of its founders, 
Nguyen Th ai Hoc. Second, the actual work she did for the VNQDD is 
either excluded from historical analyses or is barely mentioned, while 
her suicide is exalted. What follows on these pages, then, is an attempt 
to elucidate the life of Nguyen Th i Giang the patriot, her work as one 
of the most important members of the VNQDD. An analysis of the 
sources reveals that Nguyen Th i Giang’s contribution to the VNQDD 
included her work as a propagandist, a liaison offi  cer, a recruiter, 
an organiser and an intelligence offi  cer. Before delving into her life, 
however, it is necessary to comment on the sources used in this study.
 First, secondary sources pertaining specifi cally to Nguyen Th i 
Giang are scarce. Th ere are no monographs devoted entirely to her 
life, her political ideas, or her specifi c role and activities within the 
VNQDD. So far, the only major study of the VNQDD is Hoang 
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Van Dao’s Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang: A Contemporary History of a 
National Struggle, 1927–1954.16  While Hoang Van Dao does ack-
nowledge Nguyen Th i Giang’s prominence within the VNQDD, and 
while his monograph does off er glimpses into her life as a party mem-
ber, the focus is clearly not on her. Still, Nguyen Th i Giang occupies 
more space in Hoang Van Dao’s study than she does in other publi-
cations. She does fi gure in a chapter titled “Nguyen Th i Giang” in a 
larger study of anti-colonialism in Vietnam: Lang Nhan’s Nhung tran 
danh Phap: Tu Ham Nghi den Nguyen Th ai Hoc, 1885–1931.17  Here 
Nguyen Th i Giang’s work is recognised briefl y, in general terms. Th e 
events surrounding Hoc’s execution are mentioned as well, but most 
of the rest of the chapter focuses on Th i Giang’s suicide and on her 
parting letters.18 
 As for archival documents, taken individually, the sources avail-
able (French colonial administration memos and correspondence, 
interrogations, Vietnamese revolutionary memoirs) are problematic. 
French colonial sources carry their own biases. While French Sûreté 
offi  cers’ information pertaining to Vietnamese patriots’ activities 
tended to be fairly accurate, the offi  cers nonetheless oft en made much 
of Vietnamese women’s relationships with male revolutionaries, as-
suming that these women joined the resistance based only on a sub-
missive sense of fi lial piety. A clear example of this can be found in a 
1929 police report written up following an assassination that had been 
committed by members of the VNQDD, it was suspected, at the Hanoi 
Botanical Gardens. While enumerating a list of possible VNQDD sus-
pects, including some women, the authors of the police report simply 
described the women in reference to their respective male compa-
nions: “Nguyen Th ai Hoc’s mistress is Nguyen Th i Gian (sic); Pho 
Duc Chinh has Nguyen Th i Th am for a mistress.”19  As this author 
has stated elsewhere, “it seldom occurred to these authorities that it 
was possible to be both fi lial and politically conscious”.20  As such, the 
portrait they paint of Nguyen Th i Giang is strictly that of a young 
revolutionary woman whose fi ancé was a founder of the VNQDD. 
Th e crucial role played by Nguyen Th i Giang within the VNQDD 
sometimes emerges indirectly when we examine the interrogations 
carried out by the Sûreté of arrested VNQDD members. It is impera-
tive, however, that the motives of the “confessions” elicited by these 
interrogations be taken into account. It is quite possible that those 
interrogated and who provided information about Nguyen Th i Giang’s 
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activities may have implicated her and others in order to save them-
selves. It is also worth keeping in mind that the “confessions” of 
these VNQDD members may have been obtained through coercive or 
violent means. It is necessary, therefore, that the information gleaned 
from these interrogations or confessions be corroborated by other 
sources.
 As for memos and correspondence written by French colonial 
administrators, they tend to draw, with broad strokes, what they con-
sidered to be threats to the French presence in Vietnam. Th ese 
threats included any overt demonstrations of nationalist sentiment or 
any expression in favour of Vietnamese independence. Th e so-called 
enemies of the French presence in Vietnam covered a wide political 
spectrum, from collaborating Vietnamese who sought to improve the 
economic and educational conditions of their countrymen through 
constitutional means, to groups, such as the VNQDD, who called for 
armed rebellion against French colonial rule and who also advocated 
social and political revolution such as the elimination of the Viet-
namese monarchy and the establishment of a Vietnamese republic. 
In most instances, French colonial offi  cials were quick to dismiss 
these Vietnamese nationalists as failures, as intellectually and morally 
defi cient.
 Vietnamese revolutionary memoirs of course tend to glorify the 
actions of revolutionaries. For the most part, revolutionary memoirs 
(hoi ky cach manh) published by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
aft er 1945, and by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam aft er 1975, have 
focused almost exclusively on those revolutionaries who were mem-
bers of the ICP. Th ere are but a few that off er a glimpse into the 
lives and actions of VNQDD members. In these memoirs, the role of 
Nguyen Th i Giang is depicted in glowing terms, but she is still por-
trayed mostly as the fi ancée of Nguyen Th ai Hoc. Th ere is also in 
these memoirs a tendency to focus on the star-crossed lovers’ fate 
rather than on Nguyen Th i Giang’s own revolutionary fervour and 
political ideology. Most of these memoirs highlight only the events 
surrounding the patriots’ lives or those that refl ect what may be con-
sidered a “revolutionary” outlook or past. As such, much information 
is excluded from the narratives, and the portraits that emerge are 
rather unidimensional. While these memoirs do provide interesting 
details surrounding events, they are nonetheless oft en mere chrono-
logical accounts of events with little analysis. Equally problematic is 
the paucity of citations and notes in these biographical accounts or 
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memoirs. In addition, they oft en provide contradictory versions of 
events or diff erent details.21 
 Newspaper accounts are easier to analyse since there was then 
no attempt to provide an unbiased view of the news. Th e images of 
revolutionaries such as Nguyen Th ai Hoc and Nguyen Th i Giang that 
emerge from newspapers depend on the political slant of the papers 
themselves. While French colonial newspapers such as L’avenir du 
Tonkin referred to the likes of Th i Giang and Hoc as terrorists, news-
papers such as l’Humanité, published in France, depicted them as 
martyrs. Th ere is, of course, a broad spectrum between those two 
polar views. While on their own these sources can be problematic, 
taken together they allow us to better understand the role played by 
Nguyen Th i Giang within the VNQDD. While the purpose of this 
essay is to focus on the importance of Nguyen Th i Giang’s role within 
the VNQDD, it is necessary to fi rst provide a measure of historical 
context concerning that political movement. Th erefore, we will briefl y 
examine the role of Nguyen Th ai Hoc in the formation of the VNQDD 
as well as the political aims and the organisation of the party itself. 
Th is will allow for a better understanding of Nguyen Th i Giang as a 
member of the VNQDD.
Historical Background
Th e establishment of French colonial rule in Vietnam began with a 
Franco-Spanish attack on the port of Da Nang in 1858. Th e premise 
for this attack was the protection of Catholic missionaries who had 
been subjected to the severe repression and persecutions called for in 
a number of Nguyen imperial edicts in the 1820s. By 1862 the ruling 
Nguyen dynasty, recognising its military inferiority, signed a treaty (the 
Treaty of Saigon) that ceded to France Saigon and three provinces 
of southern Vietnam. Th e Nguyen subsequently signed other treaties 
that ceded further provinces to France, and by 1884 French military 
troops had made their way to northern Vietnam. Th at year, a treaty 
was signed that essentially placed all of Vietnam under French con-
trol. French administrators in Vietnam then divided the country into 
three separate administrative regions: Tonkin in the north, Annam 
in the centre, and Cochinchina in the south. While Cochinchina 
was transformed into a colony under direct French administration, 
Tonkin and Annam were administered as protectorates. In Annam 
and Tonkin the Vietnamese monarchy and the bureaucracy were 
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maintained, but they answered to the French colonial administration 
established in Hanoi.
 Vietnamese resistance to French rule and domination was imme-
diate. Th e Treaty of Saigon marked the beginning of what came to be 
known as the Scholars’ Resistance Movement. Some scholars who had 
been appointed to various levels of the imperial bureaucracy chose to 
resist colonial rule by refusing to continue to serve the Nguyen court 
and by rejecting any collaboration with France. A number of these 
scholars retreated to their native villages, where they oft en worked as 
schoolteachers. Others, such as Phan Dinh Phung, chose the path of 
armed resistance, mounting attacks against French troops and against 
Catholic villages.
Vietnamese Nationalist Movement
1885 Can Vuong Movement (Loyalty to the Emperor Movement) 
started by scholars in support of Prince Ham Nghi against 
 French takeover
1905 Phan Boi Chau starts the Dong Du Movement (To the East 
Movement)
1907 Phan Chu Trinh opens the Dong Kinh Nghia Thuc (Tonkin Free 
School) in Hanoi, promoting quoc ngu, the Vietnamese Roman-
 ised script, and developing a Western, modern curriculum
1917 Creation of the Constitutionalist Party by a group of educated 
Vietnamese based in Saigon. It called for reforms in education 
and in economic policies
1925 Founding of Thanh Nien (Revolutionary Youth League) by Ho 
 Chi Minh, a party inspired by Marxist-Leninist principles
1927 Founding of the Viet Nam Quôc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nation-
 alist Party) by Nguyen Thai Hoc and others
1930 Yen Bay Mutiny, organised by VNQDD
1931 Founding of the Indochinese Communist Party by Ho Chi Minh
1941 Creation by Ho Chi Minh of the Viet Minh, an alliance of Viet-
 namese nationalist groups, for the purpose of overthrowing 
 French rule in Vietnam
1945 The August Revolution leads to the Viet Minh seizure of power 
following the Japanese surrender. Declaration of independence 
of Vietnam
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 In 1905, inspired by the Japanese victory over Russia, a Vietna-
mese patriot by the name of Phan Boi Chau spearheaded the Dong 
Du (To the East) Movement. Chau’s nationalism found expression in 
what he believed to be Vietnam’s three affi  nities with Japan: race, 
language and culture. Like Phan Dinh Phung, Chau favoured armed 
resistance. His principal goal was to send young Vietnamese men to 
Japanese military schools. Another Vietnamese nationalist and a con-
temporary of Phan Boi Chau’s was Phan Chu Trinh, who believed 
that Vietnam’s autonomy would be possible only aft er educational, 
political and social reforms. In 1907 Trinh opened, along with co-
founders such as Luong Van Can, the Dong Kinh Nghia Th uc (Tonkin 
Free School), providing a Western-style modern education to both 
Vietnamese boys and girls. While colonial authorities shut down the 
school in 1908 because of its alleged “nationalist” curriculum and 
activities, a new generation of Vietnamese nationalists emerged, the 
products of the French colonial education system.
 Th e emergence of these new nationalist currents coincided with 
the development of the mass press in Vietnam in the 1920s. Th rough 
various newspapers, young Western-educated Vietnamese expressed 
their political views.22  Th eir political leanings covered a broad spec-
trum of the political scale. Some advocated economic nationalism 
based on the development of Vietnamese commerce, industry and 
handicraft s.23  Such demands had also been made by more moderate 
nationalists such as Bui Quang Chieu aft er the creation of the Consti-
tutionalist Party in 1917 in Cochinchina, the southernmost adminis-
trative region of French-controlled Vietnam.24 
 While some advocated Vietnamese autonomy through consti-
tutional means and through collaboration with France, others, in-
fl uenced by revolutions in China and in the Soviet Union, were more 
radical in nature, calling not only for Vietnam’s independence but 
also for political and social revolution. Such was the case of Th anh 
Nien, the Revolutionary Youth League, a political movement founded 
by Ho Chi Minh while in exile in Canton. Th anh Nien was inspired 
by the Marxist-Leninist approach adopted by Ho Chi Minh while 
he was a student in Moscow in the early 1920s. Th anh Nien would 
later become the Indochinese Communist Party. Th e Viet Nam Quôc 
Dan Dang, founded in Vietnam in 1927, was more vague about its 
ideological leanings. Its members nonetheless viewed themselves as 
revolutionaries.
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Th e Viet Nam Quôc Dan Dang
Th e VNQDD was founded by a group of Western-educated Vietna-
mese including Nguyen Th ai Hoc, who was born in 1903 and trained 
as a schoolteacher. Unable to persuade the French colonial authorities 
of the need for reforms, including freedom of the press, he decided 
to organise a political movement. Th e VNQDD was modelled on the 
Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang). It originated in 1925 with 
the establishment of a bookshop in Hanoi (Nam Dong Th u Xa), 
intended to provide a “center for study and propaganda”.25  According 
to French colonial authorities, the bookshop, which was housed in the 
home of a schoolteacher named Pham Tuan Tai, was intended also 
to engage in publication.26  Th ose affi  liated with the study centre, 
including Nguyen Th ai Hoc, had been greatly infl uenced by Sun Yat 
Sen and the 1911 Revolution in China. Th e group focused primarily 
on nationalism and carried out propaganda and recruitment cam-
paigns  —  mostly in student circles in the urban areas but also, to 
some extent, among factory workers and rural peasants.27  From the 
study centre emerged the VNQDD in 1927. By then the Guomindang 
“was sweeping to political power in China”.28  According to the histo-
rian Alexander B. Woodside, young Vietnamese nationalists such as 
Nguyen Th ai Hoc “fervently hoped” the Guomindang would “support 
a Pan-Asian movement of confrontation with Western colonialism”.29  
When such a movement failed to materialise, Nguyen Th ai Hoc created 
a Vietnamese version of the Guomindang. French colonial offi  cials, 
while seriously concerned about the creation of yet another anti-
colonial organisation, nonetheless derisively referred to the VNQDD 
as but a “servile” copy of the Chinese model.30 
 Most VNQDD members were young, French-educated Vietna-
mese: students, teachers and journalists.31  However, the party was 
also able to recruit members from among Vietnamese soldiers and 
traders. Colonial administrators attempted to explain the growth of 
the VNQDD by suggesting that it had been the outgrowth of political 
ferment in 1926 in Vietnamese schools. For a period of one year, 
Vietnamese students had engaged in school strikes, mostly to protest 
the fact that they could not openly mourn the death of the patriot 
Phan Chu Trinh.32 
 While the party’s ideological orientation was neither sophisticated 
nor complex, its one driving force was the call for Vietnamese inde-
pendence through armed struggle if necessary. Th e party also called 
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for the establishment of a Vietnamese republic. Th e VNQDD was 
not a Communist movement per se, but its structure was nonetheless 
similar to that of Communist organisations. Such had also been the 
case with its Chinese counterpart, the Guomindang, which in Canton 
benefi ted from the advice aff orded by the presence of political advisers 
from the Soviet Union.33  In spite of such infl uences, however, the 
VNQDD, according to Vu Van Th ai, was characterised by “vagueness 
in its social programs” and by the fact that it was “without a solid 
doctrinal basis”.34  Th e VNQDD was organised into local branches of 
approximately 19 members. Beneath the local branches were small 
cells of three members.35  Th e branches also had subcommittees: pro-
paganda, organisation, fi nance, intelligence.36  Part of the party’s agenda 
was the emancipation of women. Th ere were women’s branches in 
addition to the general branches. Th e purpose of these was to group 
women in order to educate them about issues such as equality and 
emancipation. Th ough it is impossible to quantify the level of women’s 
participation in the VNQDD, it is clear from archival documents 
that not only were women present in the women’s branches but also, 
as was the case with Nguyen Th i Giang and Nguyen Th i Bac, some 
women served the party beyond the women’s branches and held posi-
tions of leadership within the party.
 All members were asked to take an oath of loyalty and willing-
ness to sacrifi ce “life and property for the party”.37  Betrayal of the 
party or of its members could result in severe retribution, including 
death. Between 1928 and 1929 the party expanded rapidly. Hoc and 
his fellow revolutionaries had been successful in recruiting students, 
small business owners and civil servants.38  By 1929 the party boasted 
1,500 members and at least 120 cells.39  By 1930 the party, it is esti-
mated, counted 70,000 members, attesting to the talent and to the 
success of its recruiters and propagandists.40 
 Th e VNQDD planned for its revolution to take place in four 
phases. Th e fi rst phase was organisational in nature. Th is included 
recruitment and the establishment of branches and cells. It was during 
this fi rst phase that members were to be educated in revolutionary 
theories and practices. Th e second phase was to consist of various 
types of covert activities, such as bombings and targeted assassina-
tions, which would eventually lead to a major insurrection. Th ese 
violent actions were to serve two purposes. In the fi rst place, the 
targets were those structures, institutions and people considered to be 
symbolic of French colonial rule in Vietnam. It was also hoped that 
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such attacks would destabilise French colonial rule. Th e third phase 
was that of the major insurrection.41  Th e hope was that the agitation 
fomented in the second phase would mobilise large masses of Viet-
namese into a major armed off ensive. Th e fourth and fi nal phase 
would be that of “reconstruction”, when the VNQDD would seize 
power and establish an independent Vietnamese state.42 
 However, informants had made their way into some branches of 
the VNQDD. In fact, offi  cial colonial administration documents reveal 
that there had been informants within the party since its creation 
in 1927. Because of this, the French Sûreté was aware of nearly all 
party meetings, of who attended the meetings, and of the decisions 
taken at these meetings. Th is explains why, shortly aft er the party was 
founded, Nguyen Th ai Hoc was already being followed closely by the 
French Sûreté in Vietnam.43  Th e VNQDD came under even greater 
scrutiny aft er February 1929, when René Bazin, a French recruiter (for 
work on plantations), was assassinated. Believing that the VNQDD 
was responsible for Bazin’s death, French colonial authorities quickly 
rounded up and arrested VNQDD members.44  A professed admirer of 
Sun Yat Sen, Hoc drew a parallel between this situation and that of 
the Guomindang in 1911, in particular the “heroic deaths of the 72 
Youth Heroes in an abortive revolt in Canton on the eve of the 1911 
Chinese revolution”.45  Hoc decided that the time was ripe to prepare 
for the general insurrection. Aware of the presence of infi ltrators and 
to ensure its survival, the party therefore organised, in 1929, the 
assassination of members it deemed to have betrayed the party 
cause.46  In spite of such measures, the safety of the party was further 
undermined by “a series of accidents involving explosions in homes 
of VNQDD members manufacturing explosives”.47  Th ese incidents, of 
course, further alerted the French Sûreté in Vietnam, and Nguyen 
Th ai Hoc believed that if the party was to survive the revolution had 
to begin as soon as possible. Such was the context within which a 
number of successive attacks, including one in Yen Bay, were planned.
 Th e Yen Bay Mutiny, also referred to as the Yen Bay Uprising, 
took place in February 1930. Aft er months of planning, on 10 February 
1930 armed VNQDD rebels attacked the French military garrison at 
Yen Bay. Despite the ultimate failure of the uprising, what proved to 
be most disturbing to French colonial authorities was the fact that the 
VNQDD had been successful in recruiting Vietnamese soldiers and 
that the attack on Yen Bay was to be followed by a series of other 
attacks on French garrisons. Similar attacks were carried out fi ve days 
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later in Phu Duc, Vinh Bao and a number of other towns, with the 
participation of Vietnamese soldiers. During the attacks, a number 
of French offi  cers were killed and the rebels were able to confi scate 
weapons. A Vietnamese district administrator, Hoang Gia Mo, was 
reported to have been “captured, tried and sentenced by the people 
and beaten to death”.48  Th e attacks were followed by demonstrations, 
protests and general unrest.
 All of the attacks carried out by the VNQDD were quickly re-
pulsed by local militia led by French offi  cers. Repression against the 
VNQDD was swift  and effi  cient. French colonial authorities also used 
bombing strikes in the surrounding countryside to further halt the 
rebellion. Eleven days aft er the uprising, one newspaper reported that 
there had been more than 300 arrests.49  By 20 February Nguyen Th ai 
Hoc was already captured in Hai Duong province, east of Hanoi, aft er 
a 40-day manhunt.50  One month later, the sentence of execution came 
down for Hoc and 12 of his comrades.
Nguyen Th i Giang
Nguyen Th i Giang was born in 190651  in the village of Bac Giang, 
near Phu Lang Th uong in northern Vietnam. Th i Giang was one of 
three sisters, and all of them eventually engaged in nationalist move-
ments. Very little is known about the socio-economic circumstances 
of the family. Given that both Th i Giang and her older sister Th i 
Bac were literate, it is safe to assume that they had spent time in 
the Franco-Vietnamese educational system and that their family could 
aff ord to send them to school. Th i Giang fi rst met Nguyen Th ai Hoc 
in 1929, shortly before the VNQDD became widely known to French 
colonial authorities and before many of its members were arrested or 
driven underground.52  She was only 22 years old when Hoc convinced 
her and Th i Bac to join the VNQDD.53  Th e sisters’ initial functions 
within the party involved “relations and propaganda”.54  As Nguyen 
Th i Giang was soon able to demonstrate her commitment and her 
abilities to the party, her responsibilities within it became more signi-
fi cant. It became clear that Nguyen Th ai Hoc trusted her implicitly 
with sensitive information.55 
 If historiography has ignored the work of Nguyen Th i Giang as a 
member of the VNQDD, French colonial authorities were very much 
aware of the depth of her involvement and her infl uence within that 
movement. In his report on anti-colonial movements, Sûreté chief 
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Louis Marty stated that the VNQDD had a women’s section and that 
the women involved in it played a “not-negligible” role.56  With respect 
to Nguyen Th i Giang specifi cally, Marty described her as one whose 
“revolutionary activity surpassed that of Nguyen Th ai Hoc”.57  One 
of Th i Giang’s key roles was that of a propagandist. Th e VNQDD’s 
propaganda service was multifaceted. One of its aims was the writing, 
publication and dissemination of books, periodicals and pamphlets 
explaining the party’s aims and principles. In addition, a “military” 
section of the propaganda service was created in order to recruit into 
the VNQDD Vietnamese soldiers in the colonial army.58 
 As a propagandist, Nguyen Th i Giang travelled extensively 
throughout northern Vietnam in order to inform Vietnamese of 
the VNQDD’s mission and activities. Th i Giang would explain the 
VNQDD’s political agenda and strategies either to individuals sympa-
thetic to the cause of Vietnamese independence, or to groups, even 
entire villages. Th e propagation of the party’s ideas also entailed the 
clandestine publication of numerous political tracts and pamphlets, 
many of which had been written by Nguyen Th i Giang herself. Th e 
role of propagandist carried with it signifi cant dangers, for in colonial 
Vietnam there was neither freedom of expression nor freedom of 
assembly. Any small group of Vietnamese gathered to engage in poli-
tical discussion was in danger of arrest and imprisonment. Speakers 
at such gatherings were considered to be leaders of an anti-French 
movement and faced serious penalties, such as lengthy prison terms 
and hard labour. If they were convicted of having incited any form of 
violent political action, they could be executed. Th e travels of Nguyen 
Th i Giang were made all the more diffi  cult by the fact that French 
colonial authorities had begun the practice of requiring the acquisition 
of identifi cation papers for Vietnamese travelling throughout French 
Indochina. Nguyen Th i Giang, once she became known as a member 
of the VNQDD, would have to resort to the use of disguises as well as 
counterfeit identity papers. She was indeed engaging in risky business. 
Between 1929 and 1930, French colonial authorities, largely through 
the use of informants, were aware of Nguyen Th i Giang’s travels and 
of her work as a propagator of the VNQDD’s political ideas. Aft er 
having found some explosives in the village of Noi Vien (in Bac Ninh 
province), Sûreté offi  cials reported to the résident supérieur du Tonkin 
that Nguyen Th i Giang was a frequent visitor to the village, where she 
participated in “revolutionary conferences”.59  In the course of these 
propaganda campaigns, Th i Giang was oft en accompanied by her sister 
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Nguyen Th i Bac. As indicated in one of its reports, Th e French Sûreté 
acknowledged the VNQDD’s success when it came to propaganda:
Th e propaganda was well received by young civil servants, parti-
cularly teachers and students. It also found great favour in military 
circles. Many indigenous sub-offi  cers in the artillery, infantry, 
fi nancial administration and aviation had joined the party.60 
As the scholar Oscar Chapuis has noted, “a signifi cant number of 
those Indochinese guards had rallied VNQDD thanks to the propa-
ganda network led by two women, Cô Giang (Nguyen Th i Giang), and 
Cô Bac (Nguyen Th i Bac)”.61 
 While travelling throughout Tonkin, Nguyen Th i Giang was also 
able to exercise other functions. As one of the party’s liaison offi  cers, 
Map 3.   Provinces of northern Vietnam (Tonkin) under French colonial rule
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she ensured eff ective communication between cells, branches and other 
VNQDD members. Th i Giang’s liaison work allowed the VNQDD 
to inform its spread-out members about upcoming actions, about 
potential dangers (such as the presence of informants within cells or 
branches), and about the arrests and imprisonment of some of their 
fellow members. In addition, rather than using the postal system 
(where mail could easily be confi scated by colonial authorities), liaison 
offi  cers carried with them written instructions and correspondence 
between members of the VNQDD. In and of themselves, each of these 
documents was highly incriminating. According to Hoang Van Dao’s 
history of the VNQDD, Nguyen Th i Giang was also able to success-
fully conduct “any work the party gave her”, thus enhancing her 
standing within its ranks: “When Nguyen Th ai Hoc disguised himself 
and lay low in the provinces of Hoa Binh, Ninh Binh, and Phu Th o 
[see map 3], where the mountains provided extra diffi  culties and 
dangers, she always brought him news and information and conveyed 
his instructions to the party local chapters.” 62  Nguyen Th i Giang’s work 
as a liaison offi  cer therefore allowed the VNQDD to continue to plan 
and to carry out its objectives even though many of its members, 
especially its leadership, were forced underground because they were 
already in the French Sûreté’s cross hairs. Without capable liaison offi  -
cers, the VNQDD could not have carried out a signifi cant number of 
its planned activities. Such was the assessment of Sûreté offi  cials who 
stated in a 1934 report that Nguyen Th i Giang had served as a liaison 
offi  cer between her lover, the imprisoned Nguyen Th ai Hoc, and the 
new leaders of the party.63  Following the arrest of Nguyen Th ai Hoc 
in February 1930, Le Huu Canh had taken over the leadership of the 
VNQDD. Th anks to Nguyen Th i Giang, Canh was able to eff ectively 
communicate with Hoc while the latter was held in Hoa Lo Prison in 
Hanoi.64  By this time, Th i Giang had become the VNQDD’s principal 
adviser.65  French Sûreté chief Louis Marty stated in one of his reports 
that Nguyen Th i Giang had been an “indefatigable” liaison offi  cer.66 
 Th e signifi cance of Nguyen Th i Giang’s eff orts to continue the 
VNQDD’s activities and to establish communications between Le Huu 
Canh and Nguyen Th ai Hoc needs to be highlighted here, for the 
eff orts reveal much about Th i Giang’s devotion to the cause of Viet-
namese national independence. Prior to the Yen Bay Uprising, in late 
1929, a measure of dissension had developed within VNQDD ranks. 
Some members had objected to Nguyen Th ai Hoc’s position that im-
mediate armed insurrection should take place. Th e dissidents believed 
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that the time was not ripe for such actions, that they could be dan-
gerous to the party and to the cause. Th is small faction was led by 
Le Huu Canh. One of Canh’s followers, Nguyen Doan Lam, had even 
broken his oath to the VNQDD by refusing, on a number of occa-
sions, to execute orders given to him by Nguyen Th ai Hoc. Hoc was 
so angry with Canh that he called him a traitor and ordered his assas-
sination. Th e assassination attempt failed, but the incident nonetheless 
created a rift  within the party between those who supported Nguyen 
Th ai Hoc and those who agreed with Canh.67  Once Hoc was arrested 
following the Yen Bay Uprising and Le Huu Canh had taken over 
the leadership of the VNQDD, Nguyen Th i Giang opted to work with 
Hoc’s rival in order to ensure the survival of the VNQDD. By be-
coming the liaison between Hoc and Canh, Nguyen Th i Giang was 
able to keep intact her loyalty to both Hoc and the VNQDD. She 
was also able not only to inform Hoc about the VNQDD’s actions, 
but also to keep him fully involved as a party leader and member, his 
position therein having been inevitably compromised by his imprison-
ment. Furthermore, she contributed greatly to the party’s ability to 
continue its activities while under the threat of severe repression from 
French colonial authorities. By ensuring that communications took 
place between Hoc and Canh, Th i Giang also contributed to mending 
the rift  between the party’s factions. Th ese actions demonstrate that 
Nguyen Th i Giang was not merely a “follower” of Nguyen Th ai Hoc, 
but also a highly capable strategist.
 Liaison work also allowed the VNQDD to plan concerted actions 
against specifi c targets. Since Nguyen Th i Giang was a liaison offi  cer, 
her safety hinged upon her ability to elude informants, Sûreté offi  cers 
and the police. According to an unsigned short biography of Nguyen 
Th i Giang, the work of liaison offi  cer was an “exhausting assignment” 
for her.68  Like many liaison offi  cers of illegal political parties or move-
ments, Nguyen Th i Giang conducted much of her work in disguise. 
Up until her death in June 1930, she had been able to escape security 
agents. At one point, while she was meeting with another VNQDD 
leader, Doan Tran Nghiep, the police broke into the house and Nghiep 
was immediately arrested. Nguyen Th i Giang somehow managed to 
escape amid the confusion.69  Th is was no small feat given that her 
work within the VNQDD was well-known to the Sûreté and given that 
“her description was known to all the colonialist agents”.70  Th i Giang 
was easily identifi able since she had a specifi c physical characteristic: 
she was severely cross-eyed. Th i Giang’s ability to outwit and to elude 
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the Sûreté proved crucial to the VNQDD as she oft en aided other 
VNQDD members in their attempts to hide from French colonial 
authorities. During the manhunt that followed the Yen Bay Uprising, 
for example, Nguyen Th i Giang helped VNQDD member Nguyen Van 
Hien by fi nding and taking him to the home of a fellow VNQDD 
member, Th i Truyen, where he was to remain in hiding until it was 
safe for him to travel. Th i Giang later accompanied Hien when she 
took him to an isolated home in Haiphong from which he was able to 
escape from Vietnam to China.71  Such aid, provided to wanted mem-
bers, proved crucial to the survival of the VNQDD because aft er the 
severe repression that had followed the Yen Bay Uprising and aft er the 
execution of Nguyen Th ai Hoc and the suicide of Nguyen Th i Giang, 
the VNQDD was able to regroup by moving its operational bases to 
southern China.
 Nguyen Th i Giang’s work within the VNQDD also included the 
planning and organisation of covert actions and plots against both 
French political fi gures and institutions, and against Vietnamese con-
sidered to be traitors to the VNQDD. In December of 1929, for 
example, the Sûreté found, in a ditch in the village of Noi Vien in 
Bac Ninh province, at least 150 explosive devices hidden in large 
urns. Th e Sûreté arrested six men suspected of having fabricated the 
explosive devices. One of the accused, a man by the name of Dang 
Xuan Lien, claimed that the bombs had been craft ed at the home of 
a schoolteacher named Th ang under the instructions and the orders of 
Nguyen Th i Giang.72 
 During the Yen Bay Uprising itself, Nguyen Th i Giang had been 
more than a mere bystander or companion to her fi ancé. Nguyen Th ai 
Hoc had called upon her and her sister Nguyen Th i Bac, and a third 
woman by the name of Do Th i Tam, to form the Yen Bay troop 
unit.73  Present throughout the planning stages, it was Nguyen Th i 
Giang who had informed Nguyen Th ai Hoc that the ICP, not wanting 
to be upstaged by the VNQDD, was also planning political and mili-
tary actions in the area.74  Th e ICP had also distributed a number of 
fl yers announcing the VNQDD’s imminent attack upon the Yen Bay 
garrison.75  On the day of the uprising, while Nguyen Th ai Bac and 
others, disguised as Vietnamese peasant women selling produce, trans-
ported caches of weapons by train from Phu To to Yen Bay, Nguyen 
Th i Giang was already in Yen Bay, steering troop units to safety in the 
nearby Rung Son mountains.76  From there she was in constant, direct 
communication with the commanders of the troop units.77  In spite of 
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its ultimate failure, the Yen Bay Mutiny had been able to get off  the 
ground because of the eff orts of Nguyen Th i Giang.
 Following the Yen Bay Uprising in 1930, it became clear that 
members of the VNQDD were in grave danger. French colonial autho-
rities immediately cracked down on the movement, searching out and 
arresting suspected members of the party. Not only were Nguyen Th ai 
Hoc and other leaders arrested, but so too was Nguyen Th i Bac, Th i 
Giang’s sister. Th i Bac was taken to Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi prior to 
the trial in which she was convicted of having endangered the security 
of French Indochina. Th i Bac was sentenced to 20 years in prison.78  
She was then deported to Con Dao Prison (Poulo Condore), where 
she remained until 1936, when the metropolitan French Popular Front 
government freed a number of colonial political prisoners.79  Upon her 
release, Th i Bac would continue to work for Vietnamese independence 
as she reportedly allowed Vietnamese revolutionaries to gather at her 
home in Bac Ninh (just north of Hanoi).80 
 Immediately aft er the Yen Bay Uprising, the colonial administra-
tion asked the French Sûreté in Vietnam to conduct an inquiry into 
the causes and sequence of the events. Th e minutes of the inquiry’s 
sessions reveal that Nguyen Th i Giang was a key player in the Yen 
Bay Uprising. Th e interrogation of a suspected VNQDD member, Le 
Van Canh, centred around a plot to assassinate Governor General of 
Indochina Pierre Pasquier. Canh testifi ed that he had written a docu-
ment, dictated by Nguyen Th i Giang, in which the assassinations of 
Pasquier as well as numerous others (high-level French administrators, 
Vietnamese mandarins, and Vietnamese traitors to the VNQDD) were 
mandated. Th e document had been written in invisible ink on the 
orders of Nguyen Th i Giang and stated that it was time to remove the 
capitalist yoke that was oppressing Vietnam and that the assassination 
of Pierre Pasquier would serve as a lesson.81  Le Van Canh explained 
further that Nguyen Th i Giang’s instructions included comments about 
positive and negative policies. Th e positive policies called for the 
recruitment of as many party members as possible, while negative 
policies called for the assassination of as many enemies of the party 
as possible.82 
 Pasquier’s “death sentence”, as dictated by Th i Giang, echoes the 
party’s ideology and purpose: “Th e country lost, the family dispersed, 
the race decimated for almost one century, our Annamite83  people are 
ruthlessly under the boot of the French imperialists and the capitalists, 
and are painfully reduced to the condition of beasts of burden.” 84  
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Th e words Th i Giang used to justify Pasquier’s execution were very 
similar to those she wrote in one of her suicide letters. In the letter, 
addressed to Nguyen Th ai Hoc’s parents, Nguyen Th i Giang alluded to 
the pain of the loss of national sovereignty:
Dear Father and Mother, I die because of my circumstances. I 
cannot convey the harm done to my family and I cannot avenge 
the insult to my country. I off ered my chaste heart in Hung Vung 
temple. Now, I return to our father’s native land85  and use this 
pistol to end my life. Please be generous and accept your ungrate-
ful daughter-in-law’s respectful prostration. Respectfully yours, 
Nguyen Th i Giang.86 
In her letter Nguyen Th i Giang also expressed her regret at not being 
able to die under the tricolour fl ag of her country, and at leaving “in 
danger” her fellow revolutionaries.87 
 It is also likely that in addition to high-level French colonial 
administrators, Nguyen Th i Giang was responsible for the assassina-
tion of VNQDD members suspected of having betrayed the party. 
According to French colonial intelligence reports, Th i Giang in all 
likelihood ordered the assassination of Nguyen Van Ngoc, a suspected 
Sûreté informant.88  Ngoc, who had been arrested with other VNQDD 
members, was found strangled in prison in 1930. A few days later, 
according to Sûreté offi  cials, Th i Giang ordered the assassination of 
another VNQDD “traitor”: Pham Th anh Duong. Duong had appa-
rently provided information to the Sûreté to lead them to the party’s 
bomb reserves.89  According to the Sûreté, Nguyen Th i Giang was 
also directly involved in the assassination of a man by the name of 
Nguyen Binh. On 30 May 1930, two VNQDD members attacked and 
killed Binh, an administrator responsible for “payments” who was 
carrying 10,000 piastres. Binh was killed in broad daylight on a Hanoi 
street.90  On the night of Binh’s assassination, a meeting took place in 
which Nguyen Xuan Huan, one of the co-conspirators in the assas-
sination plot, identifi ed a woman named Th i Lê as also being present 
at the meeting. When arrested, Huan was shown a police photograph 
of Nguyen Th i Giang, whom he identifi ed as Th i Lê.91  Th e police then 
became aware that Th i Lê was one of Nguyen Th i Giang’s numerous 
aliases. Th e purpose of the meeting had been to determine what to do 
with the funds stolen from Nguyen Binh.92  According to the Sûreté, 
5,000 piastres had been sent to the Yunnan section of the VNQDD 
and the rest of the money had been sent to businesses in Hanoi and 
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Haiphong whose purposes and profi ts were intended to fi nance the 
VNQDD’s activities.93 
 Aft er the mutiny and aft er the arrests of Nguyen Th ai Hoc and 
other VNQDD members, Nguyen Th i Giang, who had escaped but 
who was being sought by the Sûreté, had proposed a plan to attack 
Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi in order to free Hoc and the others. Unable 
to accomplish this by the time of Hoc’s execution, Nguyen Th i Giang 
made her way to the execution grounds in Yen Bay  —  but not merely 
to be a silent witness to her fi ancé’s execution. She had developed a 
plan to bomb the execution grounds and to free Hoc and his com-
rades. Fearing the possibility of such actions, French colonial authori-
ties had brought in an additional 400 soldiers to provide security and 
to monitor the area. Th i Giang was therefore unable to follow through 
with her plans.
Conclusion
Th e aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that Nguyen Th i Giang’s 
participation and work in the VNQDD was considerable. Th i Giang’s 
work as a propagandist, a liaison offi  cer and an organiser allowed 
the VNQDD to develop a political programme, to recruit signifi cant 
numbers of members and to mount several “military” actions against 
colonial rule. Th e point here is not to glorify the violent actions of 
Nguyen Th i Giang and the VNQDD or to ponder upon the necessity 
of an anti-colonial armed insurrection. As noted above, French colo-
nial offi  cials recognised Nguyen Th i Giang’s prominent role within the 
VNQDD, even stating that she may have been more revolutionary or 
more politically active than Nguyen Th ai Hoc. Ironically, in spite of 
such recognition, Sûreté reports focus almost exclusively on Nguyen 
Th ai Hoc and his male compatriots within the VNQDD, making clear 
a gender bias. Given her prominence and her level of activity within 
the VNQDD, Nguyen Th i Giang should be given, at the very least, 
equal consideration to that of Nguyen Th ai Hoc. Nguyen Th i Giang’s 
contributions to the Vietnamese nationalist cause deserve to be part 
of the historical landscape. While sources are scarce and varied, they 
nonetheless clearly point out that she was a patriot and that she had 
chosen the VNQDD as a means towards national independence. Th e 
evidence also demonstrates that she was an important and infl uential 
member of the party.
 While she was engaged (perhaps even married) to Nguyen Th ai 
Hoc, much of her work was accomplished on her own, since the 
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couple’s revolutionary activities seldom allowed them to spend time 
together. She was not a mere follower of Nguyen Th ai Hoc but rather 
a genuine companion in arms. While her suicide was indeed a spec-
tacular gesture, and while one of her fi nal letters was a testament to 
her love for Nguyen Th ai Hoc as well as an expression of regret that 
she could not avenge the harm that Hoc’s execution had wreaked upon 
their family, what is most oft en ignored is the patriotic tone of those 
letters as well as her commitment to the VNQDD’s aims: “I have 
not restored to my country its glory, I have not avenged my family. 
Although I am still young, I have already sacrifi ced myself for the 
cause of the people. But the road to progress is long.” 94 
 To focus simply on her devotion to Nguyen Th ai Hoc is reduc-
tive at best. It is clear that Nguyen Th i Giang was equally devoted to 
the cause of Vietnamese independence and was a nationalist in her 
own right.
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A Nationalist Leader of the 
Indonesian Women’s Movement
Susan Blackburn
In Indonesian history Suyatin Kartowiyono (1907–83) is remembered, if at all, as a leader of the women’s movement from the late 1920s 
to the 1950s. Starting in 1928 as an organiser of the fi rst Indonesian 
women’s congress, she went on to be active in the women’s federations 
established in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s and was a founder of the 
secular women’s organisation Perwari (Persatuan Wanita Republik 
Indonesia, Union of Women of the Indonesian Republic). She is not 
remembered as part of the nationalist movement. Th e purpose of this 
chapter is to show that during the struggle against Dutch colonialism, 
she identifi ed herself  —  and indeed the women’s movement generally 
—  as nationalist. Th e questions addressed in this chapter are: Why did 
she become a nationalist, and what did that concept mean to her? 
Why did she become a leader of the women’s movement rather than 
of the mainstream nationalist movement? What was her contribution 
to the nationalist movement? How did her identifi cation with that 
movement infl uence her life? And why has Indonesian nationalist 
historiography omitted all reference to her?
 Unlike most Indonesian women leaders, Suyatin Kartowiyono left  
behind some written refl ections on the Indonesian women’s movement 
and an autobiography, Mencari Makna Hidupku [Searching for the 
Meaning of My Life], published in 1983. Because by the time the auto-
biography was written she was quite ill (she died at the end of 1983), 
it was produced with the help of Hanna Rambe, a well-established 
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journalist and author who volunteered her services because she had 
known and admired Suyatin from childhood.1  Comparing the auto-
biography with earlier writings by Suyatin,2  it seems clear that the 
work was very substantially in her own words. Probably Hanna Rambe 
recorded conversations with her and helped to structure the book with 
the aid of Suyatin’s notes and diaries.3 
 It is doubtful whether, left  to her own devices, Suyatin would 
ever have written her autobiography. Indonesians of that era, espe-
cially women, wrote little about themselves. Hers is the only such 
work by a female leader from the colonial period. Th e Indonesian 
publishing industry and the reading market were in their infancy, 
limiting the scope for publication, and traditions of modesty may 
have inhibited some Indonesian leaders from appearing to blow their 
own trumpet.4  Apart from her own writings, moreover, very little has 
been published about Suyatin Kartowiyono, although her activities in 
the women’s movement are quite well recorded. For insight into her 
own motivation, this chapter depends heavily on her own accounts.5  
In them, Suyatin oft en refers to her own emotions and opinions, 
although she reveals very little about her private life, refl ecting her 
views about what was appropriate for publication. Defying the well-
known Javanese traditional preference for harmony and avoidance of 
confrontation, and perhaps refl ecting Western literature  —  of which 
she was an avid reader  —  Suyatin does not shy away from recounting 
some of the confl icts in which she was involved and defends her 
own position strongly. Focused on her public role, her autobiography 
clearly exemplifi es what Watson refers to as “the sense of contributing 
to the defi nition of a nation”, which he regards as the “distinctively 
Indonesian consciousness” informing the 20th-century autobiographies 
he has examined.6 
Becoming a Nationalist
At no point in her autobiographical writings does Suyatin Kartowiyono 
pinpoint a moment when she became an Indonesian nationalist or 
why. Born in the Dutch colony of the Netherlands Indies, she grew 
up with the nationalist movement, moving in the 1920s, along with 
thousands of other educated young Indonesians, from an ethnic-based 
organisation to an identifi cation with Indonesia as a nation. It was as 
if she absorbed the ethos of the time, what has been called “Th e age 
of movement”, the age of the pergerakan.7  In this her father, Mahmud 
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Joyodirono, was clearly very infl uential  —  not in the sense of instilling 
nationalist ideas, but rather in his intense involvement in organisa-
tions, in the new kind of groupings that came with modern life, and 
in his attitudes. As Suyatin put it, her father “formed my personality 
as someone who couldn’t stand to see injustice or oppression. I was 
always moved to defend people who were deprived of their rights.” 8  
By contrast, her mother, R.A. Kiswari, appears to have had less in-
fl uence in shaping her character.
 Suyatin Kartowiyono, a Javanese by ethnicity, was born in a 
village in central Java, the dominant island in the Indonesian archi-
pelago. (See map 4 for places mentioned in this chapter.) Her father, 
a railway offi  cial, was a well-read man and provided a modern edu-
cation for his four daughters and his only son, who was born aft er 
Suyatin. Th is was most unusual for the times: only a small proportion 
of Indonesians went to school, and girls received even less education 
than boys. At an early age Suyatin became an avid reader, and as she 
advanced into her teenage years she followed her father into organi-
sational activities. Her father had founded a branch of Budi Utomo, 
a Javanese organisation started in 1908, which came to be identifi ed 
as a forerunner of the nationalist parties although it was not overtly 
political.9  It was inspired, as Suyatin and her father clearly were, by 
the aim of improving life for Javanese.
 When Suyatin Kartowiyono entered a Dutch secondary school 
in 1922 at the age of 15 she became active in the women’s wing of 
Jong Java (Young Java), an organisation for educated young Javanese 
who felt a sense of duty towards their motherland.10  She took on the 
editorship of the organisation’s journal. By this time, she notes quite 
casually in her autobiography, “I had long known that the colonial 
system was evil”, although she admired a number of good Dutch 
people.11  In 1926, when Suyatin was 19, together with other young 
teachers she established and became president of Puteri Indonesia 
(Indonesian Girls), the women’s wing of a new overtly nationalist 
organisation for young educated people, Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian 
Youth).12  She had begun to attend nationalist meetings, especially 
those addressed by the up-and-coming secular nationalist leader 
Sukarno, the founder of the PNI, the Nationalist Party of Indonesia. 
“I was attracted,” she noted in her autobiography, “to the idea of uni-
fying the whole of Indonesia. Really that was the only way to fi ght 
the Dutch.”13  In 1928 Pemuda Indonesia held its second congress and 
launched what is regarded as a landmark in the Indonesian nationalist 
movement, the Youth Oath, whereby young Indonesians pledged 
Chap3 (75-97)   78 7/10/13   2:03:32 PM
 A Nationalist Leader of the Indonesian Women’s Movement 79
loyalty to their nation, Indonesia, and stated that its language was 
Bahasa Indonesia, which was based not on Javanese but on Malay.14 
 It is hard to appreciate now how revolutionary those ideas were. 
Th e nation of Indonesia had no precedents. Th e very name was new, 
invented by a 19th-century anthropologist. Th e only thing that held 
together this archipelago of hundreds of islands and ethnic groups 
was that they had been conquered, bit by bit over several centuries, 
by the Dutch and brought together into what was then known as 
the Netherlands Indies or Dutch East Indies. At that time the colony 
had no common language except Dutch, which Suyatin  —  like her 
educated friends in Pemuda Indonesia  —  spoke fl uently. By the late 
1920s, becoming a nationalist meant taking on a new identity, identi-
fying with a huge archipelago rather than just one’s own ethnic group, 
Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 1908–49
1908 Establishment of fi rst modern proto-nationalist organisation, 
Budi Utomo (Noble Endeavour)
1912 Founding of fi rst nationalist organisation, Sarekat Islam 
(Islamic Union), and fi rst women’s organisation, Puteri Merdeka 
 (Free Women)
1920 Founding of Indonesian Communist Party, Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (PKI)
1927 Founding of secular nationalist organisation Partai Nasional 
Indonesia (PNI), led by Sukarno
1926–27 Unsuccessful anti-colonial revolts by PKI
1928 Youth Oath congress of Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth)
1928 First Indonesian women’s congress
1930 Founding of radical Islamic nationalist organisation Persatuan 
Muslimin Indonesia (Permi)
1931 Arrest and exile of Sukarno and other nationalist leaders
1939 Creation of GAPI, a nationalist coalition for democracy
1942–45 Japanese occupation
1945 Declaration of independence and founding of Indonesian 
republic
1945–49 Indonesian Revolution (struggle against reimposition of Dutch 
rule)
1949 Transfer of sovereignty from Dutch to Indonesian republic
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and learning what was for most people an entirely new language. 
None of these ideas came directly from the schooling they had re-
ceived at the hands of the Dutch, who had no interest at all in pro-
moting a concept of nationhood in their colony, although of course 
Western education familiarised its recipients with the history of na-
tionalist struggles. Writing about it much later, when the independent 
Republic of Indonesia was well established, Suyatin Kartowiyono 
seemed to have forgotten the novelty of the nationalist movement in 
the 1920s. Her progress from Jong Java to Pemuda Indonesia is pre-
sented as something obvious, as indeed it may have been to many edu-
cated young Indonesians who absorbed ideas of nationalism through 
their reading and from hearing these ideas propagated by the privi-
leged few  —  nationalist leaders such as Mohammad Hatta, who had 
gone to the Netherlands for higher studies, or Sukarno, who had been 
nurtured in home-grown political organisations such as Sarekat Islam.
 Nevertheless, Suyatin Kartowiyono was aware that she had been 
swept up in a time of change that entailed standing out against narrow 
ethnic-based traditions and Dutch colonial rule. She writes of having 
to take Malay lessons in order to be able to follow the nationalist 
speeches of people like Sukarno, to read the nationalist press for her-
self to be part of that movement, to make her own public speeches, 
and to write for the nationalist media.15  Although a Javanese, she 
easily rose above her ethnicity; and although a Muslim, she identifi ed 
most strongly with the secular stream in the nationalist movement. 
In both respects Suyatin had much in common with other Western-
educated Javanese who operated with ease among people of diff erent 
ethnic and religious backgrounds.
Relations with the Mainstream Nationalist Movement
Yet Suyatin did not become active in mainstream nationalist organisa-
tions led by men such as Sukarno, much as she admired him at the 
time. Again, this is something she does not explain in her writings: 
why in the late 1920s she took the decision to devote herself to the 
burgeoning women’s movement rather than to the organisations with 
which she had identifi ed up to that time. Inspired by the nationalist 
fervour of the Youth Oath of October 1928, in December of the same 
year, at the age of 21, she was one of the three organisers of the fi rst 
Indonesian women’s congress, which is regarded as the starting point 
of the national women’s movement. It involved inviting women’s orga-
nisations from around the archipelago to attend a conference with the 
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aim of promoting unity and national identity among them. Not sur-
prisingly, the conference organisers all lived in Yogyakarta, which has 
long nurtured tolerant cooperation among people of diff erent faiths. 
Catholic, secular and Islamic organisations were represented, and it 
was Suyatin’s fi rst experience of negotiating the open tensions between 
them on the question of marriage law, and steering them towards an 
agreement to work together.16 
 In taking up this leadership position, apparently Suyatin Karto-
wiyono did not consider herself to be making a choice between two 
diff erent movements. To her, the women’s movement went hand in 
hand with the nationalist movement, and her commitment was not 
so much to a particular women’s organisation as to something more 
novel, to forging an Indonesian national women’s movement. As she 
put it later, “Th e feminist struggle was especially stimulated by the 
spirit of nationalism and the sense of justice.”17  Th e fi rst women’s 
congress succeeded, as Suyatin hoped it would, in raising women’s 
awareness of belonging to the Indonesian nation, and resulted in them 
forming an umbrella organisation of Indonesian women’s groups.18 
 Th e reasons why she committed herself to both the nationalist 
and the women’s movements derive from her passionate opposition 
to discrimination. In her autobiography she credits her parents with 
a strong sense of egalitarianism, of raising their children to feel 
comfortable mixing freely with people of diff erent classes, races and 
creeds.19  For her, nationalism did not come with blinkers. At school 
she learned the meaning of justice, “a word that was very sweet to 
me: it has ever since been very important.”20  From an early age, ac-
cording to her own account, she hated invidious distinctions to be 
made between people, herself included. Although her parents were 
obviously very liberal in their views, they still expected boys and girls 
to behave diff erently; and when this involved what Suyatin Kartowiyono 
regarded as discrimination, she objected strongly. For instance, why 
should she have to help her mother in the kitchen when this was 
not expected of her brother? 21  She was particularly wounded to learn 
from her sisters that her father, to whom she felt very close, had been 
disappointed at her birth because he wanted a boy.22  Regardless of the 
fact that he soon was proud of her, more so than of her brother born 
a few years later, the very idea that parents would prefer boys to girls 
was objectionable to Suyatin.
 Oft en in later life Suyatin Kartowiyono acknowledged the pro-
found infl uence on her of the published letters of Radeng Ajeng 
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Kartini, regarded as the fi rst modern feminist in Indonesia.23  Kartini’s 
letters to Dutch friends, published in 1911 aft er her death, are full of 
resentment against the restrictions placed on upper-class Javanese girls 
like herself: restrictions such as lack of access to post-primary educa-
tion, early arranged marriages, forced deference to men and to those 
older than themselves, and the polygamous practices of aristocratic 
men. Although not subjected to such restrictions, Suyatin Kartowiyono 
was well aware of the plight of girls in the Javanese aristocracy, since 
her mother was related to the court of Yogyakarta. She became very 
critical of aristocratic life, and her autobiography relates a number of 
instances where she came into confl ict with members of that class. 
For instance, in her teens she refused to bow down to the sultan of 
Yogyakarta, or to address high-ranking Javanese people in Javanese: 
she preferred to use the very egalitarian Malay language rather than 
the status-infl ected Javanese.24  Th is “anti-feudal” behaviour caused a 
sensation at the time.25  What Suyatin also learned from Kartini’s fate 
(she was married off  to a polygamous man and died early in child-
birth) was that it was imperative for women to be able to support 
themselves.26  She made sure that she worked throughout her life to 
earn an income.
 Her identifi cation with Kartini from her early teenage years 
showed that Suyatin Kartowiyono took to feminist ideas with great 
ease. In her autobiography she wrote: “My years in MULO [secondary 
school] determined my career for life. My struggle from that time 
onwards, until 1960, was devoted to improving the rights and destiny 
of Indonesian women.” 27  She adopted the same causes as Kartini, ad-
vocating education for girls, the abolition of early arranged marriages, 
and opposition to polygamy (or, more correctly, polygyny). Th is last 
cause became critical for Suyatin several times during her life. Her 
fi rst encounter with polygamy is implicit, and not directly faced, in her 
autobiography. In her writings Suyatin Kartowiyono rarely addressed 
very personal matters that, one senses, may have been painful not 
only to her but to other members of her family. Th e fact was that 
she herself was the daughter of a polygamous father, yet she never in 
writing criticised her father for behaviour to which she objected in 
principle. She was obviously too close to him, far closer than to her 
mother, who, being unable to read or write, did not share many of 
her interests.28  Later encounters with polygamy were not so intimate 
but certainly infl uenced Suyatin Kartowiyono’s life. While she was in 
her early twenties, her public criticism of the practice of Javanese 
Chap3 (75-97)   82 7/10/13   2:03:34 PM
 A Nationalist Leader of the Indonesian Women’s Movement 83
royalty in taking multiple wives (selir) earned her a caution from the 
Dutch, who protected the privileges of the court: she was threatened 
with being banned from the principalities if she persisted in such sub-
versive behaviour.29  Later in life she learned to negotiate diplomatically 
the minefi eld that polygamy constituted in the Indonesian women’s 
movement: it caused great tension between Islamic women’s organisa-
tions and more secular ones. A testing choice was made by her in 
1937 on this issue, as described below. And fi nally, in the 1950s as 
leader of the women’s federation she came into direct confl ict with the 
powerful President Sukarno when he took a second wife.
 For all these reasons, then, Suyatin threw herself into the women’s 
movement in the late 1920s and remained a leader in it until age 
and ill health, and perhaps the tenor of the times, rendered her 
inactive by the 1960s. In all this there is an implicit question: Could 
Suyatin Kartowiyono have pursued her causes within the embrace of 
the mainstream nationalist movement? Th ere are a number of issues 
here, including leadership and gender diff erences. It was very hard for 
a woman to be a leader in male-dominated nationalist parties such 
as Sukarno’s Indonesian Nationalist Party, founded in 1927. Th e fact 
that the public meetings organised by these parties were oft en held at 
night deterred many women. Suyatin recalled that although she oft en 
attended nationalist meetings, at night she sat with Sukarno’s wife of 
the time, Inggit Garnasih, because few women came.30  Women did 
make occasional public speeches to such audiences, but it was rare. 
One of the very few women nationalist leaders of the colonial period 
was Rasuna Said, who is the subject of the next chapter in this book. 
She became the leader of a radical Islamic party, Permi (Persatuan 
Moeslimin Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Muslims), and was im-
prisoned by the Dutch in the 1930s for her outspoken attacks on 
colonialism. It was dangerous to be a nationalist leader in the late 
1920s and the 1930s: such leaders ran the risk of being arrested and 
exiled, although Indonesian nationalists did not experience the level 
of repression that the Vietnamese did, at the hands of the French, as 
illustrated in the case of Nguyen Th i Giang (chapter 2). Nevertheless, 
the dangers probably deterred many women, or at least their protec-
tive families. Suyatin Kartowiyono herself appears to have been re-
markably fearless and independent-minded, despite police surveillance 
at times.
 Suyatin had a very egalitarian relationship with her husband, em-
phasising in her autobiography that she chose him over other young 
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men because he was truly supportive of her chosen work, which she 
described as “national independence and improvement in the status of 
women”.31  Th ey were married in 1932, when she was 25 and already 
working as a teacher, as she continued to do aft er marriage. Having 
a young family in the 1930s must, however, have somewhat restricted 
what she could do in public life. In her autobiography she is rather 
defensive about the arrangements she made to combine work, activism 
and family duties, and it is unclear precisely what supportive roles 
were played by her husband and unnamed kin or domestic workers.
 Th ere is no evidence that Suyatin found it diffi  cult to work with 
men. Her autobiography shows she admired and was close to a num-
ber of male nationalist leaders, including Ki Hajar Dewantara and 
Haji Agus Salim.32  Th ey seem to have treated her as a protégé rather 
than as an equal, which is not surprising considering the age dif-
ference between them. Suyatin’s relations with her male peers could 
be ambivalent, and she was fi rm about the need to be autonomous. 
Th us she emphasised many times that women should always have their 
own income, as she had done, and on some occasions she stood up 
to male leaders, especially to Sukarno in the 1950s when he took 
a second wife. Attending a women’s congress in India in 1953, she 
reacted against the advice of Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit that “We should 
always be nice to men so that we can achieve our goals quicker”. “In 
my heart I grumbled, ‘But women can’t be nice to them all the time. 
We demand justice!’ ” 33 
 However, in her own life Suyatin Kartowiyono made some con-
cessions to diff erentiated gender roles. For instance, she claimed that 
she always put her family fi rst, as a mother should.34  Moreover, 
although she felt she found equality in her marriage, she fell into 
line with Indonesian tradition so far as to insist that her husband 
was the head of the household. Even in this admission, however, she 
was unconventional: whereas the New Order regime, during which she 
wrote her autobiography, preached that men and women were equal 
because women took leadership in the home while men were leaders 
in public life, Suyatin reversed the order, saying, “In the offi  ce and 
in organisational life I became a leader. At home, my husband was 
the head of the household.” For her this refl ected their “meeting of 
minds”.35  Neither of these concessions seems to have cramped her 
style, however: she was an independent and outspoken woman.
 Th is raises another serious point. From colonial times to the 
present, it seems that while the nationalist movement was regarded 
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as political, the women’s movement was always labelled “social”. Th e 
Dutch were inclined to regard the women’s movement quite indul-
gently for this very reason. Only a few individuals in it, such as 
Rasuna Said, were seen as too close to radical nationalists and therefore 
political; but women who concerned themselves with education and 
marriage reform were considered harmless to the regime.36  Yet such 
clear distinctions could not be drawn, as Suyatin Kartowiyono was 
well aware. Congresses of the women’s movement began with the 
singing of the nationalist anthem that had been adopted by the Youth 
Congress of 1928, and at the second women’s congress in 1929, held 
in Jakarta in the hall used by the nationalist movement, Suyatin noted 
that people kept calling out “Merdeka!” (Freedom), which made the 
police threaten to close the meeting.37  In 1941 the women’s federation 
joined the nationalist umbrella organisation Gabungan Politik Indo-
nesia (Indonesian Political Federation), which was attempting to wrest 
democratic reforms from the colonial government.38  Immediately aft er 
the declaration of independence in 1945 a new women’s federation 
was set up. Suyatin was the leader of the conference that established 
it, and she emphasised that it was “integrated with the struggle for 
freedom” since its fi rst task was to support the new republic.39 
 Th e causes Suyatin championed within the women’s movement 
were clearly political in that they involved radical changes in society 
and in public policy. Some of them were too subversive for much of 
the male-dominated nationalist movement. Leaders such as Sukarno 
frequently warned the women’s movement that “women’s issues” should 
be put on hold until the country had gained independence, and indeed 
the conception of national interest expounded by the male leaders 
should always be given priority. Th ere was an implicit acknowledge-
ment that many “women’s issues”, such as marriage reform, were too 
divisive to contemplate and that they threatened male prerogatives.
 At one point in her life Suyatin Kartowiyono was forced to make 
the choice that Sukarno urged upon the women’s movement. In 1937 
the Dutch colonial government held out the prospect of a law that 
allowed Indonesians to choose a civil marriage that enforced mono-
gamy. Th is was a radical departure from the religion-based marriage 
laws of the day, whereby one married according to the law of the 
religion or customary group to which one belonged. Th us the vast 
majority of the Indonesian population, being Muslims, were subject to 
Islamic family law, which permitted polygyny. Th e reform proposed by 
the Dutch was intended in part to meet the demands of many women’s 
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organisations for a fairer alternative for women, especially a law that 
would allow Muslim women to escape the threat of polygyny.40  But 
when the government sought the support of the women’s movement, 
Suyatin Kartowiyono and most other women leaders rejected the off er. 
Like male nationalist leaders, Suyatin claimed the proposal was a 
stratagem to divide the nationalist movement, and indeed it threatened 
to split the Islamists from the rest. She concurred with Sukarno that 
marriage law reform would have to wait until the country was inde-
pendent: “I was certain that it was better for Indonesia to fi rst achieve 
national independence as the absolute condition for improving the 
lives of women.”41  Th us she proved her nationalist credentials. Unfor-
tunately she was to fi nd that aft er the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, 
the governments of independent Indonesia shied away from the divi-
sive issue of marriage reform and it was not until 1974 that a govern-
ment was strong enough to defy Islamic opposition and force through 
a uniform marriage code.42 
 Benedict Anderson has referred to nations as “imagined commu-
nities”,43  an idea that raises the question of how nationalists opposing 
foreign rule imagined their independent nation would form a commu-
nity. Although Suyatin never spelled out her vision of the “imagined 
community” of Indonesia, it is possible to deduce it from her writings 
and activities. It was clearly based on the notions of justice and 
equality, and her view of Indonesia was open and inclusive. She never 
labelled groups as “other”, seeking to exclude them from the nation; 
rather, she recognised the diversity of Indonesia and revelled in it, as 
shown by her interest in other religions and ethnic groups. In this way 
her nationalism was more clearly aligned with the secular nationalists 
than with most Islamic nationalists. She appears to have been more 
inclusive than many secular nationalists in that she did not treat 
Chinese Indonesians as aliens, as frequently happened in Indonesia.
Her Role in the Nationalist Movement
As stated, Suyatin Kartowiyono saw the women’s movement as working 
hand in hand with the male-dominated nationalist movement to 
prepare the country for independence. It mobilised women, raising 
their awareness of the nation and of the need to create a modern state 
in which men and women were truly equal. Th e scene had been set 
in 1928 at the Youth Oath ceremony, where both men and women 
took the nationalist oath, and it culminated in the constitution of the 
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Republic of Indonesia in 1945, which declared that men and women 
were equal. As Suyatin put it in her autobiography:
As early as 1926 women’s organisations began to be political in the 
sense that what they were demanding was no longer just improve-
ment in women’s situation and equality of rights in marriage and 
citizenship, but they began to oppose colonialism and oppression 
of one nation by another. By the time of the arrival of the Japanese, 
both the women’s movement and the nationalist movement were 
struggling for the independence of the nation. Th en the feeling of 
unity among women’s organisations, and the feeling of nationalism 
among men and women, rose markedly between 1942 and 1949.44 
Compared with some other nationalist movements, in Indonesia few 
eff orts were made to mobilise the masses of men and women against 
colonialism. Unlike in India, for example, men and women were not 
recruited to support huge demonstrations of opposition to colonial 
rule. In part this was a result of careful Dutch policies to restrain 
Indonesian nationalists: when the movement showed signs of be-
coming too radical its leaders were arrested and exiled. However, few 
Indonesian organisations showed any real interest in recruiting mass 
support, and most women’s organisations were similarly reluctant — 
with the exception of Islamic organisations, which recruited on the 
basis of religion rather than nationalism. During the colonial period 
Suyatin, like most other women leaders, appeared satisfi ed with 
building small organisations of largely urban, educated women. At 
one point in her career, in 1931, she had the opportunity to make 
contact with poor working women, yet she was satisfi ed with drawing 
the attention of existing women’s organisations to the plight of these 
women rather than seeking to involve such women themselves in 
organisations.45  Although, given the constraints of the time, it would 
indeed have been diffi  cult for her to do so, even aft er independence 
she never seems to have contemplated such a move or regretted not 
being able to do so. Th us, her notions of a nationalist movement and 
of a women’s movement, which she saw as intertwined, were limited, 
as were those of most other leaders during the colonial period.
 Even if one followed the prevailing trend to regard the women’s 
movement as social, not political, and therefore not really nationalist, 
there is a strong case to be made for Suyatin Kartowiyono’s direct 
contribution to the nationalist cause during the Indonesian Revolution 
of 1945–49, the period of heroic struggle by Indonesians to prevent 
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the Dutch from re-establishing colonial rule aft er the Japanese occu-
pation. Vastly inferior to the Dutch in military terms, the Indonesian 
resistance movement  —  consisting largely of revolutionary youth and 
guerrilla soldiers, and employees of the new Republican government 
—  depended on the voluntary support of the people. Th e nationalist 
movement and the women’s movement, working together, operated on 
a mass scale during the Revolution.
 A basic requirement was to feed members of the resistance 
movement and their families at a time when food production and 
transportation were disrupted by the end of the Japanese occupation 
and the eff orts of the Dutch to reassert control, opposed at every step 
by Indonesian Republican supporters. Women immediately took on 
the task of feeding the Republicans through the organisation known 
as WANI (Wanita Negara Indonesia, Women of the Indonesian State). 
WANI appointed Suyatin to supervise the transportation of food 
in Java, and she travelled widely around the island as part of this 
mission, reporting to the Republican government in Yogyakarta. Her 
autobiography dwells eloquently on the trials of this period.46  For 
instance, she describes how, even when heavily pregnant, she squeezed 
into and out of overcrowded trains and secreted on her person incri-
minating papers and objects when Dutch soldiers came on board to 
check people’s identities and arrest revolutionaries.
 As her autobiography sums up:
For independence I did my utmost, even while pregnant. I rode 
trains at night, perched on the coupling between carriages, with 
the soot from the engine fl ying over my head; I rode bicycles with 
fl at tyres while heavily pregnant; I walked far into the night when 
called to meetings in Yogyakarta and elsewhere; and I did all this 
wholeheartedly.47 
Th ere was no doubt in her own mind that she was a very active parti-
cipant in the nationalist movement.
How Being in the Nationalist Movement Infl uenced 
Her Life
As a result of her nationalist convictions, before the Japanese occu-
pation Suyatin Kartowiyono suff ered some harassment and police 
surveillance at the hands of the Dutch colonial government, which 
was implacably opposed to the notion of independence.48  During the 
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colonial period, Suyatin’s being a nationalist meant that both she and 
her husband refused to be employed by the colonial government. 
Trained as a teacher, she taught in private schools even though the 
pay was far less than she would have received in the state system.49  
Interestingly, she had no objection to working for the Japanese during 
the occupation even though she recognised they were far more brutal 
than the Dutch.50  Presumably, like Sukarno, she anticipated that 
Indonesia would win its independence under the Japanese.
 Aft er independence Suyatin Kartowiyono was in a good position 
to benefi t from her nationalist credentials and get a well-paid position 
in the new government bureaucracy. For several years she was able to 
pursue one of her life goals through a government position promoting 
literacy. She was delighted to be able to travel around much of the 
vast archipelago in this capacity, visiting places she had barely heard 
of before. In the process she was also able to help build the network 
of her organisation, Perwari, a secular women’s organisation spread 
throughout Indonesia  —  as its president from 1953 to 1960, Suyatin 
helped it establish schools and literacy courses, mother-and-child 
health clinics and a women’s legal centre  —  as well as to participate 
in campaigns for women’s causes.51  In 1957 she fi nally resigned her 
high-ranking government job in protest against governments that 
refused to oppose polygamy and against President Sukarno when he 
embarked upon a polygamous marriage.52 
 From her autobiography and other writings, one gains the im-
pression that Suyatin Kartowiyono devoted her life to the nationalist 
movement and the women’s movement, conceiving of them as inextri-
cably intertwined insofar as their common goals were to seek an inde-
pendent nation with an egalitarian society. Her husband and six 
children, although obviously vital to her private life and the source of 
great satisfaction, did not impinge on the public persona and received 
very little attention in her autobiography.53  Another short account of 
her life pays tribute to her humanity, her generosity in sharing her 
knowledge and helping women, and her courage, honesty and sincerity 
in thought and action.54 
 Did Suyatin Kartowiyono benefi t from her involvement in the 
nationalist movement? Her autobiography leads one to believe that it 
enriched her life immeasurably. She was grateful for the opportunity 
to serve her country and in the process get to know it better. From 
time to time the autobiography waxes rhapsodical as she admires the 
Indonesian regions she visited and the remarkable people she met, 
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mostly ordinary people who overcame great odds. Th e opportunity 
to benefi t materially or personally is not mentioned; Suyatin appears 
to have lived frugally without feeling deprived, and she sought no 
honours although she did pick up three national awards along the 
way for her social work and service to the women’s movement.55 
 Any regrets Suyatin mentions concern not herself personally but 
the causes she espoused. President Sukarno disappointed her: from 
having admired him when young, she turned against him in the 
1950s when he embarked on his fi rst polygamous marriage. Th e battle 
for marriage law reform was dispiritingly long, but she was grateful 
when a law was fi nally passed in 1974, although she felt it still had 
weaknesses.56  Th ere are indications that she was disturbed during her 
fi nal years by trends in the women’s movement under the New Order. 
Th e emergence of “wives’ organizations” (i.e., organisations comprising 
wives of state employees) weakened her organisation, Perwari, and led 
to a lack of leadership in the women’s federation, Kongres Wanita 
Indonesia (Indonesian Women’s Congress).57  However, she chose to 
dwell on the progress she had perceived through her lifetime:
Th e position of our women, with such good opportunities to gain 
an education since independence, is far diff erent from what it was 
during Kartini’s life. Our struggle to gain a national marriage law 
has been achieved, twenty years aft er Indonesia’s independence.
What remained, she thought, was to ensure that single women were 
treated as equals, allowed to live their own lives.58 
How History Has Treated Her
Suyatin Kartowiyono has been sadly neglected in the writing of Indo-
nesian history. Long dominated by the state’s version of nationalism, 
Indonesian historiography presents a story of triumphant struggle for 
independence, but only a limited number of individuals are given 
recognition as having played important roles.59  Th e country has a 
National Heroes Board, which oversees the selection and promotion of 
an offi  cial list of National Heroes, carefully developed over the years 
to ensure each region has its own names and to refl ect the ideology 
of the regime in power. Th e list consists mainly of selected individuals 
who resisted the imposition of colonial rule before there was any con-
ception of an Indonesian nation, of leaders of nationalist parties, and 
of military leaders, especially from the period of the Revolution. Very 
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few women are mentioned, and the few that are are an incongruous 
bunch.60  Kartini features prominently, although she did not oppose 
Dutch rule or identify as an Indonesian. Founders of early modern 
schools for girls are mentioned: Dewi Sartika in West Java, Walanda 
Maramis in Sulawesi, and Rahmah El Yunusiah in Sumatra. None of 
these women were part of the male-dominated nationalist movement 
more narrowly conceived: their contributions were seen as social 
rather than political. Leaders of the women’s movement, including 
Suyatin Kartowiyono, do not feature in the pantheon of National 
Heroes. Th e only woman who is occasionally mentioned as belonging 
to the “political” nationalist movement is Rasuna Said, because she 
was a leader of a male-dominated party in the 1930s61  (see the next 
chapter in this book).
 Literature about the nationalist movement, at home and abroad, 
mentions almost no women outside the offi  cial pantheon. A.K. 
Pringgodigdo, whose early approach to chronicling the history of 
what he called the “Indonesian people’s movement” was unusually 
pluralistic, distinguished diff erent strands within the nationalist move-
ment, including religious, youth and women’s streams; but in writing 
about the women’s stream he mentions almost no individuals except 
his wife of the time, Suwarni Pringgodigdo.62  Other historians have 
an even narrower view.
 Th ose who have documented the history of the Indonesian 
women’s movement have been kinder to Suyatin Kartowiyono. 
Although there is no full biography of her (and indeed few have been 
published of any of her female contemporaries),63  there are tributes to 
her in a number of records of the growth of the women’s movement 
and its consolidation aft er the Japanese occupation.64  But this merely 
confi rms the line drawn between the nationalist and women’s move-
ments: they are seen to be quite separate  —  at best parallel but not 
overlapping.
 Just as there were advantages to women in joining the women’s 
movement rather than the male-dominated nationalist movement, one 
can argue that the memory of a woman like Suyatin Kartowiyono 
perhaps benefi ts from being ignored by offi  cial nationalist propaganda. 
As a number of critics have shown, the “approved” versions of the 
lives of National Heroes reduced them to “cardboard cutouts” 65  and 
contributed to the decline of interest in history in Indonesia under 
the New Order. With the revival of more independent historical and 
biographical writing in the post-Suharto era, it is to be hoped that 
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Indonesians will recognise that their nationalist movement was plural-
istic and that diff erent streams within it, such as the women’s move-
ment under the leadership of nationalists like Suyatin Kartowiyono, 
projected inspiring alternative visions for Indonesia.66 
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Rasuna Said is one of the few Indonesian women accorded the status of National Hero. Born in Maninjau, West Sumatra, in 1910, 
Rasuna is honoured for her contribution to the nationalist movement 
in the years leading up to Indonesia’s independence and for the offi  cial 
roles she undertook once independence had been achieved. Oft en 
referred to as Singa Betina (lioness) or Srikandi (warrior princess), an 
epitaph reportedly given to her by Indonesia’s fi rst president, Sukarno, 
Rasuna is regarded as the embodiment of a female fi ghting spirit.1  
She is identifi ed strongly with the Minangkabau ethnic group, from 
which she and many other nationalist leaders came, a people known 
for their combative nature and deep sense of Islamic piety.
 Rasuna came to national prominence in November 1932 when 
she became the fi rst woman in the Netherlands Indies to be arrested 
and charged by the Dutch colonial government for “sowing hatred” 
against the Dutch. In the off ending speech, she expounded on the 
platform of the Islamic political party to which she belonged, Permi, 
arguing that Islam taught that imperialism was wrong and that inde-
pendence would surely come one day, forcing the Dutch from Indo-
nesian lands. Rasuna’s political career began when she was in her late 
teens. She took leadership positions in a number of organisations in 
the colonial period, culminating in her becoming a parliamentarian 
in independent Indonesia. She was also an educator, devoting several 
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decades to teaching girls and women in her native Minangkabau and 
then North Sumatra. Outspoken, personally devout, and strong enough 
to take on the challenges of participating in a nationalist movement 
and revolutionary war, Rasuna Said is a fascinating fi gure worthy of 
greater scholarly attention.
 Unfortunately, Rasuna Said has left  no autobiographical writings. 
Th is chapter is thus based largely on Indonesian-language biographies, 
on Rasuna’s journalistic writings, and on newspaper and Dutch reports 
produced while she was still alive.2  In this chapter, I consider what 
we learn from Rasuna’s biography, writings and speeches regarding her 
understanding of nationalism and why she became involved, at great 
personal cost to herself and her family life. A passionate advocate for 
education for girls and women and for women’s political involvement, 
how did she reconcile her gender activism with her equally strong 
Islamic faith?
Historical Background
Th e fi rst half of the 20th century, into which Rasuna was born, was 
a volatile and exciting period when anti-colonialism was growing in 
Indonesia. Contestations and exchange among proponents of ideas 
rooted in Communist ideology, in secularism, and in Islamic tradition 
or reform added great complexity to the nascent nationalist move-
ment. From the early decades of the century, religious confl icts arose 
between the reformists known as the kaum muda (young group) and 
the kaum tua (old group), and the customary leaders aligned with the 
colonial authorities. Th e kaum muda were returning students, parti-
cularly from Cairo, with new ideas on how to revitalise and modernise 
Islamic practice and enable Muslim nations to throw off  (Christian) 
colonial rule, while the kaum tua rejected the need for substantial 
reform of Islamic practice.
 In Java, the nationalist movement was led largely by a small elite 
who had received a Western education either in the Indies or in the 
Netherlands. Th ey formed political parties that diff ered in ideologies, 
tactics and strategies. Two of the best known were the Partai National 
Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party), led by the future Indonesian 
president Sukarno, which espoused a populist ideology rooted in a 
blend of Marxist, nationalist and Islamic ideas; and the Partai Sarekat 
Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party, PSII) which was 
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the only Islamic-based party in Java. Mass-based Islamic organisations 
such as Muhammadiyah, which was dedicated to religious and social 
reform and did not engage directly in politics, nevertheless strongly 
infl uenced the growth of a sense of one national community rooted in 
the majority faith of its populace, Islam. (Key dates for the Indonesian 
nationalist movement are found in the text box in the previous chap-
ter. For place names mentioned in this chapter, see maps 4 and 5.)
 In West Sumatra, the home of the Minangkabau ethnic group, 
the nationalist movement developed somewhat diff erently. Long a 
centre for Islamic reform, West Sumatra was the site of the Paderi 
Wars (1820–37), a confl ict that broke out between the purveyors of 
new Islamic ideas brought back by a number of religious leaders who 
studied abroad, and the traditional elite. Th e latter defended the blend 
of local custom and Islamic belief that had developed over centuries 
in the region, including its matrilineal inheritance system, against a 
stricter interpretation of what was Islamic.3  Th e confl ict between the 
kaum muda and kaum tua in the early years of the 20th century was 
in some ways a continuation of this older contestation. But what began 
as a religious reform movement in West Sumatra became increasingly 
nationalist in ideology and outlook; for the younger generation of 
Minangkabau leaders, there was no contradiction between these two 
currents of thought.
 Schools were at the centre of the reformist project in West Suma-
tra. Th e fi rst school to break away from a traditional model of educa-
tion to introduce secular subjects was the Diniyah School, founded 
in Padang Panjang in 1915 by the prominent Islamic reformist 
Zainuddin Labai El Yunus. More important, Zainuddin’s sister, Rahmah 
El Yunusiah, established a version of the Diniyah School for girls in 
1923 and thus became a central fi gure in the development of modern 
Islamic education in Indonesia, particularly for girls. Th e fame of her 
school spread, attracting pupils from as far away as Malaysia and 
Singapore, as noted in chapter 6 by Helen Ting in this volume. By 
1926 it had become a boarding school for girls that taught a mixture 
of religious subjects and domestic science. 
 Rahmah’s motto for her school was that girls must be educated to 
become educators in the home, in the school and in society.4  Despite 
the matrilineal inheritance system, which gave Minangkabau women 
some economic independence, a woman’s primary function was con-
sidered to be her role as wife and mother, as it was elsewhere in the 
Indies at this time. A basic education was thought adequate for girls 
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who married young. Some religious knowledge was considered neces-
sary, but even girls from pious families generally received only a rudi-
mentary religious education. Th e Islamic reformist movement changed 
this attitude. Th e kaum muda established religious organisations and 
schools specifi cally for girls, arguing that women had the same rights 
to religious education as men because, just like men, they were 
accountable before God for their deeds on Earth. Further, women had 
the responsibility to spread Islam to other women through involve-
ment in organisations such as Aisyiyah, the women’s wing of Muham-
madiyah, to further the interests of Islam in Indonesia. Th us women 
required education related not just to their roles in the family, but 
also to their religious roles.5  Rahmah’s school was the embodiment 
of such an attitude, and Rahmah herself was a strong, independent 
woman who impressed people with her single-mindedness and the 
fi rmness of her convictions. 
 Another fi gure pivotal to the Minangkabau reformist movement, 
Haji Abdul Kasim Abdullah, known as Haji Rasul, founded a second 
important school network in 1918 with the establishment of the fi rst 
Th awalib school, also in Padang Panjang. Inspired by the Diniyah 
School, Haji Rasul’s school introduced graded classes, textbooks, and 
more modern methods of teaching and curriculum. Th e Th awalib 
schools specialised in teaching theoretical and philosophical aspects of 
Islam. Th e goal was to produce graduates who could think for them-
selves and act as teachers and religious reformers in the community.6  
Th is emphasis on students refl ecting on their social and political 
circumstances and those of Muslims in the Indies led many students 
into political involvement. Th e original school in Padang Panjang be-
came heavily infl uenced by Communist ideology, causing Haji Rasul, 
a fervent anti-Communist, to resign  —  but the network continued to 
grow, producing many of the region’s younger leaders. Among such 
leaders, Communist ideology oft en blended with Islamic ideas about 
social justice and anti-imperialism to produce interesting alliances 
between Communists, traders and some of the kaum muda in the 
major cities of the region.7 
 By 1930, there were various strands of the kaum muda move-
ment. Muhammadiyah, the Islamic organisation founded in Java in 
1912, was introduced into West Sumatra by Haji Rasul in 1925 and 
began to experience strong growth.8  Th e PSII was also gaining in 
popularity. Both Muhammadiyah and the PSII were more radical in 
West Sumatra than in Java. Th en in November 1928, the Sumatra 
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Th awalib Union, an organisation for Th awalib students, was estab-
lished. It was set up with the goal of unifying the various Th awalib 
schools and modernising the curriculum, but its sphere of interest 
soon grew to include issues of social and political transformation.9  
As some of the more radical Minangkabau leaders tried to take 
Muhammadiyah in a more political direction, the central leadership 
in Java came under increasing pressure from the Dutch authorities 
to weed out such elements and purge the West Sumatran branches 
of “extremists”.10  Matters came to a head in 1930, resulting in the 
founding by the leaders of the Sumatra Th awalib Union of a new 
organisation, Persatuan Moeslimin Indonesia (Permi, Union of Indo-
nesian Muslims).11  It attracted the more political elements of the West 
Sumatran kaum muda, including those dissatisfi ed with the apolitical 
direction of Muhammadiyah.
 Permi combined Islam and nationalism as its two pillars, dif-
ferentiating itself from the secular-oriented parties led by Dutch-
speaking intellectuals such as the future president, Sukarno, but also 
from most other Islamic organisations not involved in politics, such as 
Muhammadiyah. Its motto was “Islam to achieve the nobility of Islam, 
nationalism to achieve an independent Indonesia”.12  Th e widespread 
appeal of Permi and its leaders immediately attracted the attention of 
Dutch authorities concerned about the combination of political radi-
calism and Islam.13  At its third congress in Padang in December 1932, 
Permi offi  cially became a political party with 160 branches throughout 
West Sumatra, its primary base of support, and in most regions of 
Sumatra.14  Of the 10,000 or so Permi members in 1933, several thou-
sand were women.15 
Rasuna: Th e Early Years
Born during a period of turbulence, Rasuna Said came from a family 
known for their religiosity and well regarded in the village in which 
they lived, near the marketplace of the bustling town of Maninjau. 
Rasuna grew up in the home of her uncle because her father, a suc-
cessful trader, was oft en away for long periods. She was reportedly the 
only one of her siblings to receive a religious education rather than 
a secular education in a Dutch school aft er she left  primary school.16  
Aft er graduating from primary school, she studied at an Islamic 
school near her home before moving to Padang Panjang to attend the 
Diniyah School.17 
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 While studying at the Diniyah School, Rasuna began to teach 
younger students  —  a practice common among gift ed students. She 
also came into contact with the founder’s sister, Rahmah El Yunusiah, 
who was six years older than Rasuna. Th ey reportedly took lessons 
together with some leading kaum muda scholars, most notably Haji 
Rasul. Although he is known for a number of his less enlightened 
views on women,18  Haji Rasul nevertheless believed in the importance 
of religious education for girls. When Diniyah Girls School was estab-
lished in 1923, Rasuna became an assistant teacher there while conti-
nuing her studies. She also attended a school in Padang Panjang that 
taught girls household skills.
 In 1926 Rasuna returned to Maninjau for a couple of years 
following a major earthquake in Padang Panjang that destroyed the 
newly constructed Diniyah Girls School.19  While there, she continued 
her religious education, studying primarily at the Th awalib school 
under the directorship of Haji Udin Rachmany, a reformist Muslim 
involved in both the political and religious movements, from whom 
she also took private lessons. Rasuna excelled, completing the four-
year course in just two years.20  She was also involved in establishing 
a school to combat illiteracy, the fi rst of its kind in the town. During 
this time, Rasuna acquired many of the skills that were to mark 
her participation in the nationalist movement. Aft er sunset prayers 
each evening, Haji Rachmany reportedly talked to his students about 
the nationalist movement and the need to achieve Indonesian inde-
pendence. He also gave his students weekly lessons in public speaking 
and debating, and Rasuna sometimes made speeches that lasted an 
entire aft ernoon.21 
A Political Career
Haji Rachmany was the person who introduced Rasuna into the 
world of political organisations. Like many of the Minangkabau kaum 
muda, he had been attracted to the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
stance of the Communist Party and become a member, but he 
was expelled when he questioned the party’s position on religion 
in 1925.22  However, he continued his association with the Sarikat 
Rakyat (People’s Union), a Communist-affi  liated organisation popular 
in West Sumatra, and it was no doubt Rachmany who convinced his 
young student Rasuna to join that organisation in 1926, becoming 
either branch secretary or propagandist.23  While she was a member 
of Sarikat Rakyat, the Communist Party staged a disastrous abortive 
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revolt in West Sumatra  —  in the town of Silungkang  —  in 1927.24  
Both Rachmany and Rasuna were reportedly involved in preparations 
for the revolt in Maninjau, and following its suppression, Sarikat 
Rakyat was disbanded.25  Th is ended Rasuna’s formal involvement with 
left -wing politics, but some of its ideologies continued to inspire her.
 In 1928 Rasuna joined a branch of Partai Sarikat Islam (later 
renamed PSII), again with Rachmany, who became its leader in the 
West Sumatran region in 1929. Rasuna held a position in the central 
leadership of the Maninjau branch. Sometime in 1928–29 Rasuna 
returned to Padang Panjang, to her position of assistant teacher at the 
Diniyah Girls School under Rahmah El Yunusiah, and once again she 
immersed herself in the social and political ferment of the town.26  In 
1929, at the age of 19, she married Duski Samad, a politically active 
teacher at the Sumatra Th awalib School in Padang Panjang. Th is she 
did against the wishes of her family, choosing a partner who shared 
her political aspirations.27  Rasuna’s actions here demonstrate not only 
her strength of character and independent mind, but the extent to 
which she was moving away from tradition, presumably under the 
infl uence of the Islamic reform movement. Aft er her marriage, Rasuna 
continued to teach at the Diniyah Girls School while becoming in-
creasingly political through her membership of Permi.
 It is notable that from the beginning women were integral to 
Permi’s central leadership, something that had never happened in an 
Islamic organisation in Java. Although Permi did form a women’s 
wing, in which Rasuna Said was also involved, women in Permi were 
not simply relegated to a separate section of the main party, subor-
dinate to it structurally, as was the usual case in Indonesia. Rasuna 
Said was one of three female leaders of Permi and the only one ap-
pointed to the central board in 1931, as a “propagandist”. Th e other 
two women, Rasimah Ismail and Ratna Sari, were added to the party’s 
leadership the following year, along with a number of other women.
 What makes Rasuna’s involvement in the Permi leadership and 
her role as propagandist so interesting is that her appointment to this 
role happened a year aft er Haji Rasul took on the Muhammadiyah 
leadership from Java over the issue of a woman addressing a mixed 
gathering, an act he considered haram (prohibited) and against cus-
tom, although it was common practice in Java.28  As this incident indi-
cates, there were diff erences in attitude towards women’s participation 
in the public sphere both within and between Muslim groups. Alfi an 
has argued that reformist Islam as it developed in Minangkabau was 
more puritanical than in Java; it was more concerned with a faithful 
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following of the central tenets of Islam than with the modernising 
aspect of the reformist project, and this led to diff erent attitudes on 
women’s roles and a greater polarisation in West Sumatra on the issue 
than in Java.29  Abdullah also recounts a 1927 visit by Haji Fachruddin, 
a leading Muhammadiyah fi gure from Yogyakarta, to West Sumatra, 
where he told his audience that Islam was now more progressive 
in Java than in Sumatra.30  Like other Islamic reformist movements 
going back to the Paderi War, Muhammadiyah was also critical of 
the matrilineal inheritance system in Minangkabau, which was seen as 
backward.31  Nevertheless, in Minangkabau women participated in 
Muslim organisations, including Muhammadiyah, in large numbers. 
Rasuna apparently threw herself into her new job as propagandist for 
Permi, travelling around the region to address public meetings and 
attempting to persuade other women to join the movement in fi ghting 
for Indonesian independence. Her husband did the same, and it is said 
that the marriage suff ered: the two oft en did not see each other for 
weeks at a time and divorced in the early 1930s, with Rasuna retaining 
custody of their young daughter.32  But the two remained friends for 
the rest of Rasuna’s life, and they continued to work together in the 
party leadership.
 In 1930 the relationship between Rasuna and Rahmah El 
Yunusiah, who continued to be her employer at the school in Padang 
Panjang, fell apart over the issue of the teaching of politics. In a legen-
dary episode, Rasuna is said to have begun to teach her young stu-
dents, both in class and outside, about the importance of political 
action in order to achieve an independent Indonesia.33  Because of the 
situation in their homeland, they, as the future leaders of Minang-
kabau, needed to be involved in the political movement. Rasuna’s 
request to have politics taught as a separate subject was rejected by 
Rahmah, on the grounds that faith must form the bedrock of all edu-
cation: without it, all political action was meaningless and possibly 
dangerous because it would be open to exploitation. Th e teaching of 
politics would also endanger the school, bringing it to the attention 
of the Dutch authorities and causing disputes among teachers, pupils 
and parents. If pupils wanted to engage in politics, they could do so 
aft er graduation, and their religious education would give them a fi rm 
foundation on which to base their actions.34 
 Nevertheless, Rasuna continued to engage her students in poli-
tical discussions and, given her prominence in the Permi movement, 
was a fi gure of great charisma, revered by many of the girls, who 
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became so absorbed in the political maelstrom around them that they 
began to neglect the regulations of the boarding school, including 
communal prayers.35  When it became clear that no agreement could 
be reached between these two strong-willed women, Rahmah took the 
matter to the School Council, which agreed that politics should not 
be taught in the school. Consequently, in 1931 Rasuna left  Diniyah 
Girls School and moved to Padang.
 Th e move was fortuitous for Rasuna, given that the central board 
of Permi had moved to Padang, which became the centre of the 
Islamic nationalist movement.36  In Padang Rasuna was shocked by 
what she saw as the backward state of women, and she launched an 
attack on the local traditions and customs that denied girls education 
and political participation.37  She formed a Permi group specifi cally for 
women and girls, founded a primary school in Padang, and taught at 
the Th awalib Putri School. Under Permi’s direction, literacy schools 
were set up all over West Sumatra that also served to provide political 
education and draw people into the movement, and Rasuna taught 
in these too. She then left  her primary school in Padang and went 
to teach at a teacher training school in Bukittinggi, aft er the school 
director, the charismatic Permi leader Muchtar Loethfi , requested the 
Permi leadership board that she take up this position because he was 
so impressed by her.38  She still held this position in December 1932, 
when her life took a dramatic turn.
Rasuna’s Arrest and Trial
Dutch authorities had become increasingly concerned about the 
nationalist sentiments being expressed by the more radical Indonesian 
organisations. Th e role of women in stirring up nationalist sentiments 
in West Sumatra was commented on by one Dutch offi  cial in 1933. 
“More than elsewhere,” he stated, “women on the West coast tend to 
be interested in the political movement, and to drive this movement, 
whereby they sometimes deliberately put the men to shame.” Women 
such as Rasuna Said and Rasimah Ismail, he continued, were no 
exceptions; and in many meetings, women were in the majority and 
oft en expressed themselves “more sharply and passionately than the 
other sex”.39  Rasuna Said had thus begun to acquire a reputation for 
fearlessly expressing radical political ideas.
 Rasuna gave a speech at a public meeting of the women’s wing 
of Permi in Padang Panjang on 23 October 1932 titled “Steps to the 
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Independence of the People in a Greater Indonesia”.40  Aft er giving 
a history of the nationalist movement in Indonesia, she argued that 
Dutch rule had destroyed people’s livelihoods, which in turn had de-
stroyed the character and values of the Indonesian people. Th e Quran, 
she continued, taught that imperialism ruined their lives and those of 
their grandchildren. According to the report of the meeting, Rasuna 
quoted “a wise person”: “Man is born free, it is only society that makes 
him into a slave, sinning against religion and nation.” It went on: 
“Th e speaker raised the spirits of the gathering with these words: ‘It 
is better that we ask Allah for death than that we are not of service 
to the nation’. ” In these short excerpts we see some of the reasons for 
Dutch concern. Th e critique of imperialism is typical of sentiments 
expressed by the confl uence of radical and Islamic ideas in West 
Sumatra. And it comes close to a call to arms, linking nationalist ideas 
with those of serving God.
 Less than a month later, aft er another speech in Payakumbuh, 
Rasuna Said was arrested and charged with contravening articles 153 
and 154 of the Criminal Code, the “hate sowing” articles designed 
to be used against those who intentionally disturbed public order or 
expressed feelings of hatred or contempt for the Dutch government in 
the Indies. Rasuna gave the speech at a public session of the women’s 
section of Permi on the principles and goals of Permi. She began by 
explaining Permi’s policy of treating imperialism as the enemy, and 
of not joining any of the councils established by the Dutch to allow 
limited political participation by Indonesians. Permi, she said, was 
working towards an independent Indonesia, and the councils were 
there only to improve the Netherlands Indies, not Indonesia. At this 
stage of the speech, an offi  cial intervened and warned Rasuna to watch 
her words. She continued with the theme of Islam as the enemy of 
imperialism on the basis of the Quran. She then moved on to defend 
Permi against accusations that it was not aligned with the national 
movement but rather based on Islam, which was international, and 
stated that Permi would treat all Indonesians who were not Muslims 
justly in accord with what was written in the Quran. Finally she called 
on the daughters of Payakumbuh to “move” and not to be feeble as 
they had been so far: “We must achieve Indonesian independence, 
independence must come.” Th e speech, according to the newspaper 
report, was well received by the public, who numbered about 1,000.41 
 Rasuna Said was held in custody until her trial on 28 December 
1932. Although she was the fi rst woman to be charged with what was 
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known as a spreekdelict (speaking off ence), she was soon joined by her 
fellow Permi member Rasimah Ismail, who was arrested aft er a speech 
at a Permi meeting on 23 November. Th e arrest of the two women 
caused a stir locally, but aft er Rasuna’s trial, where she received a sen-
tence of 15 months’ imprisonment, her case became a national cause 
célèbre. Th e response was in part because of the novelty factor: she 
was the fi rst woman to be imprisoned for speaking out against Dutch 
rule. But more important, it was because of her demeanour and the 
sentiments she expressed at her trial. Rasuna was unrepentant. In a 
letter she sent to the Permi board while awaiting trial, she stated: “We 
struggle with conviction! If we win in our struggle, we will get two 
benefi ts. First, Indonesia will be free; second, paradise as promised by 
God. And if we fail  —  but we are not allowed to  —  then indeed a free 
Indonesia will not be achieved, but paradise still awaits. Th is is our 
conviction!” 42 
 People fl ocked from all over West Sumatra to attend Rasuna’s 
trial before the local court in Payakumbuh. Up to 1,500 people, some 
from the towns but others from Islamic boarding schools in the vil-
lages, waited outside the courtroom. Th e charges were read out: that 
she, in a public meeting of around 1,000 people, had planted feelings 
of hostility, at the very least sowing hatred towards the Dutch govern-
ment. Th e off ending words singled out by the authorities were: “Th e 
people demand Indonesian independence. Until they are independent, 
the people of Indonesia will be considered lowly and abject by the 
world. Permi bases its politics on non-cooperation, it does not parti-
cipate in Councils created by the Dutch government.”43  Rasuna was 
then cross-examined on what she meant by various sentiments ex-
pressed in the speech. She answered every question without hesitation 
and gave unadorned answers, oft en causing a stir among the audience. 
For example, when she was asked what she meant by her opening 
words in the meeting  —  “Happy greetings to the sons and daughters 
who are not yet free, but will become free, and the Dutch government 
will disappear”  —  Rasuna explained that the people of Indonesia were 
not yet free but “sooner or later will achieve independence. I know, 
and the whole world knows, that every people has the right to inde-
pendence. It is also clear that when the time comes when Indonesia 
is independent, then the Dutch government that is in power now will 
disappear, itself fall.” When asked why she made the statement, she 
said it was in order “to hold out the promise of the times to come. 
Also to raise the spirits of my people.”
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 Under questioning, Rasuna explained that the struggle against 
oppression was a natural law, that the Indonesians were enslaved by 
Dutch regulations and norms, and that they were victims of impe-
rialism. Her goal was to increase the spirit of the people to struggle 
to achieve independence. When the judge asked the meaning of her 
statement “If my brothers feel afraid to join the struggle, won’t they 
feel embarrassed if Indonesian independence is achieved by women?” 
she replied (confi rming Dutch views about the way women were 
egging men on to join the movement) that she said this to “increase 
the fuel” of the movement among men. Th e audience, she said else-
where, consisted of women and some men, some of whom were 
educated, but all of whom understood the meaning of her speech. 
When asked how she knew this, she replied, “Th ey had tears in their 
eyes while I spoke.”
 News of Rasuna’s sentence and trial spread across the archipelago. 
Th e way in which she conducted herself and used the court as a forum 
to disseminate Permi’s political views and agitate for Indonesian inde-
pendence met with widespread approval. Permi received letters and 
telegrams of admiration and support from a number of political parties 
and individuals. Dr Sutomo, a well-known Javanese nationalist leader, 
called Rasuna a “model for Indonesian leaders and heroes”.44  Locally, 
Rasuna Said was compared to the nationalist leader Sukarno, who 
had given a famous speech at his trial in Bandung in August 1930. 
While awaiting her transfer to the women’s prison in Semarang, Java, 
where she would serve out her sentence, Rasuna was inundated by 
gift s of food from the local women of Payakumbuh, and it was also 
reported that at least fi ve women had named their daughters Rasuna, 
with one woman stating, “May my child be like Rasuna.” 45  When the 
ship arrived in the harbour near Padang to take Rasuna and Rasimah 
Ismail, who had been sentenced to nine months by the local court 
in Bukittinggi, to Tanjung Priok in Java, over 1,000 people fl ocked to 
bid them farewell.
 Rasuna Said’s trial represents the peak of her involvement in the 
political stream of the nationalist movement. Th e public recognition 
and support she received made her for a short time the most promi-
nent woman in that movement. However, her involvement came at 
great personal cost to this young woman, who was accompanied to 
the women’s prison in Semarang by her baby daughter. Th e same 
opinion writer who compared her so favourably to Sukarno in a later 
piece also pointed out the diff erences between the two. Sukarno, he 
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wrote, was an engineer, a graduate of higher education, with a high 
level of knowledge and experience in the world of politics. Rasuna, on 
the other hand, was a primary school graduate who could not speak 
Dutch and had very little experience of politics, especially outside her 
region. For the defence teams at his trial Sukarno had top men from 
across Java; Rasuna had only one defence advocate, from the neigh-
bouring province.
 Rasuna Said was the fi rst of the Permi leaders tried and impri-
soned by the Dutch. Dutch authorities instituted a range of repressive 
measures against the remaining leaders, including restrictions on 
movement, a prohibition on teaching, and a ban on holding public 
meetings. Th e three main leaders were arrested in August and Sep-
tember 1933 and exiled to Boven Digul in Papua, as were other leading 
fi gures including Rasuna’s former husband, Duski Samad. Others left  
the region because they feared government reprisals. In the end, there 
was almost no one left  to run the main offi  ce in Padang. Ratna Sari, 
another prominent Minangkabau woman, became Permi’s fi rst female 
president, also taking on the role of secretary, and the fi rst female 
to head any political party in Indonesia. Unfortunately, she did not 
remain president for long: her family placed pressure on her to return 
home, which she then did. Permi limped on for some years, before 
fi nally disbanding in October 1937.
Post-Imprisonment
When Rasuna was released from prison in 1934, she returned to a 
very diff erent world. Dutch repressive activity had succeeded in taking 
the steam out of the nationalist movement, especially in West Sumatra. 
In Java, a celebration had been planned for her and Rasimah’s release, 
but it could not be held due to a ban on public meetings.46  Rasuna 
returned to Padang and studied for four years at the Islamic College, 
a teacher training institute established by Permi in 1931.47  She began 
her journalistic career, writing for the college journal Raya, as well as 
teaching at a girls’ school she had founded.48  According to J. Jahroni, 
Rasuna wrote several harsh critiques of the Dutch for causing misery 
to Indonesia, with Raya becoming a rallying point for the movement 
in West Sumatra. However, she became disillusioned with the demise 
of Permi and the cowardly attitude of some Permi leaders.49  Th e 
Dutch continued to exercise strict control over the nationalist move-
ment in Padang, and as a result of all these factors Rasuna eventually 
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moved to Medan in North Sumatra, probably around 1938. Th ere 
she established a girls’ school and edited the journal Menara Putri, a 
weekly magazine focusing on issues to do with women and Islam.50  
Politics was taught at the school, with girls told that they had an im-
portant role to play in the nationalist movement and that they had 
the right and responsibility to contribute to the social, economic and 
political fi elds rather than simply running the household, although 
this was also important.51 
 Rasuna’s only appearance in the public spotlight during these years 
came with the release of a Draft  Marriage Ordinance by the Dutch 
authorities in June 1937. Th e ordinance allowed Muslim couples to 
voluntarily register a marriage contract that prohibited polygamy and 
permitted divorce only before a judge in a civil court.52  It caused 
such an outcry among Islamic groups that it was withdrawn from 
discussion before it was formally introduced. Although the ordinance 
was meant to apply only to Java and Madura, ad hoc committees to 
fi ght it were set up in numerous cities outside of Java, including 
Medan. Rasuna Said gave the keynote address at a meeting of the 
Medan committee in August 1937, before 500 women.53  In her speech 
Rasuna defended Islamic marriage law, including polygamy and provi-
sions for divorce, while acknowledging there were problems with its 
implementation in Indonesia. Her argument was that although there 
was a “fl ood” of divorces, leaving many women and children destitute, 
and men took a second wife without thinking deeply about their ac-
tions, these shortcomings had to do with the state of society, not with 
the marriage law itself. Islam, she argued, regulated marriage perfectly. 
Polygamy was necessary in some cases because it was preferable to 
men taking mistresses and having children out of wedlock, leaving 
women and their families in a precarious legal situation without the 
rights accorded to them as legitimate family members. Divorce was an 
escape clause from an unhappy marriage. Forcing men, and especially 
women, to appear before a court of law to provide evidence of the 
need for a divorce would be deeply shaming and would deter divorce 
applications, so that women would be unable to remarry and would 
be forced to live in poverty.
 Th e contents of Rasuna’s speech refl ected the general attitude of 
Islamic groups to the draft  ordinance. She acknowledged there were 
problems but disagreed with the remedy proposed, instead seeing the 
solution in better education for Islamic marriage offi  cials responsible 
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for implementing Islamic marriage law, and in giving greater auto-
nomy to Muslims to marry, reconcile and divorce according to the 
teachings of Islam. In her speech, Rasuna identifi ed herself clearly 
within an Indonesian Islamic women’s movement and diff erentiated 
herself from the nationalist movement. As Muslim women, she argued, 
members of her movement had an insight into the state of marriage 
that had as much validity as that of either the men and women of 
the nationalist movement, or the government. While secular women’s 
groups were fi ghting for stronger protection for women in marriage, 
although they mostly rejected the draft  ordinance  —  as chapter 3 on 
Suyatin Kartowiyono points out  —  Muslim women’s groups defended 
marriage law based on orthodox interpretations of the Quran and 
regulated by Muslims themselves. Marriage law was a major stumbling 
block to the unifi cation of the women’s movement in Indonesia in 
the pre-independence period, especially given the numerical strength 
of the Muslim women’s organisations, and continued to be a sticking 
point in the newly formed republic until at least the 1970s.
 Interestingly, Rasuna’s tone was altogether diff erent from that 
of her earlier speeches. She began by praising the Dutch authorities 
for their good intentions in wanting to improve the ailing state of 
marriage in Indonesia, while politely disagreeing with their proposals 
for reform. She presented her arguments with conviction, but in a 
respectful and reasoned way, and ended by calling on the Dutch 
government to withdraw the draft  ordinance in a manner well re-
moved from the fi ery speeches she had made before her arrest. 
From her time in Medan, Rasuna allegedly became associated more 
with left -oriented political movements, although the primary evidence 
for such accusations seems to be her second marriage to Bariun 
AS, a known left ist.54  Yet there is no sign here of her earlier anti-
imperialism, or of left ist sentiments. Perhaps this is tactical; she had 
clearly learnt from her earlier experience of incarceration. But the 
views she expressed concerning Islam and the importance of Islamic 
practices and institutions in daily life are consistent with her strong 
Islamic identity. Her biographers noted that throughout her life 
Rasuna dressed in what was regarded as an Islamic way: a long batik 
skirt, fl owing tunic, and headdress pinned neatly under the chin. She 
also strictly observed Islamic dietary requirements and was respected 
for her piety and religious knowledge. Rasuna was both a strong 
advocate for the rights of women and a committed Muslim who 
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believed her reformist beliefs provided women with a platform from 
which to reform society and press for those rights.
Th e Later Years
Rasuna returned to West Sumatra in 1942 following the Japanese 
occupation of Sumatra during World War II. On her return she joined 
the short-lived Pemuda Nippon Raya, an organisation founded by 
Chatib Sulaiman to bring all the youth organisations in the region 
under one umbrella and, under the guise of supporting the Japanese, 
to work towards Indonesian independence. When the Japanese 
disbanded the movement, suspicious of its goals, they arrested the 
leaders, Rasuna included, but soon released them to avoid causing 
popular unrest.55  In October 1943, prompted by the Japanese for stra-
tegic reasons to aid their own defence, Chatib Sulaiman established 
a volunteer military force known as Giyu Gun. From the beginning, 
Giyu Gun had strong nationalist aims. It became a vehicle to prepare 
for Indonesian self-government, by establishing networks of commu-
nication and self-help across the region as well as developing military 
skills and arming those trained.56 
 Sulaiman enlisted young leaders from across West Sumatra to 
recruit and support the forces, including Rasuna, Rahmah El Yunusiah 
and Ratna Sari. Th ey founded a woman’s section of the Giyu Gun 
called Hahanokai, which acted as a support organisation, helping with 
the logistics of feeding and clothing the fl edgling force and providing 
them with moral support. Th e women were also active as propagan-
dists, drumming up community support for the troops and inspiring 
potential recruits to join the organisation. Rasuna travelled widely 
and worked tirelessly for Hahanokai. According to one story, Rasuna’s 
friends visited her at home and were surprised to meet Bariun AS, 
her second husband, there  —  Rasuna having largely kept her marriage 
a secret. Bariun is reported to have told the women, “Yes, Kak Una 
[Sister Una] is my wife, but actually she is married to the struggle.” 
And Rasuna herself is said to have concurred: “No matter how much I 
need Bung Bariun [Brother Bariun], the struggle is more important.” 57 
 Aft er the declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 August 
1945, Rasuna continued to be involved in politics at the regional level 
but also increasingly at the national level. Unfortunately, it is diffi  cult 
to fi nd detailed reports of her activities from the period 1945 till her 
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death in 1965, but she seems to have played an important and perhaps 
idiosyncratic  —  or at least individual  —  role in national life. At the 
regional level, when independence was declared, Rasuna worked 
together with a number of leading fi gures to form organisations sup-
porting the new republic. When Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, 
himself a West Sumatran, visited Bukittinggi on 29–30 July 1947 and 
established an organisation called Fron Pertahanan Nasional (National 
Defence Front), Rasuna became part of the central leadership of the 
organisation and headed the women’s section. Th e organisation brought 
together the various elements of Minangkabau society, including reli-
gious and customary leaders and mass organisations, political parties, 
and women’s and youth groups, in an attempt to avoid the types of 
social and political divisions that were causing major problems else-
where in Indonesia and becoming apparent in West Sumatra.58  Th e 
fact that Rasuna was chosen to play a prominent role in this and 
other organisations shows the prestige she enjoyed in the region.
 One organisation to which Rasuna belonged that is not men-
tioned in any of the biographies is the Volksfront, an organisation 
established by Chatib Sulaiman and Barius AS in mid-March 1946 as 
a local chapter of the Persatuan Perjuangan (Struggle Union), founded 
by the Communist leader Tan Malaka.59  At a conference in Java, Tan 
Malaka had presented a seven-point programme that he wanted the 
government to adopt. Th e Republican government considered three 
of these points unacceptable: 100 per cent independence (this was a 
time when the republic was involved in negotiations with the Dutch 
to form part of a federation), the seizure and control of plantations 
belonging to the enemy, and the seizure and control of industries 
belonging to the enemy.60  In West Sumatra the Volksfront began to 
assume many of the functions of the regional government, and rela-
tions between the two bodies became increasingly tense. When the 
Volksfront introduced measures that would make the 100 rupiah note 
invalid, its leaders were arrested and detained.61  Rasuna Said was 
among those arrested, but she was given house arrest. All the leaders 
were released aft er a week, on the proviso they did not attempt to 
seize economic control again.62 
 Rasuna soon became more involved at the level of national poli-
tics. In January 1947, she was one of 14 members chosen by the West 
Sumatran chapter of the Indonesian National Committee to represent 
the region in the Central Indonesian National Committee, a quasi 
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parliament established to assist the president. According to her bio-
graphies, she became a member of the Working Party of the Central 
Indonesian National Committee, a legislative body established to 
increase the power of the Committee vis-à-vis the president.63  Rasuna 
supported the ratifi cation of the Linggajati Agreement, which had 
been drawn up in November 1946, recognising Indonesian sovereignty 
over Java and Sumatra within a Dutch Federal Republic. Her support 
for the Linggajati Agreement is interesting, given her involvement 
in the Persatuan Perjuangan, which had demanded “100% indepen-
dence”, and the continued opposition to the agreement of some left -
wing groups, headed by Tan Malaka, and the reformist Islamic party 
Masyumi.64  Th is is evidence of Rasuna’s support for President Sukarno, 
with whom she is said to have had a close relationship.
 Aft er the transfer of power from the Dutch to the republic in 
1950, Rasuna was appointed to the transitional parliament intended to 
advise the president until elections could be held. Her appointment 
was as a representative of women’s groups, and she was part of the 
Finance Committee of the parliament. She was also a member of the 
steering committee of a body set up by the parliament to coordinate 
eff orts to bring West Irian (now West Papua) under Indonesian 
control. When Sukarno formed the National Council, an advisory 
body to the cabinet meant to represent functional groups in society, 
Rasuna was appointed a member in July 1957. And when that body 
was transformed into the Supreme Advisory Council, as part of 
the move towards authoritarian rule in Indonesia, she retained her 
membership.65  She stayed in parliament until her death from breast 
cancer in November 1965, a time when the country was in turmoil 
as the transition began between the old order under Sukarno, and the 
New Order under Suharto. Before her death, she is said to have de-
voted more and more time to trading activities, having acquired capi-
tal through her political connections and become a wealthy woman.
 Although details are hard to come by, there are a number of 
interesting facets of Rasuna’s later career and life. First, Rasuna refused 
to join the Muslim political party Masyumi, unlike many of her former 
colleagues from Permi, and despite being urged to do so. Second, 
she became directly involved in the nationalist women’s movement, 
joining Perwari, a secular women’s organisation established in late 
1945 to fi ght for social justice for women and for all society, and to 
assist in the struggle for Indonesian independence (see chapter 3 on 
Suyatin Kartowiyono).66  Perwari was particularly associated with the 
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struggle during the 1950s for a marriage law, a struggle in which there 
was much tension between Muslim women’s organisations and other 
women’s organisations. It is unclear how long Rasuna was a member 
and in what capacity, but she was associated with the organisation 
until at least 1954, when she was said to have been its vice-president.67  
Th ird, Rasuna became involved in the peace movement in the 1950s, 
attending peace congresses in Copenhagen, Budapest and Beijing as 
well as organising a peace conference in Jakarta. According to a Dutch 
report in 1954, she was a “well-known fi gure” in “the Communist 
women’s and world peace movement”.68  Finally, Rasuna strongly 
rejected the Revolutionary Government Republic of Indonesia rebel-
lion in West Sumatra, which involved many of her old colleagues, 
including Rahmah El Yunusiah. Th e rebellion (1958–61) arose through 
widespread disillusionment with the radical direction the Sukarno 
government was taking and received support from many kaum muda 
Muslims, including several in the Masyumi party.69  Rasuna denounced 
the actions of a number of her former friends, speaking with Sukarno 
at a public rally in Bandung, calling on the rebels to return to the 
nationalist fold, and stating that the rebellion made her feel ashamed 
to be a daughter of Minangkabau.70 
 Perhaps Rasuna’s path in later life was informed by a more left -
wing world view, developing out of the earlier period when she was 
infl uenced by ideas combining Islamic anti-imperialism with left ist 
thought, while not necessarily adopting other Marxist ideas, especially 
regarding the role of religion in daily life. Perhaps with the establish-
ment of the republic she became more secular in her outlook, in 
the sense that  —  like many other committed Indonesian Muslims, 
including her fellow Minangkabau Hatta  —  she came to believe that 
religion should not form the basis of the state. If so, it is a clear rejec-
tion of some of the ideas she expressed in her days of involvement in 
Permi, where Islam and nationalism were the twin pillars. Neverthe-
less, Islam remained central to her own life and to her legacy as a 
strong Muslim woman fi ghting for what she believed in: the nation, 
and the rights of women to education and full participation in social 
and political life.
A National Hero
Rasuna was awarded the title National Hero on 13 December 1974. 
Th is made her only the ninth woman to achieve such recognition 
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in Indonesia and the fi rst to be honoured for her contribution to 
the nationalist struggle. Previously women were recognised either for 
their participation in regional struggles against Dutch rule, which took 
place before the national movement originated, or for their general 
contribution to the women’s movement, fi ghting for education and the 
rights of women.71 
 Rasuna Said lived during tumultuous times. Like many of her 
generation she was born into a colonial state, lived through a period 
of Japanese occupation, participated in a revolutionary war, and be-
came part of the fi rst democratic period of rule in Indonesia. Th rough 
all of these changes, she demonstrated a deep commitment to the 
nationalist cause, to Islam and to the interests of women. Th e locus 
of her activities changed from regional to national, but even in her 
time as a propagandist for Permi, it was clear that her loyalties lay 
with an entity far larger than just West Sumatra. Her faith informed 
her anti-imperialism; how she understood the role of the non-Muslim 
minority within an independent state is unclear. Her faith also taught 
her that women needed to be educated and were religious subjects 
whose rights and duties were the same as men’s, even if their social 
roles diff ered. Th e twin pillars enshrined as Permi’s ideological basis 
of Islam and nationalism made Rasuna a passionate advocate for the 
need for women to become educated and involved in politics, an atti-
tude that made her diff erent from the mainstream of Islamic reformists 
and Muslim women’s organisations who believed that women should 
be active in the Islamic reform movement but not nationalist politics.
 Th ere is, however, much about Rasuna’s motivations and ideo-
logical commitment that remains elusive. Th e speeches we have from 
the height of her political engagement in the nationalist movement do 
not specifi cally mention issues of women’s rights, beyond the need for 
women to participate in the nationalist cause. At times she identifi ed 
strongly with the reformist Islamic movement, for example on the 
issue of marriage reform; at other times her nationalism appeared to 
be the strongest motivating force. In the later decades of colonial rule, 
Sukarno claimed to be “a convinced nationalist, a convinced Muslim, 
a convinced Marxist”.72  Rasuna’s life story shows a similar commit-
ment to nationalism and Islam. While Sukarno may have added 
Marxism, Rasuna, less overtly left ist in her ideology, added a commit-
ment to the rights of women.
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chapter 5
Salud Algabre: A Forgotten 
Member of the Philippine Sakdal
Ma. Luisa T. Camagay
Born in 1894, Salud Algabre was a member of the Sakdal, a Philip-pine peasant organisation founded in 1930 by Benigno Ramos. 
Th e organisation protested against the mainstream nationalist move-
ment led by Manuel Quezon, because the Sakdalistas considered that 
it was not seeking genuine independence from the American colo-
nialists and that it was dominated by landlord interests. Salud fi gured 
prominently in an uprising on 2 May 1935 in the town of Cabuyao, 
Laguna, when she led a group of Sakdalistas who blocked the railroad, 
cut telegraph lines and patrolled the national highway.
 For this act, Salud was arrested by the authorities and stood trial 
on the charge of being a member of an illegal association. Th e case 
lasted for four years. Th e court found her guilty, and she was fi ned 
and sentenced to imprisonment for six to ten years  —  the only woman 
Sakdalista to be so punished. However, she served less than two years 
of her sentence as she was pardoned by Quezon, president of the 
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Aft er World War II Salud conti-
nued her fi ght against big landholders until she died at the age of 85 
in 1979.
 In books containing short biographies of Filipinos in history, there 
are few women, and Salud does not fi gure in the list. Th ere is more 
documentation of Filipino women who struggled to be given the right 
to vote.1  Th e fact that this was a cause spearheaded by educated and 
professional women who were able to document their struggle made 
them by default visible in the historical narrative. Absent or rare, 
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Philippine Nationalist Movement
1896 Outbreak of the Philippine Revolution against Spanish rule
1898 Declaration of independence of the Philippines, followed shortly 
afterwards by the takeover of the country by the United States
1930 Benigno Ramos establishes the Sakdal movement, whose objec-
 tive is to accuse and expose government offi  cials whose acts are 
detrimental to the country
1934 US Congress passes the Tydings-McDuffi  e Act, which provides 
that independence will be granted to the Philippines in ten years
1935 A constitutional convention in the Philippines approves the con-
 stitution on 8 February 1935, and the US president does the same 
on 23 March 1935
 The Sakdal Uprising takes place on 2–3 May 1935 to register 
rejection of the Tydings-McDuffi  e Law and to demand indepen-
 dence by 31 December 1935
 The Commonwealth Government provided for in the 1935 Con-
 stitution is inaugurated on 15 November 1935
1942 Japanese forces land in the Philippines
1943 A Japanese-sponsored republic is proclaimed on 14 October 1943
1945 General Douglas MacArthur proclaims the liberation of the Philip-
 pines from the Japanese
1946 The United States grants the Philippines independence on 4 July
however, is the documentation of women who were active in the 
nationalist movement but came from the lower class. Legitimate though 
the causes of both these types of women, struggles by peasant women 
remain absent or marginalised in the pages of the nation’s history.
 It is also notable that those few women who are generally recog-
nised as having participated in the nationalist movement in the 20th 
century identifi ed with the mainstream and were part of the elite 
that led it. Th e Sakdal movement has been relegated to the sidelines, 
even though it was part of a long history of peasant movements that 
combined nationalism with a struggle for land in the Philippines. 
Except for the discussion of Sakdalism in David Sturtevant’s book 
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(1976), the history of the movement has not been extensively docu-
mented, so the role of Salud Algabre in the Philippines nationalist 
movement has received very little attention. In eff ect, not until very 
recently have women in such peasant movements been the subjects of 
historical study.2 
 Th is chapter relies on a few lesser-known interviews of our 
protagonist. Salud was interviewed in 1935 by the Sunday Tribune 
Magazine and in 1966 by the historian David Sturtevant.3  Th ese tran-
scribed interviews provide invaluable insights into her personality 
and her convictions. Eleven years later, Salud was interviewed by the 
Filipino historian Isagani Medina. Salud was by then 83 years old. Th e 
result of this interview was an article written in 1996 by Th elma B. 
Kintanar and Carina C. David.4  So far, these three interviews remain 
the major sources of information about Salud.
 As a female member of a section of the Philippine nationalist 
movement that combined the demands for independence and rights 
for peasants, Salud Algabre has been lost from view in the history of 
Philippine nationalism. Th is chapter will attempt to return her to the 
ranks of notable nationalists.
Salud Algabre in 1977. Courtesy of 
Nestor Castro
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Filipino Women in the Nationalist Movement
Th e Philippines is home to the fi rst nationalist movement in Southeast 
Asia to have declared independence from Spanish colonial rule and 
established a modern nation-state. In the 19th century modern-style 
nationalist organisations were formed, and in 1896 the Philippine 
Revolution led to the end of Spanish colonial rule and the declaration 
of a short-lived independent Philippine Republic in 1898. US colo-
nialism almost immediately displaced the Spanish. Admittedly, it was 
of a much more benign type than the Spanish colonialism, and the 
Americans claimed to be preparing the Philippines for independence, 
but the actual transfer of sovereignty did not occur until aft er World 
War II, in 1946.
 In the 20th century the mainstream Philippine nationalist move-
ment, which had resorted to armed rebellion against the Spanish, was 
led by a landed elite who cooperated with the Americans, taking posi-
tions in the Philippine Commonwealth structures created by the colo-
nial power in preparation for eventual independence. Th e Jones Law 
of 1916 was the fi rst articulation by the United States of its decision 
to grant the Philippines independence on the condition that a stable 
government was established. It also created an all-Filipino legislature 
composed of a House of Representatives headed by Sergio Osmena 
and a Senate headed by Manuel Quezon. Members of both chambers 
came from the landowning class. Th is elite used their political clout to 
protect their economic interests. Members of the Philippine missions 
sent to the United States to work for independence laws also ori-
ginated from the landed class. Th ere was no room in this mainstream 
nationalist movement for peasants, who constituted the majority of 
the population and included many tenants of the large landlords. Nor 
was there much room for women, even of the elite class.
 Th e Philippine nationalist movement contained a few notable 
women, but colonialism had made it diffi  cult for many women to 
become involved in such public political activities. Eff orts were made 
by the Spanish colonial power, and particularly the Catholic Church, 
to reduce Filipino women to a position of subordination in relation 
to men. Th is kind of socialisation, impressed through education and 
the publication of moral codes about how women should behave, may 
have had an impact on the elite but aff ected ordinary Filipino women 
far less. Aft er all, the creation story of the Filipinos, wherein man and 
woman emerged from a single node of a bamboo, underscored the 
Chap5 (124-146)   127 7/10/13   2:04:36 PM
128 Ma. Luisa T. Camagay
Map 6.   Th e Philippines
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egalitarian status of man and woman in rural society. Women’s poli-
tical activity began in the 19th century. Filipino women established a 
Masonic Lodge dedicated to women and formed a women’s chapter in 
the Katipunan, a secret organisation that aimed to overthrow Spanish 
rule in the Philippines.5 
 In the early 20th century, under US rule, some Filipino women 
entered male-dominated professions (such as medicine and law) and 
demanded the right to vote in the electoral assemblies established by 
the Americans. Th ey fi nally acquired the right to vote through a pro-
vision in the 1935 Constitution.6 
 In this context Filipino women were emboldened to get involved 
in the aff airs of the nation. Th e women included Salud Algabre, who 
took up the fi ght to improve the situation of peasants, for which she 
saw the independence of the country as indispensable. 
Th e Sakdal Movement
Th e Philippines has a long history of agrarian unrest, caused by land 
tenure problems. By the 19th century, land became an important 
economic asset not only for food production but also for commercial 
crops. Early in that century, the Spanish fi nally opened up the Philip-
pines to world trade, which created a demand for certain crops such 
as sugar, tobacco, abaca hemp and rice. At that time, landowners were 
of two types: religious corporations and private individuals. Th e former 
owned vast tracts of lands devoted to cash crops. Th e majority of 
Filipino landowners, who owned two to three hectares of land, were 
compelled to borrow capital for the cultivation of cash crops. Loans 
were extended by rich landowners who imposed usurious rates and 
readily acquired the land once the farmer defaulted in paying his debt. 
With an economy based on agriculture and the landholding class con-
fi ned to a few, tenancy became the norm rather than the exception.
 Protests against vast estates owned by Catholic orders such as 
the Dominicans contributed to the Philippine Revolution. Th ese estates 
were found in most provinces of southern Luzon, the main island of 
the Philippines. (For places mentioned in this chapter, see maps 6 and 
7.) One of the revered leaders of the 19th-century nationalist move-
ment, Jose Rizal, came from the province of Laguna, which was prac-
tically a Dominican estate, where tenants were ruthlessly exploited. 
Laguna was also the native province of Salud Algabre. Land tenure 
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problems persisted there, even though land was purchased by private 
owners under US colonialism.
 Th e pattern of farmers losing their land to big landowners, as 
described above, persisted during the US period. It did not help that 
many Filipinos did not have legal title to their land since the process 
of getting a title required money, education and time, all of which the 
ordinary Filipino farmer lacked. Hence Filipino society during the 
early decades of the 20th century continued to be dominated by large 
landowners.
 Th e Depression of the 1930s worsened the lot of farmers in the 
Philippines, which fuelled peasant uprisings, including the Sakdal 
movement. Unlike the more common spontaneous peasant Millenarian 
uprisings, however, Sakdal was also a nationalist organisation.
 Ramos, the founder of the Sakdal movement, was an employee 
of the Philippine Senate who fell out with the nationalist leader, 
Manuel Quezon, who was the Senate president and had been respon-
sible for getting Ramos his job. Ramos vowed henceforth to be a critic 
of Quezon as well as the government. In 1930 he founded an organi-
sation and a newspaper, both bearing the name “Sakdal”, a Tagalog 
word meaning “to accuse” or “to strike”. Th e objective of the organi-
sation was “to accuse governmental offi  cials before the public of acts 
which Ramos declared detrimental to the country and especially to 
the common people”.7  Ramos urged his followers not to participate in 
government, not to vote, and not to pay the cedula or poll tax. Th e 
fi eld notes gathered by Sturtevant, a historian of this period of Philip-
pine history, yielded testimonies of arrested Sakdal members who re-
fused to pay their poll tax. Salud Algabre’s husband was one of them.8 
 One issue of the newspaper Sakdal, dated 16 August 1930, set out 
the nationalist ideas of the organisation. It argued that independence 
was not something to be granted by the United States; it was a right 
declared by the Filipinos. It was wrong, therefore, for leaders such as 
Quezon to send missions to Washington to seek independence: the 
nationalist movement should seize independence.
 In 1933, the Sakdal movement became a political party. A con-
vention was held on 29 October, and Sakdal produced a constitution 
and by-laws.
 Th e Tydings-McDuffi  e Law, which provided for a transition 
government to last for ten years, was approved by the Philippine 
Legislature on 1 May 1934. Ramos explained Sakdal’s rejection of the 
Tydings-McDuffi  e Law in this manner:
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We do not believe the Tydings-McDuffi  e Act  …  Since 1898, the 
United States has again and again repeated the statement: We will 
recognize the independence of the Philippines and has designed 
legislation to permit independence. But they never carried it out. 
By saying that they will recognize independence in ten years, the 
Americans are doing nothing more than suppressing independence 
agitation for ten years. Th e Americans, who have over and over 
promised to recognize our independence and have always broken 
their promise, have now enunciated a new promise called Tydings-
McDuffi  e Act. So why should they be believed this time? We have 
affi  rmed that at whatever cost we must secure independence by 
our own strength.9 
In July of 1934, a constitutional convention took place to draft  a con-
stitution that was to be ratifi ed through a plebiscite on 14 May 1935. 
On 2–3 May the Sakdal Uprising took place, registering the Sakdal’s 
rejection of the constitution. By this time the movement had adher-
ents in the provinces of Laguna, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Tarlac, 
Batangas, Tayabas, Cavite, Capiz, Cebu, Negros, Cagayan, Antique and 
Misamis. Th ese provinces had large estates and landless tenants. At 
the time of the uprising, the Sakdal movement advocated land reform, 
the dismantling of large estates or haciendas, and immediate, com-
plete and absolute independence from the United States.
 Clearly, the agrarian discontent in the Philippines attracted 
peasants to the movement. Th is was the situation of the Sakdal move-
ment when Salud Algabre became a member.
Personal Antecedents of Salud
Salud Algabre was born two years before the beginning of the Philip-
pine Revolution of 1896. She was the daughter of Maximo Algabre, a 
landowner from Cabuyao, and Justina Tirones, a seamstress. She had 
nine siblings, but only six survived.
 Th e Algabre family had a history of resistance against colonisers 
starting from the Spanish period. According to Salud, her grandfather 
and father fought the Spaniards during the Philippine Revolution. Her 
grandfather, who was a gobernardorcillo (head of a town), slashed 
his own throat as a protest against the threat of the Spanish civil 
authorities to banish him to a far-off  place for refusing to kiss the 
hand of a priest. An uncle was a member of the Katipunan, the secret 
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organisation that spearheaded the Philippine Revolution. Some rela-
tives were exiled to Dapitan and Jolo in Mindanao for their revolu-
tionary activities.10  Salud mentioned that during the war against Spain 
her grandfather and father were soldiers who faced the Spaniards in 
Calamba and Santa Cruz, two towns in Laguna. Both fought under 
General Juan Cailles, who would later become governor of Laguna 
during the US period.
 In her interview in 1966,11  Salud recalled that her paternal grand-
father had extensive landholdings and fi ve granaries. Th e fact that he 
owned land qualifi ed him to get elected as gobernadorcillo during the 
Spanish period. She did not mention how her grandfather lost his 
lands. It is likely that he became indebted in some way and due to his 
inability to pay back the loan his land was acquired by the lender.
 Both Salud’s parents had formal schooling, having spent about six 
years in Manila. When it was Salud’s turn to study, she too was sent 
to Manila during the years 1903–9. Living with an uncle in Tondo, 
she was able to fi nish grade four. Her mother, however, made her stop 
schooling out of fear that her American music teacher, Mrs Brown, 
would take her to the United States. Salud had fond memories of this 
teacher and also remembered her English teacher, Mrs Domondon, 
and her sewing teacher, Mrs Emilia Flores. With her schooling halted, 
Salud was entrusted by her mother to a private tutor until the fi rst 
year of high school.12 
 According to Salud, her patriotism was sparked by her apprecia-
tion for a subject in elementary school that must have been civics, a 
subject introduced by the Americans to the curriculum and focused on 
training for citizenship. Salud recalled that it was through this subject 
that she internalised her identity as a Filipino and her love for her 
country. In her later interview with Isagani Medina, Salud sang from 
memory the patriotic song Philippines, My Philippines composed by 
Francisco Santiago.13  When she was 19 years old Salud featured as 
one of the town belles of Cabuyao, in Laguna, in the annual parade 
on 30 December 1913 to commemorate the death anniversary of the 
national hero Jose Rizal.14 
 In her 1966 interview, Salud admitted to having several suitors 
but said it was Severo Generalla who won her heart. She mentions 
that by this time both her parents were gone and that the match was 
initiated by the father of Severo, who was the master baker in a 
bakery in Pandacan, a suburb of Manila. Salud mentions that Severo 
studied nine years in Manila and attended night school at the Liceo 
de Manila, where he obtained an Associate in Arts degree. Salud was 
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21 years old and was working as a seamstress when she married 
Severo in 1915.15 
 Severo left  his job as a baker and became a cigar maker at 
Tabacalera, a private tobacco factory, where he became president in 
Pandacan of the Union Obreros de Tabaco de Filipinas (Tobacco 
Workers Union of the Philippines). Salud described her husband as 
a “strong union man” and mentioned that Severo’s affi  liation to the 
union “would lead to some trouble” (using her own words) that 
necessitated their leaving Manila and returning to the province of 
Laguna. Severo owned a stall in the Calamba public market and also 
went into farming.16 
 Although Salud and Severo may have started life as members of 
the Filipino educated elite, they experienced growing impoverishment. 
Th e loss of their lands in the provinces may have resulted in their 
relocation to Manila in search of job opportunities in the city. Severo’s 
involvement in the labour movement in Manila then forced him and 
Salud to return to their place of origin, now as landless peasants. Th is 
marked a turning point in Salud’s life. It was back in Laguna that 
Salud would become a member of the Sakdal movement.
Salud as a Member of the Sakdal Movement
A reversal of the family’s fortunes, added to the fact that she had some 
education, made Salud Algabre analyse the situation not only of her-
self but of the peasant class to which she now belonged. Salud elo-
quently articulated the plight of the dispossessed, which is evident in 
an interview given in 1935 aft er she was arrested.17 
 For Salud, no number of petitions sent to the US government 
or consultations with Filipino leaders  —  who in her mind had become 
stooges of the Americans  —  would ameliorate the condition of the 
peasants. In her 1966 interview she expressed the injustice that had 
befallen tenant farmers in these words:
When we worked the land, we were cheated. Th e terms on the 
estate were 50-50. If the tenants harvested 1,000 tons, 500 were 
to go to the proprietario [landowner] and 500 to the farmers. But 
we never got the agreed 50 per cent. We would get a mere 25 per 
cent, sometimes even less.18 
Salud was convinced that there was no one to turn to but her fellow 
peasants, who had to organise themselves. Th is realisation moved her 
to join the Sakdal movement.
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 Salud became a member of Sakdal in 1930, when she was 36 years 
old. Her interest in the movement was awakened when her grand-
father Lino handed her a copy of the newspaper Sakdal. For Salud, the 
contents of the newspaper expressed succinctly the plight of peasants 
like her who were attracted to the objectives of the Sakdal movement, 
which worked for the distribution of land and the independence of 
the Philippines from the United States.19 
 In her 1966 interview, Salud stated that independence was indis-
pensable and was an important precondition for improving the plight 
of peasants:
Nothing could solve our problem except independence, as the 
United States had promised. Freedom was the solution  …  With 
independence, the leaders would cease to be powerful. Instead, it 
would be the people who were powerful. Th e people would have 
their freedom. We would have our own lands; they would no 
longer be the monopoly of the proprietarios and of government 
offi  cials. As it was, we had nothing.20 
Salud’s words, recorded in an interview aft er she was captured in 1935, 
describe vividly the plight of peasants during the 1930s:
We cannot send the children to school without money. Times are 
bad. What mother wouldn’t send her children to school if she 
could. Two years ago we made a sugar crop for Julia Lumpaco in 
Calamba. We were to take what they gave us aft er the sugar was 
sold. We harvested 122 tons of cane. We have received no pay as 
yet. We owe Julia P137.00 Th e account is mixed up. Some times 
[sic] when we got a peso she would put down P1.15 or P1.20. 
When we got P5.00 she would put down P5.75. We were dissatis-
fi ed. Couldn’t stand the charges so we left . She said for every ton 
we harvested she would collect fi ft y centavos on the land. We 
were supposed to get a fourth of the harvest. Th ey wouldn’t let us 
raise chickens. We needed chickens to get spending money for the 
children; where we are now we are getting P1.20 a week for the 
chickens, have fruit trees and get odd jobs cutting cane. We had 
two carabaos [buff aloes], but both have been sold. We borrowed 
P400.00 on a mortgage when my child got sick. A surveyor agreed 
to survey our solar [farm] and get title for P50.00. He did it in our 
absence and made mistakes in the boundary. Th en he sued us for 
P130.00. We spent the P50.00 we had to pay for the title in the 
lawsuit. We haven’t been able to pay the land tax for four or fi ve 
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years. My husband was put in jail because he had no cedula. We 
are against the Constitution. We are against the leaders because 
they promise us independence and never get it. We think there is 
no hope for us in our hardships without independence.21 
When they met Benigno Ramos, the founder of the Sakdal movement, 
in 1930, Salud and her husband agreed to help organise the movement 
in the town of Cabuyao. In her 1966 interview Salud described Ramos 
as “a good man” and said that she and her husband agreed completely 
with his purpose. Organising the movement in Cabuyao meant distri-
buting free copies of the newspaper Sakdal and explaining its contents 
to other peasants.22 
 Eventually Salud’s home became a regular meeting place every 
Sunday. Salud recalled later that Mass was celebrated in the morning, 
offi  ciated by the head of the newly established Iglesia Filipina Inde-
pendiente (Philippine Independent Church), Gregorio Aglipay.23 
 Th is church played an important part in the Philippine nation-
alist movement. In 1898, during the Philippine Revolution, Aglipay, 
a Filipino secular priest, was appointed by Emilio Aguinaldo as the 
chief chaplain of the Filipino armed forces. He was summoned by 
the Manila Ecclesiastical Tribunal, a church body controlled by the 
Spaniards, for having accepted such an appointment and for other 
breaches to the canonical discipline. Aglipay never appeared before 
the tribunal and as a result was excommunicated. In 1902, the Philip-
pine Independence Church was formally established with Father Aglipay 
as its fi rst bishop, independent of the Pope in Rome. It drew many 
adherents among the Filipinos because its liturgy was similar to the 
Catholic faith. Th e only diff erence was that it had severed its ties with 
Rome. Th is was why the Philippine Revolution considered it to be a 
national church; its clergy was entirely Filipino, and it was headed 
by a Filipino.
 Sakdal delegations from nearby provinces such as Tayabas, 
Batangas, Cavite, Rizal and Bulacan congregated in Salud’s house. At 
one point there were about 500 Sakdalistas present. Salud commented 
in the 1966 interview: “It was exciting. Religion in the morning and 
politics all day.” Th ese meetings assumed a festive air, with everyone 
bringing their own food and Ramos and Aglipay in regular attendance: 
“Cooking fi res burned all day and well into the night.”24  Starting in 
late 1931, meetings were held regularly until the Sakdal Uprising on 
2–3 May 1935.
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Map 7.   Provinces of southern Luzon, Philippines
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 Th e town authorities were suspicious. Th e police would barge 
in and inquire why people were gathering. Th ey would disperse the 
group and deny them freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. 
Arrests of Sakdal members took place as well.25 
 Th e non-payment of cedula became a convenient excuse for 
arresting Sakdalistas. Salud’s husband was one of those jailed for not 
paying cedula and was made to wear a uniform with stripes like those 
of the tiger. In her 1966 interview Salud recounted:
I took a picture of Severo in that tiger shirt and mailed it to the 
United States. I wanted the Americans to know what their compa-
triots here in the Philippines were doing to the people. What kind 
of government did we have if men who refused to pay the cedula 
were forced to wear tiger suits. Nothing happened. I don’t know 
whether they received it or whether it was intercepted.26  
In a meeting of local leaders held in Salud’s house on 7 April 1935, 
it was agreed that an uprising would be held on 2 May 1935. Salud’s 
role was to inform the Sakdal leaders in the nearby towns of Cabuyao 
such as San Pedro, Calamba, Los Banos and Caluan of the impending 
uprising. She instructed them that the uprising would consist of their 
occupying the municipal hall of the town, raising the Sakdal fl ag and 
proclaiming independence.27 
Th e Sakdal Uprising in Cabuyao
In her 1966 interview, Salud Algabre gave an extensive account of 
her part in the Sakdal revolt of 1935. On 30 April 1935 she went to 
San Pedro, Calamba, Los Banos and Caluan to inform Sakdal leaders 
of the forthcoming uprising. She was back in Cabuyao the following 
day, 1 May. According to her, the Sakdalistas were armed with bolos 
(knives), clubs, sickles, some shotguns and revolvers.28 
 On the aft ernoon of the appointed day, 2 May, Salud led a group 
of Sakdalistas assembled near the railroad station and blocked the 
railroad and cut the telegraph lines. Salud was garbed in a white long-
sleeved shirt, a red skirt with a blue tapis (a piece of cloth wrapped 
around the skirt) and a white headband.29  Th e colours red, white and 
blue echoed the colours of the Philippine fl ag.
 Other Sakdalistas converged in the municipal hall of Cabuyao. 
At that time, the municipal mayor tried to dissuade them from occu-
pying the town hall. Seeing that he had failed to stop them, the mayor 
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admonished them not to touch anything found inside the building. 
Even the guns in the armoury of the municipal hall were not touched 
by Sakdalistas. Th ey raised the red Sakdal fl ag and sang the Sakdal 
hymn.30 
 Salud and her group proceeded to the highway and felled trees 
to block the road. Traffi  c was stopped at the highway at six in the 
evening. At seven o’clock, Salud and her group stopped a car carrying 
Marines from Los Banos. A sergeant asked Salud why they were being 
stopped. Salud introduced herself and her companions as Sakdalistas 
and said that they were demanding “immediate, complete and abso-
lute independence”. She asked for the Marines’ fi rearms and the key of 
their vehicle, and issued a receipt for the confi scated items. Salud gave 
food to the Marines and stayed with them until the morning. Because 
the Marines seemed frightened by the Sakdalistas with their bolos, 
Salud then released them.31 
 Following is an account recorded in 1935 by one of those stopped 
by Salud:
Salud Algabre, the generala was a thin, slight woman and she must 
have been around forty. But her frailty ended then and there. In 
her attire, her brisk manner and her speed, she aff ected a martial 
disposition. She had on a white long sleeved camiseta [a shirt], 
a red skirt and a white piece of cloth for a tapiz. Th ese together 
with a white headband made her a perfect picture of a war general. 
We noticed too that she was restlessly walking hither and yon, in-
specting detained cars, issuing receipts for confi scated revolvers. 
Later on, she made it emphatic that only those revolvers belonging 
to Filipinos would be returned to their owners. Americans, Chinese 
and other foreigners would have to give up their weapons for lost.32 
Th e confi scation of weapons belong to Americans, Chinese and other 
foreigners by Salud, with the parting shot that they should be consi-
dered as lost, implies that these people were considered as oppressors 
of Filipino peasants and therefore deemed as enemies. Th e same ac-
count mentioned that in issuing receipts for confi scated items, Salud 
borrowed a fountain pen from the author of the account. She cut off  a 
piece of her skirt and said: “Now take this piece of cloth as a receipt 
of your fountain pen and as soon as the war is over, just show me this 
receipt and you can have your pen back.” We do not know whether 
the promise was fulfi lled, but what was signifi cant was the expression 
of Salud’s word of honour.
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 Salud’s married name, Generalla, was easily transformed into 
Generala, which was the Spanish term for “woman general”. In fact, 
despite being expected to assume the surname of her husband, Salud 
retained her maiden name, Algabre. In a sign of her independence, 
she explained, “It’s my custom not to use my husband’s name. I don’t 
want my maiden name to die.” 33 
 Around eight in the morning, Salud returned to her house to get 
some rice. It was at this time that the governor of the province, Juan 
Cailles, and his soldiers stormed the Cabuyao municipal hall. When 
news reached Salud that the constables were aft er her, she went to the 
house of a friend to check on her children and hid in an irrigation 
canal. At the time of the uprising, the eldest of Salud’s fi ve children 
was 16 years old and the youngest 14 months. She remained there 
until 1.30 in the aft ernoon. Salud recounted:
Hardly had I reached home when I was informed that a number 
of Constabulary soldiers led by Governor Cailles were on the way 
to arrest me. Leaving my children crying, I went to the river about 
fi ve meters from the house, and submerged myself in the water. I 
kept my head under the water as long as I could stand it without 
breathing, then I would rise for a breath of fresh air.
 I heard Governor Cailles giving orders to shoot me down on 
sight. I was fearful the soldiers, angered at not fi nding me, might 
shoot my children. I expected to hear their shots anytime. Gover-
nor Cailles and his men waited at the house for almost an hour. 
I thought I would go crazy if they did not go away soon. At last 
they left , and I sneaked into the house and told my children to be 
good for I was going away. Th en I went to Pulong Kahoy in Cavite 
where I hid until the Constabulary came last Sunday.34 
In her escape towards Silang, Cavite, Salud later recalled meeting a 
soldier along a dike. He ordered her to come close to him. She said:
I drew myself straight and tall and walked up to him. He had 
on a Constabulary hat, but was wearing only an undershirt and 
trousers. He had also a rifl e with a fi xed bayonet in his hands. We 
just stared at each other over the bayonet. Aft er a long time, he 
lowered the rifl e, turned and left . I continued on across the paddies.
 I believe he knew who I was. Perhaps he had heard that I had 
a powerful anting-anting [amulet]. People said I did. But my only 
anting-anting was help from God.35 
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Salud continued to elude the soldiers as she crossed rivers and hiked 
through rice paddies. She even mentioned that there was an airplane 
searching for her. Aft er she reached Silang, she was walking along the 
bank of the river when she encountered a huge pile of rocks. As she 
turned back, Salud would have fallen into the river had not her tresses 
got entangled in the branch of a tree. She recounted how scared she 
was at nightfall, imagining supernatural beings lurking around but at 
the same time mesmerised by the myriad of fi refl ies that lighted the 
place where she was hiding. She recalled having staved off  hunger by 
eating raw eggs from a hen’s nest that she chanced upon.36 
 One of her uncles, Miguel de la Cueva, a fellow Sakdalista who 
was also searching for her, discovered Salud hiding in a grove of 
bamboo. He convinced her to give herself up. She was presented to 
the authorities of Silang and then brought back to Cabuyao and then 
to Santa Cruz, the capital of Laguna province. She was incarcerated 
from 5 May 1935 to 1 October 1935, when she was set free upon pay-
ment of bail amounting to 2,000 pesos.37 
 While in jail, Salud was visited and interviewed by some Ameri-
can authorities. One of them asked her why she and the Sakdalistas 
had staged an uprising. Salud replied that the Sakdalistas were aft er 
“immediate, complete and absolute independence”. Participating in the 
plebiscite scheduled to accept or reject the Tydings-McDuffi  e Law 
providing for a ten-year transition before the granting of indepen-
dence by the United States was unacceptable to the Sakdalistas. Salud 
thought that the Americans appreciated her reply.38 
 It must have helped Salud that her husband shared her aspira-
tions since he too was a member of the Sakdal movement. Severo 
was a delegate to a Sakdal Convention, representing Laguna province. 
According to Salud in her 1966 interview, aft er the uprising Severo 
escaped to Mount Makiling, where he hid for seven months. He 
secretly went back to Manila but was later captured and imprisoned. 
He was released before World War II.39  Sturtevant mentioned that 
Severo, being a labour leader and aware of the fate of popular move-
ments, counselled moderation, which Salud rejected.40 
 While Salud was incarcerated her children were left  in the care 
of an aunt, which she confessed made her feel guilty. One of Salud’s 
sons recounted that one time they left  behind their youngest sibling 
with a dog that had recently given birth. Th ey heard the child crying, 
apparently out of hunger. When the siblings got to her, they saw her 
suckling from the dog.41 
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 Th e trial of Salud and the Sakdalistas took four years. It was held 
in Intramuros, Manila. According to Salud, her children followed her 
during these hearings as this was the only opportunity for her to see 
them. A court decision was handed down on 3 January 1939. It read:
Wherefore, it having been proved beyond reasonable doubt that 
the Lapiang Sakdalista (Sakdalista Party) is an association which 
has for its objective the overthrow of the Government through 
forcible means, an act punished by the Penal Code, and that the 
defendants are members of the said party, some of them being also 
offi  cers and organizers, the Court fi nds the said defendants (with 
the exception of Benigno Ramos who has not yet been tried) guilty 
of the crime of illegal association and hereby sentences them.42 
Salud was the only woman Sakdal member who was imprisoned for 
being one of the leaders of the Cabuyao Uprising. 
 According to Salud,43  she was sentenced to a term of six to ten 
years of imprisonment and fi ned 5,000 pesos but she did not serve 
the full term. Aft er being imprisoned for one year, seven months and 
three days, she was pardoned by Manuel Quezon, president of the 
Commonwealth government, the very person whom the Sakdalistas 
detested. Th e Sakdalistas viewed Quezon as being in cahoots with 
the Americans in withholding independence from the Filipinos. Th ey 
perceived him as misleading the people by saying that the Common-
wealth government was transitional when in reality he wanted US 
interests to continue in the Philippines. According to the Sakdalistas, 
Quezon was from the privileged class and the government that he 
headed catered to the interests of the elite and not to the lower 
class. Moreover, the Sakdalistas referred to Quezon as dugong Kastila 
(Spanish blood), which reminded the ordinary folk of the cruel and 
oppressive Spanish colonialists.
Struggle aft er the Uprising
Aft er accusing Quezon of collaborating with the Americans, during 
the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese Salud herself was 
accused of being a Japanese collaborator and imprisoned. She was 
arrested by the 48th Infantry Regiment of the United States Armed 
Forces of the Far East guerrillas on 4 February 1945 and was arraigned 
in court on 17 October 1945.44 
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 In her testimony, Salud stated that Benigno Ramos, founder 
of the Sakdal movement, had invited her to be a member of the 
Makabayan Katipunan ng mga Pilipino (MAKAPILI, Association of 
Patriotic Filipinos). Th is organisation was described in the court “as an 
organization of military character for the purpose of giving material 
support and physical as well as moral assistance and aid to the Empire 
of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines”.45  It is 
pertinent to point out that Ramos had sought asylum in Japan in 
December 1934 and directed the activities of the Sakdal movement 
from that country. Ramos was welcomed by radical Japanese Pan 
Asianists who claimed Japan should take a leading role in liberating 
Asia from Western imperialism. Ramos convinced the Japanese to 
support popular anti-colonial movements such as the Sakdal. During 
the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Ramos returned to his 
homeland and worked with the Japanese.
 Salud testifi ed in court that Ramos’ invitation came a month 
before she was arrested. She said that she was told to oversee a 
MAKAPILI plantation in Barrio San Jose and was given fi ve Filipino 
guards by the Japanese to protect the plantation. According to Salud, 
the Japanese provided rice for the 60 Filipinos working on the planta-
tion. She added that she was given a .38 calibre pistol by the Japanese 
and mentioned that four Japanese offi  cers frequented her home.
 On 16 December 1946, the People’s Court (a court established to 
try cases of collaboration in the Philippines) ordered the provisional 
dismissal of the case against Salud “on the ground that witnesses which 
the prosecution intended to present in this case are not available”.46 
 Salud denied that the Sakdalistas were in league with the 
Japanese.47  It is possible to conjecture that Salud, like other Sakdal 
members, saw the Japanese as liberators of the Filipinos from the 
American colonialists. Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
espoused Asia for Asians but with Japan as the leader. Many of the 
mainstream nationalist Filipino elite also worked with the Japanese 
during the war, for similar reasons or out of self-interest, making the 
issue of collaboration a very murky one.
 Aft er the war, Salud continued to oppose the rich who held on to 
big landholdings. In one of her battles she took on the Tuason family 
over the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. Salud said: “Th e reason why 
I neglected my children is because I helped fi ght the avidity of the 
Tuasons in Tatalon.” 48  Th us she continued to cast her lot with the dis-
possessed, although it is notable that she did not join the Hukbalahap 
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movement, which began during World War II and claimed to fi ght for 
both independence and peasants’ rights to land. Perhaps the Commu-
nist ideology of the Hukbalahap did not appeal to Salud.
Salud’s Legacy
When interviewed at the age of 72 by Sturtevant and asked whether 
there was bitterness in her heart aft er the failed Sakdal Uprising, Salud 
replied: “I was not bitter. I did what I thought was right. We lost and 
I was punished. Th e principles we fought for, and my faith in God, 
strengthened me.”49 
 Looking back to that fateful day of 2 May 1935, when the 
uprising was quelled by government forces, Salud felt that it was 
not a failure. Her words were: “no uprising fails. Each step is a step 
in the right direction.” 50  Th ese words echoed Salud’s thinking that 
change, whether economic or political or both, constituted a process, 
be it evolutionary or radical. One piece of evidence for this optimism 
was that as an aft ermath of the Sakdal Uprising, the Commonwealth 
government adopted measures to improve the conditions of peasants 
through Manuel Quezon’s Social Justice Program.
 Salud considered the Sakdal Uprising a shining moment in the 
history of the Philippines. It probably represented a high point in her 
life too. She explained that despite being advanced in age, talking 
about the Sakdal movement rejuvenated her:
We have talked a long time, but I am not tired. Whenever there is 
talk about the Sakdalistas, I become younger and stronger. I feel 
like it is 1935 again. Th at was the moment. [My emphasis.] Every-
thing led up to the uprising. Th at was the high point of all our 
lives. Aft erwards things were never the same. Later people and 
principles became confused. Few people think well of Sakdalism 
these days. Th ey should remember what happened in May 1935. 
Th ey should also remember why.51  
Asked if she had any words to impart to the youth of the Philippines, 
Salud answered: “I no longer have anything to say. It’s really up to 
them. Th ey should love their country. Th ey’re Filipinos. Th ey should 
help their fellow Filipinos rise.”52 
 By some strange coincidence, Salud passed away on 2 May 1979, 
on the 44th anniversary of the Sakdal Uprising in which she had 
played a key role. She was 85 years old. Her fellow Sakdalistas acted 
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as pallbearers when she was interred at the North Cemetery in Manila. 
Jeremias Addia, a fellow Sakdalista, recited the following verse before 
her coffi  n was lowered:
Ang gawaing maglingkod sa lahi at bayan,
Kakambal ng dusa at kamatayan,
At ang maaring ngayo’y kasalanan
Bukas makalawa ay kabayanihan.
(To serve one’s race and country,
Is intertwined with suff ering and death,
And what today may be considered a crime
May tomorrow be a heroic act.)53 
Addia’s prophecy was not fulfi lled in the case of the Sakdal in general 
and Salud Algabre in particular, refl ective perhaps of the continued 
marginality of the appreciation of the peasants’ struggle in the national 
history of the Philippines. Th e political struggle and fragments of the 
life story of Salud were fortunately documented in the interviews used 
in this chapter. Th ey serve as an argument for the use of oral history 
as a method in the documentation of women in nationalist move-
ments, especially women from the peasant class. It is the only way 
their story can be heard and preserved for posterity.
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chapter 6
Shamsiah Fakeh and Aishah Ghani 
in Malaya: Nationalists in Th eir 
Own Right, Feminists Ahead of 
Th eir Time
Helen Ting
This chapter compares the political involvement of two contem-poraries, Shamsiah Fakeh (1924–2008) and Aishah Ghani (1923–
2013), who grew up in British Malaya. Aishah and Shamsiah shared 
many similarities in terms of their ethnic origins and childhood 
education, but their fate and life journeys diff ered radically as adults. 
Born into the matrilineal Minangkabau culture, both went through 
Malay primary schooling and even continued their education in the 
same well-known Arabic-medium Islamic school in Padang Panjang, 
West Sumatra, which is discussed in greater detail in chapter 4 of 
this book (Sally White). Both of them were initiated in their political 
involvement within the left -wing Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), the 
fi rst Malay political party formed aft er World War II.1  Both of them 
also became famous as the head of AWAS (Angkatan Wanita Sedar), 
the women’s wing of the MNP. Aishah left  the MNP aft er ten months 
and Shamsiah came in to replace her, staying on with the MNP until 
it was outlawed.
 Subsequently, Aishah joined the United Malays National Organi-
sation (UMNO) and became its women’s wing leader aft er indepen-
dence. Entering the government, she was appointed as the general 
welfare minister in 1974  —  a position she held until 1984, when she 
retired from politics. Aishah is well known for having promoted 
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Th irteen-year-old 
Shamsiah Fakeh with 
her mother and brother 
before both siblings 
left  for Sumatra in 
1938 to study. Photo 
from Memoir Shamsiah 





Shamsiah Fakeh, 1960. Photo 
from Memoir Shamsiah Fakeh, 
courtesy of Strategic Information 
and Research Development 
Centre, Petaling Jaya
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Aishah Ghani (standing, middle) with friends at Diniyah Putri School in 
Padang Panjang, 1937; seated is Ibu Rahmah El Yunusiah, the principal of the 
school. Courtesy of Arkib Negara, Malaysia
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Aishah Ghani speaking at the general 
election campaign in Kampung 
Datuk Keramat, Kuala Lumpur, 1964. 
Courtesy of Arkib Negara, Malaysia
Aishah Ghani at Hyde Park, London, 1956. Courtesy of Arkib Negara, 
Malaysia
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Syariah legal reform by overseeing a high-level committee that nego-
tiated, deliberated and put together a comprehensive set of family laws 
based on an enlightened interpretation of the Islamic laws.2  Unfortu-
nately, this set of laws was subverted by conservative religious scholars 
and offi  cials in various states who were unhappy that she had made 
polygamy almost impossible for Muslim men.3
 Shamsiah ended up joining the anti-British armed insurrection 
led by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). When a state of 
Emergency was declared in June 1948, she was confronted with the 
dilemma faced by many other left -wing leaders: either retreat into the 
jungle or, like thousands of others, be detained without trial at the 
pleasure of the colonial power. She became part of the all-Malay 10th 
Regiment of the Malayan National Liberation Army formed by the 
MCP in the jungle. In 1957 she was sent by the MCP to further 
her studies in China, and she worked in the Malay section of Beijing 
Radio as a broadcaster for more than three years. In 1965 the party 
sent Shamsiah to Indonesia to do international representation work, 
but she was detained there for two years by the Indonesian military. 
In December 1967, she and her husband together with two other 
comrades were released and allowed to return to Beijing. Infl uenced 
by the Cultural Revolution in China, the MCP leaders there became 
involved in factional confl icts. As a consequence, Shamsiah and her 
husband were suspended from party membership in 1968 and kept 
under house arrest for two years. Shamsiah and her family were sub-
sequently allowed by the Chinese government to live as ordinary 
foreign sojourners rather than be placed under the MCP.4  Aft er waiting 
for ten years, their application to return to Malaysia was fi nally ap-
proved in 1994.
Some Methodological Considerations
In this comparative analysis, the most important sources of informa-
tion are the autobiographies of Shamsiah5  and Aishah. In 1991 a 
Malay magazine, Dewan Masyarakat, published a seven-part series of 
articles on Shamsiah.6  At that time Shamsiah was in exile in China, 
waiting for the Malaysian government to allow her to return. Th e fea-
ture was written by Fatini Yaacob, a journalist for Dewan Masyarakat, 
based on her extensive research and interviews with people who were 
related to or had worked with Shamsiah at various times. Th e contents 
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of the articles, while colourful and informative, should be taken with 
a pinch of salt. For instance, the background of Shamsiah’s father as 
depicted by Fatini diff ers from that described by Shamsiah in her 
memoirs. Nonetheless, these articles give a feel for the popular image 
of Shamsiah in the Malay community. As for Aishah, there are a 
couple of academic works about the women’s wing of UMNO7  that 
provide third-person accounts of her life.
 In their memoirs, the articulation of the self-identity of Aishah 
and Shamsiah is undoubtedly intertwined with their lifelong political 
commitment. Writing about memoirs and autobiography, Mark 
Freeman has noted that they may be understood as the “re-writing of 
self ” as the autobiographer looks back at the life path travelled from 
the vantage point of the historical position and perspective he or she 
has arrived at.8  While such dynamics of re-interpretation imply that 
the perspective articulated may not always refl ect the original point 
of view in real time, it is nonetheless a perspective the person has 
evolved by virtue of successive political decisions, lifelong actions and 
practices. In this sense, the writing of memoirs can be understood as 
an attempt at making sense of the self and evaluating the meaning of 
one’s past deeds as inscribed in the larger sociopolitical context. To a 
lesser or greater extent, their narratives inevitably refl ect or challenge 
the dominant narrative of Malaysian national history, depending on 
which side of the political divide their struggle was situated.
 From another point of view, we may also understand the lives 
and self-identities of Aishah and Shamsiah as having been forged 
progressively by virtue of their continued actions and practices that 
committed them further to the political struggle they were engaged 
in.9  Th e everyday choices they made and the actions they took not 
only resulted in their being assigned to diff erent historical positions in 
the grand narratives of Malaysian national history, but also led them 
to subscribe to the general political understanding of their immediate 
community of struggle. By comparing the interpretations of two 
persons on opposite sides of the struggle, we can gain some insights 
into the perspectives of actors on both sides of the divide, however 
partial they may be. In the meantime, for the analysis to do them 
justice, we need to be attentive to possible variations in terms of their 
embrace of the general sociopolitical  —  be they ideological, gender, 
class and/or ethnic  —  positions of the respective nationalist move-
ments they participated in.
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Historical Context
British Malaya consisted of three diff erent colonial political systems of 
direct and indirect rule over the Malay states. Th e states of Selangor 
and Negri Sembilan, in which Aishah Ghani and Shamsiah Fakeh were 
born respectively, were part of the Federated Malay States under the 
indirect rule of the British. Th e British practised a racial policy of 
divide and rule, building their political legitimacy as protectors of the 
Malay people against the Chinese and Indian population who migrated 
to carry out various new economic functions such as tin-mining and 
rubber plantation activities. During the fi rst half of the 20th century, 
the predominantly depressed socio-economic conditions of the Malay 
population led to a sense of alarm and urgency among the Malay 
intelligentsia to uplift  the community in the face of the more urbanised 
non-Malay population.
 Th e hardship suff ered under Japanese occupation between 1941 
and 1945 stirred political awareness among the Malayan population. 
Th e predominantly Chinese Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army 
(MPAJA), which was formed by the MCP, saw more Malays who were 
tired of the tyrannical Japanese rule joining their ranks towards the 
mid-1940s. Fatefully, the brief period of political vacuum aft er the 
Japanese surrender and before the return of the British, termed the 
interregnum period, saw violent Sino-Malay clashes occurring in iso-
lated locations in Malaya due to some overzealous, reckless Chinese 
leaders of the MPAJA punishing Malays who collaborated with the 
Japanese. In retaliation, some local Malay leaders such as Kiai Salleh 
organised paramilitary groups that went about killing Chinese indis-
criminately, regardless of whether or not they were MPAJA members. 
Th ese violent ethnic clashes formed the historical context in which a 
popular Malay movement emerged against the Malayan Union Plan, 
the civilian political system proposed by the British to replace the 
British Military Administration. Inaugurated on 1 April 1946, the 
short-lived Malayan Union was replaced by the Federation of Malaya 
on 1 February 1948.
 By then, there were three main pan-Malayan political movements 
in post-war Malaya: the left -leaning MNP, which was formed in 1945; 
the MCP, which had existed since the 1930s; and UMNO, which was 
formed at the fi rst Anti-Malayan Union Congress attended by state-
level Malay associations throughout the peninsula in March 1946. 
Th e MNP was invited to join the Anti-Malayan Union Congress but 
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withdrew from it aft er three months. Even though the Malayan Union 
was put in place as planned, the British authority gave in to Malay 
pressure and negotiated a replacement with the Malay sultans and 
UMNO representatives in the form of an Anglo-Malay agreement. 
Th is gave rise to the Federation of Malaya, which imposed far more 
Malayan Nationalist Movements
1874 Direct British intervention begins in sultanates on 
 Malayan Peninsula
1895 Britain establishes Federated Malay States
1928 Formation of Nanyang Communist Party, renamed 
 Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930
1945 Formation of Malayan Nationalist Party (MNP)
Mar. 1946 Formation of United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO)
Apr. 1946 Malayan Union formed
July 1946 Tripartite (sultans, UMNO representatives and British 
offi  cials) secret negotiation begins on alternative to 
Malayan Union
Dec. 1946 Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action (PMCJA) formed
Jan. 1947 MNP resigns from PMCJA and forms PUTERA, before 
rejoining PMCJA to form AMCJA-PUTERA
May 1947 Publication of draft Anglo-Malay Federation Agreement
July / Aug. 1947 AMCJA-PUTERA fi nalises the People’s Constitutional 
 Proposals for Malaya
Oct. 1947 All-Malaya strike against the Federation of Malaya 
Agreement
Feb. 1948 Federation of Malaya formed
June 1948 Declaration of state of Emergency throughout Malaya
1955 Federal Legislative Councillors elected
1957 Independence of Federation of Malaya
1963 Formation of Federation of Malaysia
1989 Peace treaty signed between Malaysian government 
 and MCP
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stringent conditions in granting political status to the non-Malay 
population. In response, non-Malays and left ist groups (including the 
MNP) came together to form a multi-ethnic platform called PUTERA-
AMCJA10  to propose an alternative political system to the Federation 
of Malaya.
 Even before the declaration of the state of Emergency in June 
1948, British colonial power had tightened its control over union 
activities and cracked down massively on left ist sympathisers. MCP 
leaders and members as well as some of those from the MNP retreated 
into the jungle to escape arrest and regrouped to take up guerrilla 
warfare. Malaya was eff ectively plunged into a civil war.
 Incremental political autonomy was granted by the British, in 
part as a strategy to thwart the anti-colonial political edge of the 
MCP armed insurrection. In an attempt to cater to a multi-ethnic mix 
of voters in municipal elections, a temporary collaboration between 
UMNO and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) gave rise to 
the emergence of the Alliance, a coalition of UMNO, the Malayan 
Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress. Th is required the 
national leaders of UMNO to switch radically from the organisation’s 
founding rhetoric of exclusionary Malay nationalism to a more ac-
commodating Malayan nationalism in partnership with the Malayan 
Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress. Th e manage-
ment of internal contradiction arising from this tension among dif-
ferent factions within UMNO presented a constant and ongoing chal-
lenge to its national leaders.11  It was to the Alliance leaders that the 
British subsequently handed over the political control of British Malaya 
minus Singapore.
 As the Federation of Malaya achieved political independence in 
1957, the pro-British and staunchly anti-Communist political elites of 
the Alliance were not interested in negotiating a peace settlement with 
the MCP. Even though the security forces managed to drive MCP 
guerrilla forces farther north to the Th ai border, they were not able 
to eradicate the latter completely. A peace accord was signed between 
the Malaysian government and the MCP leadership only in December 
1989  —  in Hatyai, Th ailand, witnessed by Th ai government offi  cials.
Childhood Memories of Aishah
Aishah Ghani was born in 1923 in Kampung Sungai Serai, Hulu Langat, 
in the state of Selangor. (For place names in this chapter, see maps 
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5 and 8.) As the youngest among fi ve children, she was the apple 
of her parents’ eye. Aishah excelled in studies and received an off er 
to continue her education in an English convent school in Kajang, a 
town near her village. Her father strongly opposed this, as he believed 
studying in an English Christian school would bring about “many 
sins” (bersekolah Inggeris akan membawa banyak dosa).12  Aishah later 
recounted that she was extremely sad but had to obey her father’s 
wish. Aft er having completed fi ve years of primary education in a 
Malay-language school, she was off ered a place at the age of 11 to be 
a trainee teacher  —  but her parents rejected that option as well because 
they did not want her to stay away from home.
 Aishah then had to confront her worst fear: her parents wanted to 
marry her off , as was the fate of most young Malay girls of her age 
and time. Her mother asked her to prepare embroidered bed linen, 
an essential item in a Malay bride’s dowry. She protested with all her 
might, screaming, crying and throwing away materials her mother 
handed her for the embroidery work. She began a few days of hunger 
strike, threatening that “something bad” would happen if her plea to 
continue her studies did not materialise.13  Subsequently, her Indo-
nesian brother-in-law Abdul Halim, who was a religious teacher, 
managed to persuade Aishah’s parents to send her to a religious 
boarding school for girls in West Sumatra. In fact, it was also thanks 
to Abdul Halim, who believed in the importance of educating girls, 
that Aishah had gone to primary school, unlike her two illiterate 
elder sisters.
 Aishah also recounted an unforgettable experience that infl uenced 
her greatly when she was in grade four in the Malay school: the 
visit of Miss Kontik Kamariah binti Ahmad. Aishah was impressed 
by the fact that Kontik, who was in her early twenties, arrived at 
the school driving a red sports car. Even more impressive, she saw 
her school principal nodding constantly to whatever Miss Kontik had 
to say throughout her stay at the school. Aishah mentioned that this 
experience had given her the belief that in order to advance, besides 
being educated a woman should be brave in overcoming any resis-
tance. She said that she was “spellbound” (terpesona) and “dazed” 
(terpegun) by the thought that a young lady like Kontik could drive 
her own car and give instructions to a male school principal.14  Kontik 
was the fi rst school inspector of the Malay schools in the state of 
Selangor. She was also the fi rst Malay woman to pass the Senior 
Cambridge examinations.
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 Aishah successfully completed grade seven at the Arabic-medium 
primary Diniyah Girls School in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra, 
within four years (1936–39), despite her very elementary linguistic 
competence in the Arabic language at enrolment. In 1940 she conti-
nued her studies in Kolej Islam, an Islamic teachers’ training college 
in Padang, but her education was interrupted by the Japanese occupa-
tion. She managed to return home and worked briefl y as a teacher.
Shamsiah’s Childhood
Shamsiah Fakeh was born in 1924, a year aft er Aishah, in Kampung 
Gemuruh, Kuala Pilah, in the state of Negeri Sembilan. She was the 
second among eight brothers and sisters. Unlike Aishah, Shamsiah 
grew up in poverty. Her father, of Sumatran origin, was a peddler 
selling vegetables, fi sh and home-made medicine. Shamsiah recalled that 
her father was oft en chased away by the police because he did not 
have a legal trading licence, and he was once detained in the police 
station for a few days. In order to supplement the household income, 
her mother also went from house to house selling cloth to villagers.
 In 1938, aft er her Malay-medium primary education, Shamsiah’s 
father sent her to an Islamic school in Padang Panjang, accompanied 
by her younger brother. In her memoirs, Shamsiah mentioned that 
the school inculcated a nationalist spirit among its young Indone-
sian students. 
 Due to the unstable international political situation, her father 
brought her back to Malaya in 1940 to continue her studies in a 
recently founded local Islamic school, the Islamic High School in 
Pelangai  —  but that did not last long. Within a year the founder of the 
school, Tuan Guru Lebai Maadah, arranged with the respective parents 
for Shamsiah to be married to a rich farmer’s son, her classmate. She 
stopped schooling aft er her marriage. According to Shamsiah, Lebai 
Maadah arranged the marriage to get monetary contributions from the 
parents involved so as to expand his school.15  Th us, unlike Aishah, 
Shamsiah was not able to escape the common fate of early marriage. 
As a rich farmer’s son, Shamsiah’s husband, Yasin Kina, did not work 
and relied on his parents for fi nancial support. His parents also gave 
the couple some farmland and built a small house for them. Shamsiah 
recalled that she had to help with farming activities, which she was 
not used to. In June 1944, eight months’ pregnant and aft er being 
married for three years, she was divorced without any valid reason by 
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Yasin. Both the children she bore with Yasin died in infancy due to 
malnutrition.
 While Shamsiah felt bitter about Yasin’s inconsiderate treatment, 
her even shorter marriage with her second husband, J.M. Rusdi, was 
no better. Rusdi was a womaniser and a spy for the Japanese. He 
divorced Shamsiah aft er fi ve months of marriage, again without any 
valid reason. As a consequence of these two marriages, Shamsiah de-
veloped strong feelings about male oppression of women. In addition, 
she felt sorry that her education had been interrupted by marriage 
and the poverty of her family.
Common Political Roots Going Separate Ways
Aishah Ghani and Shamsiah Fakeh shared a common starting point 
in their experience of political initiation in a turbulent post-war era, 
when anti-colonialism was on the rise but Sino-Malay confl icts pre-
vented a united anti-colonial nationalist movement.
 Shortly aft er the end of World War II, Aishah was employed as 
a lead writer by the MNP for its party organ, Pelita Malaya. She was 
initially highly enthusiastic about MNP’s anti-colonial cause. Besides 
holding publishing responsibilities, she was also asked to head the 
women’s wing, AWAS. As the head of AWAS, she followed party 
leaders  —  in particular Ahmad Boestamam, who headed the male 
youth wing, API (Angkatan Pemuda Insaf)  —  to various corners of 
British Malaya to mobilise popular support for MNP and recruit 
women villagers into AWAS. When Aishah left  MNP aft er ten months, 
Shamsiah came in to replace her.
 Shamsiah explained later that she encountered and became 
attracted to the anti-colonial discourse of the MNP during her Islamic 
studies in Bagan Serai, in the state of Perak, aft er the war. In her 
memoirs, she said, “It was from here that I began to be attracted to 
the nationalist struggle or the struggle to demand independence.” 16  
With the blessings of her father, she was able to follow closely semi-
nars and public forums organised by both the MNP and UMNO. She 
got to know some of the MNP leaders, and once she even stood up 
and gave a spontaneous speech at a public meeting organised by the 
MNP.
 When she became the women’s wing leader, Shamsiah also fol-
lowed other party leaders to various places around the country to rally 
people to the cause of anti-colonialism, to expand party membership 
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and to form local branches. Shamsiah was highly spirited and a gift ed, 
fi ery speaker. She was able to utilise her religious knowledge in her 
speeches, quoting verses from the Quran and the Prophet’s Hadith. 
She became a well-known anti-colonial Malay woman leader. She was 
also a member of the MNP Central Committee from December 1946 
until the party was banned in 1948.
 Why did Shamsiah stay on in the MNP and then continue her 
anti-colonial struggle in the MCP, while Aishah left  the MNP within 
less than a year? How did they explain their successive course of 
nationalist commitment?
 A closer look at the underlying logic of how Aishah and Shamsiah 
explained their nationalist commitment reveals that they refl ect fairly 
standard themes discussed by those on both sides of the political 
divide. Th e disagreement with armed struggle as a means to achieve 
national autonomy and the rejection of Communist ideology are the 
two main lines of argument used by Aishah to explain why she left 
the MNP and, correspondingly, to portray UMNO in a positive light.
 In her autobiography, Aishah mentioned that from time to time 
she was sent by the MNP to attend training courses or meetings 
together with other party leaders in secluded places. Aft er attending 
them, her doubt regarding the political orientation of the MNP grew. 
She talked about a meeting in which there were joint discussions with 
“a lot of ” Chinese on how to get support from the Malay population. 
She asked the MNP leadership why Chinese were present at an MNP 
meeting, but she did not get a clear answer. In one course the speaker 
talked about the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the success of the 
Communists in spreading their infl uence, and their future plans for 
Southeast Asia. She mentioned that only God knew how she felt at 
that time, and that she “surrendered” to Him to spare her from going 
astray.17  She did not explain why she was so anxious but seemed 
equally uncomfortable with the fact that the course was held in a 
desolate slum area inhabited by Chinese farmers and pig-rearers as by 
the fact that the speaker was advocating the Communist takeover of 
Southeast Asia through armed revolt.
 In early July 1946, aft er ten months in the party, Aishah decided 
to quit the MNP when it wanted to send her to Ipoh, in the state of 
Perak, to take charge of the northern region. She rejected the off er 
and informed the party that she wished to stop her work at the MNP 
and withdraw her party membership. She then joined Radio British 
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Military Administration as a Malay-language broadcaster. Th e offi  cial 
reason Aishah gave to the MNP party leadership for leaving was that 
she was getting married to Abdul Aziz bin Abu Hassan. Aishah also 
gave a second reason in her autobiography. She said that she had lost 
faith in the MNP’s struggle. She felt that party leaders were too ambi-
tious (cita-citanya ingin menjangkau awan) and hence did not exercise 
discretion over whom to befriend or build political alliances with. She 
noted that the MNP leaders did not believe that British colonialism 
could end by mere persuasion and hence believed that armed struggle 
was inevitable and were prepared for it.18  Aft er the above-mentioned 
course on the Russian Revolution, she recounted that she argued with 
a party leader on the wisdom of armed insurrection. Her position was 
that the Malays in Malaya did not need to start a revolt to secure 
independence, especially since revolt would entail the loss of lives.19  
She was also critical of MNP leaders’ “fantasy” of setting up a Melayu 
Raya empire (which would encompass both Indonesia and Malaysia) 
in the form of a republic.20 
 Shamsiah, on the other hand, emphasised in her memoirs the 
anti-colonial credentials of the MNP and MCP, and contrasted them 
with the complicity of UMNO with the colonial power and the latter’s 
initial reluctance to use the slogan of “merdeka” (meaning indepen-
dence). In defence of the armed struggle of the MCP, she also quoted 
Samad Idris, a journalist-turned-UMNO politician who in his memoir 
described his involvement in Barisan 33. Barisan 33 was a relatively 
unknown paramilitary cell annexed to UMNO youth, with plans to 
secure fi rearms and attack police stations, that was secretly organised 
in the 1950s. Even though the plans were not realised, Shamsiah 
asked why this plan by UMNO youth for an armed uprising against 
the British was acceptable to UMNO while Malays involved in armed 
struggle under the leadership of the MCP in the jungle were branded 
as “Communist terrorists”.21 
 In one of the feature articles about Shamsiah in Dewan Masya-
rakat, the central concern of its author, Fatini, was how such a great, 
dedicated female anti-colonial nationalist steeped in Islamic knowledge 
could embrace Communism. Fatini seemed to equate Communism 
simplistically with atheism, or the rejection of Islamic belief. She 
suggested that Shamsiah “imbibed Communist ideology” even as her 
nationalist spirit remained strong.22  A surrendered MCP member 
interviewed by Fatini claimed that Shamsiah admitted to being a 
Chap6 (147-174)   161 7/10/13   2:05:12 PM
162 Helen Ting
“Communist representative”, who according to him had to fulfi l three 
conditions: be an atheist, be loyal to MCP, and have strong discipline 
and understand Communist philosophy and struggle.23 
 Referring to the Dewan Masyarakat articles, Shamsiah wrote in 
her memoirs: “In actual fact, I am not a female leader of the Com-
munist Party of Malaya or a famous female public fi gure. I am just 
a woman fi ghter (pejuang wanita) who struggled against the British 
for the independence of my homeland and for the emancipation of 
women.”24  She claimed that she was seen as a Malay woman leader 
who headed the fi rst progressive women’s body in Malaya (AWAS) 
that was not afraid to fi ght the colonial power.25  She was proud of 
what she had done and urged the readers of her memoirs to dif-
ferentiate between the colonial era under the British and the era aft er 
independence.26 
 Aishah did not join UMNO immediately aft er she left  MNP in 
1946. She explained in her autobiography that she concentrated on her 
work as a radio broadcaster and the new family she was building. She 
joined UMNO only in 1950, when she began to work part-time in 
order to be able to take care of her two young children. Upon joining 
UMNO, she was immediately assigned as the secretary of the women’s 
wing of the local branch. From the following year until she went to 
London for further studies in 1955, Aishah was a regular member of 
the women’s wing delegation to the UMNO general assembly.
 How do we make sense of Aishah Ghani’s commitment to the 
cause of Malaya’s political independence when, aft er fi ve years of 
active political involvement in UMNO, she left  the country for further 
studies just as the country was about to deliberate on its fi rst majority-
elected federal legislative council? And how should we understand her 
perspective in terms of political commitment when she rejected the 
UMNO president’s request to return from London to lead the women’s 
wing of UMNO in 1956?
 Aishah mentioned in her autobiography that in 1956, aft er she 
completed her English language courses and just as she was about to 
start her journalism course, the UMNO leader Tunku Abdul Rahman 
met her in London. He told her that Khadijah Sidek, the leader of the 
women’s wing, had been expelled from the party, and he asked Aishah 
whether she was willing to return to Malaya to replace Khadijah. She 
refused straight away, explaining to him that she needed to remain in 
London to complete her journalism course. She commented that the 
Tunku’s query strengthened her resolve to equip herself with as much 
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knowledge as possible so that she could become an eff ective leader 
of consequence rather than feeling handicapped in the face of bigger 
challenges.27 
 Th ese actions make one wonder whether Aishah perceived the 
role of the UMNO women’s wing as subsidiary and secondary in 
achieving independence: she did not think it worthwhile to heed the 
Tunku’s request and abandon her journalism training. Indirectly, Aishah 
explained her stance by proposing a diff erent role for herself. She 
quoted the Tunku as telling Malayan students in London that although 
the initial objective of struggle to achieve independence might not 
take too much time, translating this independence into meaningful 
reality (mengisi kemerdekaan) would then become a heavy respon-
sibility and would take a long time.28  Aishah seemed to understand 
this goal as raising the status of the Malay people to the same level 
as non-Malay Malayans.29  When she landed at the airport in Kuala 
Lumpur upon her return from London in December 1958, she men-
tioned that she praised God for the fact that her homeland had 
achieved independence, and that she as the daughter of this homeland 
had returned from her sojourn overseas to contribute to the struggle 
to mengisi kemerdekaan.30 
 It is reasonable to deduce from the above that Aishah was a 
very rational, determined, even politically ambitious person. From 
her youth, she seemed to know exactly what she wanted and worked 
hard to ensure that she could achieve it. While the great majority of 
UMNO grass-roots members communicated mainly in Malay, it was 
the English-educated male elites who dominated the national leadership 
of the party. Aishah seemed to aspire to become part of the English-
educated political elites at the top; she was not content with being just 
a mediocre politician due to her lack of knowledge and exposure. Th e 
Tunku emphasised English profi ciency as one of the conditions for an 
UMNO leader to be chosen as an electoral candidate. It was not dif-
fi cult for Aishah to fi gure out that should she master English and 
acquire a professional qualifi cation, she would be well placed  —  even 
ahead of some of her Malay-educated male colleagues  —  to rise up 
the ranks to the national level.31 
Th e Ethnic Dimension
With regard to UMNO’s political orientation, Aishah found the 
“method of struggle to demand independence pursued by the Malay 
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leaders in UMNO more convincing”.32  She believed that the Malay 
people were still in a position of weakness and that if they demanded 
something with force, they would face negative consequences. While 
she acknowledged both UMNO and MNP as Malay nationalist parties 
aiming to liberate the country, she found the struggle of UMNO 
“more honest and pure”.33  It is notable that she described UMNO’s 
struggle as fi ghting for the future of the Malay people34  rather than 
for all Malayan people.35 
 In her memoirs Aishah sounded as though she was addressing 
only Malay readers, despite having been a cabinet minister for a 
decade. Malaya for her was confi ned mainly to the Malay community. 
Her struggle focused on the emancipation of the Malay people rather 
than decolonisation of the people of all ethnicities in Malaya at that 
time. In her memoirs, she expressed her unease when mingling with 
non-Malays in the meetings or training courses conducted by the 
MNP. It may even be argued that she looked upon non-Malays with 
a certain degree of mistrust and hostility. Instead of acknowledging 
the negotiation of independence from the British as the joint eff orts 
of a multi-ethnic united front, she contended that “it was the Malay 
people who had fought for independence”.36 
 In her autobiography, Aishah expressed her admiration for 
and agreement with the controversial book written by Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad in the aft ermath of the racial riots of 13 May 1969, Th e 
Malay Dilemma.37  She referred to non-Malays freely and indiscrimi-
nately as “immigrants” (pendatang) and wrote approvingly of 
Mahathir’s reference to Malays as the “defi nitive people” of Malaya. 
According to her, “immigrants” needed to respect the policy of the 
land and not go overboard in demanding their rights.38 
 Perhaps, like many among the Malay population, Aishah had a 
perspective on the Chinese population in Malaya that was skewed 
by the sporadic Sino-Malay violence that broke out during the inter-
regnum period. She talked about some ruthless and arbitrary atrocities 
committed by “a group of Chinese” belonging to the MPAJA. Noting 
that many Malays fell victim to Chinese, she related how she and her 
relatives had heard her neighbour screaming for help one night in 
August 1945 and the following morning the neighbour and his son 
were found to have been killed. Even though she acknowledged that 
some villagers said it was not the MPAJA that had killed them but 
the rubber tappers who previously worked under the neighbour, she 
apparently did not think so.39 
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 It is revealing to read her commentaries on the Anti-Malayan 
Union Movement. She mentioned that Malay papers reminded Malays 
that if they did not bravely do something to oppose the Mala-
yan Union Plan, they would be faced with consequences worse than 
the Japanese oppression.40  She noted that with the implementation of 
the Malayan Union Plan, “all the people will be given the same rights 
regardless of their descent, and all will be called ‘Malayan’”.41  Th is 
argument that all Malayan people being given the same rights would 
result in “consequences worse than the Japanese oppression” makes 
sense only if Sino-Malay distrust and hostility are presumed. Notably, 
among all other leaders who spoke at the Anti-Malayan Union Move-
ment Congress, she quoted Kiai Salleh, the leader of a Malay para-
military group that indiscriminately killed members of the Chinese 
population, including defenceless women and children.42 
 Aishah’s narrow Malay nationalistic political perspective on 
Malayan nationhood coincided with the generation of UMNO politi-
cians who rose from the time of Premier Abdul Razak aft er the racial 
riots in 1969. Aishah rose to become the women’s wing national leader 
with the changing of the guard from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Abdul 
Razak. On the other hand, if this was her perspective of nationalism, 
it is understandable that she felt uneasy in the MNP and with the 
ambiguous association with the Chinese-dominated Malayan Com-
munist Party and preferred instead UMNO as the vehicle of her poli-
tical activism.
 Shamsiah, on the other hand, appears to have been far more 
ethnically inclusive in her perspective. From her childhood world of 
Malay culture and Islamic studies, her political involvement seemed to 
have widened her horizon and contacts with people of other ethnic 
communities. In her memoirs, she did not seem to judge or react to 
people based on their ethnic origins. She never commented in any 
negative sense on the Chinese community or her Chinese comrades, 
or on the predominantly “Chinese nature” of the MCP. She did not 
use the pejorative term pendatang (immigrant) to refer to non-Malays 
as did Aishah (and probably many other Malays of her time).
 It was Fatini’s articles that referred to Shamsiah’s initial public 
contact with “the Chinese” (synonym for the author with “Commu-
nist”) in a negative sense. Apparently Aishah Ghani, as one of Fatini’s 
informants, suggested that Shamsiah might have been exposed to 
Communist ideas in the context of the PUTERA-AMCJA campaign, 
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when she appeared frequently in public with a couple of Chinese 
women leaders of mass organisations that were seen as fronts for the 
MCP.43  PUTERA-AMCJA was formed to campaign against the Federa-
tion of Malaya Agreement (proposal of a political structure to replace 
the Malayan Union), forged between the British colonial power and 
UMNO and Malay rulers in 1947.
 Shamsiah, on the other hand, described the PUTERA-AMCJA 
collaboration as playing an important and positive role in the history 
of the struggle against colonialism. She referred to the coalition as the 
fi rst to provide a platform for cooperation and unity of all ethnic com-
munities in Malaya, preceding the multi-ethnic Alliance coalition.44  
She stressed that AWAS, representing progressive and politically con-
scious Malay women, was proud to be part of the historic PUTERA-
AMCJA cooperation.
 Th ere is also the question of how the predominantly Chinese 
MCP regarded Shamsiah. Fatini was told by her informants, former 
comrades of Shamsiah who surrendered, that Shamsiah was greatly 
respected by Chinese MCP members and leaders even though she 
apparently did not occupy any important offi  cial position. In his inter-
view with Fatini, Ahmad Salleh45  argued that Shamsiah must have 
abandoned her Islamic faith or else she could not have become some-
one trusted by the MCP Central Committee.46  He insinuated that she 
might have been used by the MCP as a public front to demonstrate 
the goodwill of the MCP towards the Malay people.
 Apparently in response to this report, Shamsiah explained in 
her memoirs that as a branch level committee member, she was not 
entitled to carry a pistol and a hand grenade. However, Musa Ahmad, 
the chairman of the MCP at the time, told the 10th Regiment that she 
was given the honour of being able to do so as a sign of respect for 
the leader of AWAS, that is, she stressed, in her capacity as a Malay 
woman. According to her, Musa said that the MCP was worried that 
its good name might be tainted if she got killed and the enemy found 
that she did not have a fi rearm.47  In fact, the political importance of 
the all-Malay 10th Regiment cannot be underestimated. Th e regiment 
refuted the allegation that the MCP was a “Chinese party” and the 
shaping of Malay public opinion by British propaganda that carica-
tured its struggle as a Chinese insurrection. Yet it appears that it was 
not only the ethnic dimension that mattered in the case of Shamsiah 
but the fact that she was a woman as well, as she herself stressed.
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Th e Gender Dimension
Both Shamsiah and Aishah faced issues concerning the quality and 
availability of women leaders in their respective organisations. Aishah 
spoke about the challenge to fi nd suitable members for local women’s 
wing committees, let alone for heads of those committees. She 
acknowledged the lack of political ambition among the Malay women 
who joined UMNO in the name of strengthening Malay unity and 
helping the party to win as many electoral seats as they could. More 
detrimentally, some of those in rural areas also frowned on other 
women who indicated their readiness to play a more active role in the 
party. Most early local women’s wing leaders were older housewives 
whose husbands were men of wealth or status, such as village head, 
school principal or district offi  cer.48  Aishah described their political 
knowledge and understanding as “very moderate” and pragmatic.49 
 Th is was clearly not her idea and ideal of a woman political 
leader. Aishah’s reference point might well have been the young, 
modern and English-speaking Miss Kontik, whom she encountered as 
a primary school pupil. Th is might explain the reason for which she 
decided to leave everything behind to further her studies and master 
English so as to become a diff erent type of female political leader.
 Elsewhere, Aishah mentioned that she was elected consecutively 
12 times (1960–72) to the Supreme Council of UMNO without having 
to campaign much for herself, which was indeed a feat as a female 
UMNO leader. Interestingly, she mentioned that based on her expe-
rience, a woman who wished to become a division chief needed to 
have strong male supporters.50  She also said that besides having loyal 
and skillful supporters, such a candidate needed to fully understand 
politics as a “game” and be confi dent that she had mastered well 
the art of this “game”, and yet be wise enough to know the pitfalls 
to avoid.51 
 Shamsiah, on the other hand, approached the issue of women’s 
participation in politics from a diff erent angle. Given her very down-
to-earth and humble perspective of herself and her service to the 
cause of decolonisation, she empathised with and instilled a sense of 
mission among her followers. According to her, her message to them 
was very simple. She would explain that under the yoke of colonisa-
tion, the (Malay) people remained poor and low in knowledge. Only 
when they had a free and independent country would it be possible 
to build the nation and bring prosperity to society.52  Using stories 
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about the Prophet Muhammad’s wives who sought knowledge and 
actively conducted various activities outside the home, she encouraged 
village women to develop their potential and leadership qualities 
and to go beyond shouldering household responsibilities. She also 
reminded them to pursue independence hand in hand with men, 
likening men and women to the two wings of a bird: the lack of one 
would cripple movement.53 
 Her former comrade in AWAS, Aishah Hussein, recalled that they 
used to walk three or four kilometres in the rural area of Sungai Long, 
near Kajang, to recruit women villagers as members. Shamsiah also 
organised programmes for these women with the aim to conscientise 
them, such as literacy, cooking and sewing classes, so that they would 
be confi dent and know how to conduct themselves in public func-
tions. In order to broaden their world view, those women who knew 
how to read were asked to buy and read newspapers. Th ese women 
members also participated in fundraising eff orts to support the poli-
tical activities of AWAS in particular and MNP in general.54 
 Shamsiah explained that her nationalist struggle for inde-
pendence had made her aware of the oppression of women. She 
believed that the struggle for men’s liberty depended on the same for 
women. In eff ect, she noted that while women suff ered from all kinds 
of oppression due to the feudalist, capitalist and imperialist systems, 
they were also oppressed by men because of traditional customs and 
religious rules. As an example, she gave her experience of being 
divorced by her fi rst husband without a valid reason when she was 
eight months’ pregnant.55  Shamsiah described the responsibility of 
raising the living standard of women, achieving equal rights for men 
and women, and liberating women from the chain of oppression as a 
big and heavy responsibility to be accomplished over the long term. 
Achieving the independence of her homeland, for her, was the fi rst 
step towards the liberation of women.56 
 Despite her belief in women’s liberation, Shamsiah took a contro-
versial step in her third marriage. She married Ahmad Boestamam, 
the head of API, as his second wife in December 1946, six months 
aft er she started working at the MNP.
 Fatini described Shamsiah’s third marriage thus: “Th is was the 
most sensational marriage in the history of the Malay nationalist 
struggle. Boestamam and Shamsiah  —  the API chief and AWAS head 
—  they were a great match!” Nonetheless, her subsequent comments 
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were damaging: “But just as her previous marriages, this marriage also 
ended in failure. What was wrong with Shamsiah?” 57  When asked, 
Ishak Hj. Muhammad, a one-time president of MNP, criticised Sham-
siah, saying that she “likes to get married” and was “mad about men” 
and even wanted to elope with Ahmad Boestamam.58  Nonetheless, 
her other former comrades defended her. Wahi Anuwar, her fourth 
husband, said Ahmad was “a bit egoistic and got carried away by his 
ego”.59  Another unnamed informant referred to Ahmad as follows: 
“Boestamam’s ego is too high. He does not like to be challenged and 
does not obey any leaders.” 60  It appears that Ahmad might have been 
interested in Shamsiah from the beginning. He may have felt “chal-
lenged” when Shamsiah teased him about the shortcomings of API’s 
contribution to the party, and decided to “tackle” her by making her 
his wife.61 
 In her autobiography, Shamsiah defended her decision to marry 
Ahmad Boestamam as a way to learn from him:
At that time I was aware that even though I had high morale for 
the struggle my ideological and political maturity was still low. I 
was still green and lacking experience in struggle. Th is is not some-
thing strange. While I needed to learn by doing, I also needed help 
from people who were experienced. I thought I would get a lot of 
help from Ahmad if I married him.62 
She also defended her position as the second wife by saying that from 
a religious point of view Islam allowed polygyny, and that she main-
tained a good relationship with Ahmad’s fi rst wife, Rabitah. Shamsiah 
blamed her subsequent divorce with Ahmad on his mother and elder 
sister, who did not approve of her.63  Fatini’s sources mentioned that 
Shamsiah was unhappy that Ahmad Boestamam, when convicted of 
sedition for his writings, sought donations to pay his fi ne in order 
to avoid going to jail. She felt that it would have been better for 
him to suff er in prison rather than beg for people’s sympathy to bail 
himself out.64 
 Another more serious accusation against Shamsiah was made by 
Musa Ahmad, the former MCP chairman who surrendered to the 
Malaysian government in 1981. He claimed that Shamsiah threw into 
the river the child she bore in the jungle with her fourth husband, 
Wahi Anuwar. Shamsiah denied this in her memoirs. She described the 
diffi  cult situation she was in aft er giving birth and struggling to keep 
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her infant son with her. Her hiding place was attacked several times 
by the British Army.65  Lacking rest and proper nutrition, she had no 
milk to feed her baby. So in the end she allowed her comrades who 
saved her to take him away to be adopted by a family in the nearby 
village. However, she found out aft er three years that her baby had 
been killed by them.66  When the MCP leaders found out about it, 
they punished those who were involved aft er consulting with her.67  
Th is episode illustrates the dilemma of a woman freedom fi ghter, who 
despite doing all she could to save her baby still ended up losing 
him while she soldiered on with her political struggle. Th e fact that 
Aishah took leave from political involvement for a few years aft er her 
marriage is perhaps, in a mild sense, the reverse of Shamsiah’s bitter 
experience of the “domestic tension” oft en faced by women involved 
in political activities.
Conclusion
Th e lives of Aishah and Shamsiah are embedded in the larger histo-
rical and ideological struggle for independence in British Malaya, and 
are marked by social confl icts that remained unresolved for decades 
even aft er independence. Th eir private lives and political involvement 
were also profoundly marked by the cultural norms and religious 
practices of their ethnic community as Malay and Muslim women. In 
their own ways, they sought what they understood as the acceptable 
way to self-emancipation and struggled to enlarge that space.
 While knowledge of the wider historical context is indispensable 
for us to understand more fully the story of their struggle, and how 
their political involvement gave meaning to their identity, their life 
experiences also enable us to gain insights into how  —  as social agents 
of change on two diff erent sides of the political divide  —  they parti-
cipated in and contributed to the ongoing struggle through their 
respective localised, situated practices. As noted by Roxana Waterson, 
analysing personal narratives at the intersection with history helps 
us to understand what it was like to live through “interesting times” 
and gain insights into wider social and political processes.68  It is this 
diversity and distinctiveness of individual experiences, off ering parti-
cular points of view while refl ecting the workings of the larger struc-
tural forces, that could be the unique contribution of biographical 
studies to enriching historical understanding.
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chapter 7
Lily Eberwein: Her Life and 
Involvement in the Anti-cession 
Movement in Sarawak
Welyne J. Jehom
This chapter examines the political involvement of Lily Eberwein (1900–80) in what is referred to as the anti-cession movement in 
Sarawak, now a part of Malaysia. Th is little-known nationalist move-
ment in the 1940s attempted to retain the “independence” of Sarawak 
against takeover by Britain. Although it failed to achieve its objective, 
it did serve to politicise many local people, including women.
 Despite being Eurasian by birth, Lily Eberwein identifi ed with 
the Malay community in the multi-ethnic society of Sarawak and was 
active as an educationalist and a political leader. She was a pioneer 
in a number of ways, being the fi rst “Malay” woman off ered a job 
as a telephone operator at the government department in 1927, and 
then the fi rst “Malay” woman principal of Permaisuri Girls School, 
the fi rst Malay girls’ school in Sarawak, founded in 1930. During 
the Japanese occupation in Sarawak, the Japanese appointed Eberwein 
as the leader of the Malay section of the Kaum Ibu, a multi-ethnic 
women’s association.1  In March 1947 she was elected as the chair-
person of the women’s wing of the Malay National Union of Sarawak, 
a leading group in the anti-cession movement.2  Eberwein resigned 
from her post as the principal of Permaisuri Girls School in 1947 as a 
gesture of protest against the cession, but she continued her role as an 
educationalist by establishing new schools.
 From a theoretical point of view, the anti-cession movement is a 
strange nationalist phenomenon because it supported the continuation 
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Kaum Ibu MNU, Sarawak, 1946. Courtesy of Datuk Sri Hajjah Hafsah Harun
Lily Eberwein Abdullah, 
1980. Courtesy of Datuk Sri 
Hajjah Hafsah Harun
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of the rule of the “White Rajahs” of Sarawak. Sarawak was traditionally 
under the suzerainty of the Brunei sultan, who ruled through Malay 
chiefs. In 1841 the British Brooke family took over, and three genera-
tions of Brookes managed to maintain their control over this remote 
and neglected part of Borneo and generate goodwill and support 
among the local population. As in other parts of Southeast Asia, 
however, the Japanese occupation during World War II swept away 
the old regime; and aft er the war Britain negotiated with the reigning 
Brooke Rajah to “cede” Sarawak to the British empire, adding it to 
their other colonies in the region. Politicised by their experience of 
Japanese rule, local leaders opposed the cession, wishing to keep 
Sarawak independent of the British empire. Although it may seem 
odd to label as nationalist a movement that supported one form of 
British rule, that of the Brookes, against another, the British empire, 
it is understandable from the point of view of local Malay elites who 
identifi ed the Brookes with their long-standing political domination in 
Sarawak, and from the point of view of the anti-cession movement’s 
vision of a new future for their independent nation.
 Focusing on Lily Eberwein helps to draw attention to the in-
volvement of women in the anti-cession movement, a matter that has 
largely been neglected in historical works  —  although women’s parti-
cipation has been mentioned by Sabihah Osman,3  Hasbie Sulaiman,4  
Sanib Said5  and Robert Reece.6  Nordi Archie, who wrote about the 
participation and the role of women in Sarawak politics between 1946 
and 1996, briefl y discussed their early political engagement in the 
anti-cession movement in 1946.7  Th is chapter is based on very limited 
archival sources and an interview with Eberwein’s daughter who was 
a former minister of culture, youth and sport in Sarawak, Datuk Sri 
Hajjah Hafsah Harun.8 
Historical Background
Sarawak is located on the island of Borneo, separated from West 
Malaysia (Peninsular Malaysia) by the South China Sea. (For place 
names in this chapter, see map 5.) It is one of the two states that 
have made up East Malaysia since the formation of the Federation of 
Malaysia in 1963. Among the more than 40 ethnic groups in Sarawak, 
the major ones are the Iban, Chinese and Malay, followed by Bidayuh, 
Melanau, Orang Ulu and other indigenous groups. Terminology is 
loose: Ibans and Bidayuh have oft en been referred to as Dayaks. 
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Table 1 gives the statistics for the ethnic groups in 1947. Th e category 
“Other indigenous” includes groups such as Kayan, Kenyah, Penan, 
Kelabit, Bisaya, Kajang and Sembop, while the category “Others” 
includes Indians.
Table 1   Sarawak population by ethnic group, 1947 9 
Malay 97,469
Sea Dayak [Iban] 190,326







 Malays in Sarawak were divided into the aristocratic elite 
(perabangan) and commoners  —  the latter were mainly fi shermen, 
petty traders involved in riverine trade with indigenous people of 
the interior, and farmers growing rice, coconut and rubber.10  Th e 
indigenous groups practised shift ing cultivation, planted sago, or lived 
by fi shing.11  Chinese cultivation concentrated on smallholdings of 
cash crops such as rubber and pepper.12 
 Although Malays were a non-indigenous minority, they domi-
nated the area politically. Sarawak was ruled by the Malay Brunei 
sultanate until the arrival and involvement of James Brooke in the 
“Sarawak aff air” in 1839, when Sarawak was in rebellion against the 
central power. Brooke assisted the sultan’s representative and brought 
peace to the area, for which he was rewarded in 1841 with the title of 
Rajah of Sarawak. According to Sanib, “James Brooke and the ‘dynasty’ 
which he founded in Sarawak, seen in a larger context of the Malay 
world, was just another of those Malay kingdoms that mark the his-
tory of the archipelago.”13  However, Reece has argued that the Brooke 
Raj should also be seen as part of the development of European im-
perialism in insular Southeast Asia, rendering ambiguous later objec-
tions to the takeover of Sarawak by the British colonial offi  ce. Never-
theless, the Brooke Raj depended on the Malay aristocratic elite to 
rule Sarawak. In a country where immigrant Malays had been accus-
tomed to rule, apparently there was little objection to having another 
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kind of foreigner as rajah. Under the Brookes, members of the tradi-
tional Malay elite were recruited to hold highly respected posts in the 
civil service, where they gained administrative experience, subordinate 
only to the Brookes and their European offi  cers.14 
 Th e last White Rajah of Sarawak, Charles Vyner Brooke, took up 
his post in 1917 and was forced out of power by the Japanese during 
World War II. Aft er the war he decided that the best future for 
Sarawak was to become a British Crown Colony, and so, on 6 February 
1946, the colonial secretary announced in the British Parliament that 
Rajah Vyner Brooke had decided to cede his country to the British 
Crown. Th e decision to cede15  Sarawak to the British Crown was made 
without consulting the Rajah Muda (Prince) Anthony Brooke,16  who 
expected to become the White Rajah aft er his uncle, Vyner Brooke. 
According to Reece, “It may have been that his nephew’s (Anthony) 
infl exibility in negotiations with the Colonial Offi  ce fi nally persuaded 
the Rajah that he should not succeed him and that Sarawak should 
instead become the colony of the Crown.” 17 
 During the 1930s, offi  cials of the Colonial Offi  ce had toyed with 
the idea of taking over the Sarawak government from the Brooke 
regime and considered potential economic opportunities opened up by 
such a move. At the end of World War II, access to rubber and oil 
The Anti-cession Movement in Sarawak
1839 Arrival and involvement of James Brooke in “Sarawak aff air”
1841 Sultan of Brunei rewards James Brooke with title of Rajah of 
Sarawak
1917 Last White Rajah of Sarawak, Charles Vyner Brooke, takes up 
his post
1941–45 Japanese occupation of Sarawak
Feb. 1946 Britain announces that Rajah Vyner Brooke has decided to 
cede his country to the British Crown
July 1946 Sarawak becomes a Crown Colony
1946 Beginning of anti-cession movement
1963 Formation of the Federation of Malaysia, including Malayan 
Peninsula, Sarawak and Sabah
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in Sarawak acquired a greater priority in view of the impending inde-
pendence to be granted to India and Burma.18  Th e British arranged 
with Rajah Brooke for Sarawak to become a Crown Colony on 1 July 
1946.19  Sarawak was to remain under British administration until it 
joined the Malayan Peninsula with Sabah to form the Federation of 
Malaysia in 1963. Th e loss of Sarawak’s independence in 1946 was 
resisted by elements within it, in what was called the “anti-cession 
movement”. Th is movement indicated the politicisation of important 
sections of the population in the previous decade.
Th e Anti-cession Movement
Until the late 1930s, state politics in Sarawak was confi ned to the 
Brooke family and the 70 to 80 Europeans in the Sarawak Service.20  
Traditional Malay and a handful of Chinese elites monopolised the 
representation of native and Chinese interests. Th en Malays and 
Chinese began forming communal organisations that threatened to 
bypass the traditional leadership. Th e Ibans also began to assert them-
selves by establishing a communally based cooperative aimed at com-
peting with Chinese traders.
 Th e catalyst for this social change was education. Christian 
churches had established mission schools, and the Chinese had also 
set up schools privately. Elite Malays had the opportunity to be pre-
pared for clerical government posts in the National College, which 
was founded by the government in 1919.21  Government provision for 
Iban education was negligible. However, in the early 1930s there was 
a considerable increase in educational opportunities in the Sarawak 
capital, Kuching.22 
 While schooling was spreading among all communities, parti-
cularly in the larger towns, employment opportunities were not. Th e 
Native Offi  cer Service remained the monopoly of the perabangan in 
spite of the growing number of educated Malays and Ibans who were 
much better qualifi ed. It was not until 1941 that the government 
appointed the fi rst Malay native offi  cer who was not an aristocrat. By 
1941, there were a substantial number of young educated people of all 
races whose expectations could not be satisfi ed by either the Brooke 
government or the traditional Malay and Chinese leadership.23 
 Fajar Sarawak,24  founded in 1930 by a small group of educated 
Malays of non-aristocratic origin, was the fi rst Malay-language news-
paper in Sarawak. It showed the fi rst stirrings of Malay political 
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awareness: it was very critical of the perabangan, describing them 
as being more concerned with their wealth than with helping poor 
Malays, and also hinted that the perabangan were doing very little to 
justify the position of prestige and authority that they had traditionally 
enjoyed. However, the paper disappeared aft er a few months, due to 
lack of support and to active opposition by the perabangan.25 
 Haji Abdul Rahman pursued the idea of a pan-Malay organisation, 
which had been suggested by one of the founders of Fajar Sarawak, 
Rakawi Yusoff . Th us, 1939 saw the formation of Persatuan Melayu 
Sarawak (Sarawak Malay Union), which was renamed Persatuan Melayu 
Kebangsaan Sarawak (Malay National Union, MNU) aft er World War 
II.26  Among its many objectives were: to unite Malays and work 
together for their advancement; to promote business, education, cul-
ture and the Malay language; and to protect the Islamic faith.27  How-
ever, the most signifi cant objective that showed dissatisfaction with the 
traditional form of representation through the perabangan was that the 
MNU aimed to liaise between Malays and the government.28  Th rough 
the MNU, younger Malays sensed that to improve in their social and 
economic condition, they would have to bypass the perabangan.
 Before the Japanese invasion, then, there were already manifes-
tations of discontent among the newly educated generation vis-à-vis 
the traditional leadership. Th e Japanese regime broke the myth of 
European political and cultural supremacy. At that time, Ibans were 
for the fi rst time given the opportunity to participate in government 
administration by the Japanese. While the Japanese occupation did 
not provide opportunities for political activity, it did inspire people 
in Sarawak with the self-confi dence to adopt a political stance and 
to organise what amounted to political parties. By the end of the 
war, therefore, all the main ethnic groups in Sarawak had become 
politicised.29  Subsequently, the MNU, the China Distress Relief Fund 
committees, and the Dayaks Cooperative Society became the pre-
cursors of post-war political parties, two of them in response to the 
cession controversy in early 1946. 
 During World War II the Malay National Union (MNU) and 
educated Malays were not favoured by the Japanese, who followed 
the Brooke style of governing the masses through the traditional 
elite.30  Nevertheless, networks among MNU members were main-
tained and their branches were revived aft er World War II, serving 
the cause of anti-cessionists in mobilising mass support within the 
Malay community.31 
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 Following the announcement on 6 February 1946 by the rajah 
that the British Crown had consented to taking over Sarawak, the 
MNU and Sarawak Dayak Association (SDA) emerged as Sarawak’s 
fi rst political parties. For many months, SDA leaders could not come 
to a clear stand on cession. Both organisations were apprehensive of 
Chinese domination. Th ere were obstacles before the MNU and SDA 
could cooperate, due to suspicion that the former were simply using 
the latter to meet their own ends: this suspicion was fuelled by the 
patronising attitude to indigenous Sarawakians among MNU conser-
vatives. However, agreement on cooperation was fi nally achieved as 
the Ibans were convinced by the close personal friendship between 
Robert Jitam and Mohd. Nor, and by Suhaily bin Matlayeir, who knew 
most of the Ibans in Kuching and spoke their language.32  However, 
from July until October 1946, the MNU faced internal confl ict be-
tween the conservatives and younger activists. Th e latter were mostly 
English-educated Malays of non-aristocratic origin who found they 
had more in common politically with Robert Jitam of SDA. MNU 
members wished to see a reinstatement of the rajah, but not neces-
sarily for the same reasons. For the traditional elite, reinstatement of 
the Brookes meant a return to the status quo in which they had occu-
pied positions of power and prestige.33  Th e motivation of younger 
Malays in the MNU was more complex because while some just 
wanted the restoration of Brooke rule, others wanted self-government 
as promised in the 1941 constitution, which the Rajah had introduced 
just before the Japanese occupation.34 
 Aft er the war, the rajah made plans to return to Sarawak in 
March 1946 to revive the 1941 constitution. In order to show that he 
was ceding the territory to Britain in a proper constitutional manner, 
the rajah called a meeting of the Council Negri (Council of State), 
which was held from 15 to 17 May 1946, solely for the purpose of 
passing the cession bill. Although 10 of the 16 Malay members voted 
against the bill, most European members (seven out of ten) voted in 
favour, and the cession bill was passed by 18 votes to 16 on a show of 
hands.35  In a cable sent to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, the 
Malay leaders Datu Patinggi and Abang Haji Zaini stated that cession 
did not have the lawful assent of the representatives of the indigenous 
people and that fi ve of the native members who had voted for cession 
were “under monetary infl uence”.36 
 Th e anti-cession campaign took the form of expressions of loyalty 
to Bertram and Anthony Brooke, Rajah Vyner Brooke’s brother and 
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nephew respectively.37  Datu Patinggi invited Bertram and his son 
Anthony, who was regarded as the rajah’s successor, to return to 
Sarawak to initiate fresh discussions on the question of cession. In 
his letter opposing cession Datu Patinggi included a memorandum 
from MNU leaders and village heads, dated 12 March, pleading that if 
the rajah felt unable to continue taking charge of the government he 
should hand over to Anthony Brooke.38  Th e anti-cession movement, 
spearheaded by the MNU, was under way.
 Aft er the announcement of cession, there were mixed feelings 
among the Chinese in Sarawak. Some Chinese assumed that Sarawak 
would form part of the Malayan Union and that the Sarawak Chinese 
would enjoy the rights of Malayan Union citizenship. Others men-
tioned that “all we want is to have our status raised so that we can 
enjoy equal rights with the natives”, while some, although concerned 
that cession might bring an increase in taxation, looked forward to the 
development that they anticipated colonial status would bring about. 
Mission-educated Chinese who had a stake in economic development 
and modernisation but appreciated many of the features of personal 
rule were uncertain whether the new government would be able to 
exercise the same control over some of the Ibans of the interior, whose 
recent headhunting exploits were well known. Among the Ibans, only 
those who were mission-educated were aware of the cession. Th e other 
Ibans and most of the upriver people continued to think for some 
time that the rajah was still in authority.39 
 Th e diff ering perceptions and reactions of the many ethnic groups 
in Sarawak determined the amount of support and participation in 
the anti-cession movement. However, published accounts of the move-
ment give scant attention to women’s role in it. Th e remainder of this 
chapter focuses on the life of Lily Eberwein. Th e other important issue 
that is of interest here is whether those women thought of their action 
as political and of themselves as nationalists.
Locating Malay Women in the Anti-cession Movement
Among the Malays educated before World War II were women who 
had access to the fi rst Malay girls’ school, Sekolah Permaisuri, which 
did not open until 1930. Up until that time, limited modern education 
was accessible only to aristocratic Malay girls.40  Although the kind of 
education available to Malay girls before World War II was intended 
merely to improve their feminine skills, nonetheless a few of these 
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Malay women excelled in their studies and pursued teaching careers. 
A student of Lily Eberwein, Ajibah Abol, who studied at Sekolah 
Permaisuri, later pursued a teaching career in the same school. Malay 
women were not visible in career advancement until aft er the 1950s.41 
 Th e Japanese occupation gave women in Sarawak their fi rst taste 
of being in associations and working together. Ethnic-based associa-
tions were encouraged during the Japanese occupation between 
1941 and 1945.42  Th ese associations were responsible for organising 
demonstrations of loyalty and cultural events to celebrate the Japanese 
emperor’s birthday and war heroes. Th e Japanese also sponsored the 
setting up of a women’s association known as Kaum Ibu (Women’s 
Group), which included representatives of the four major ethnic 
groups. Its leaders were Eberwein, the headmistress of Permaisuri 
Girls School, for the Malay section; Mary Ong, the daughter of Ong 
Tiang Swee, a trained nurse, for the Chinese; Barbara Bay (Bayang) 
of the Dayaks Cooperative Association (Syarikat Kerjasama Dayak) for 
the Ibans; and Mrs Gopal, the wife of an Indian doctor, to represent 
the Indians. Th eir tasks in Kaum Ibu were to collect unused and 
recyclable metal and to organise fairs to raise funds for Japanese sol-
diers. Kaum Ibu was also responsible for organising singing and 
dancing for such events. Apart from that, Kaum Ibu was responsible 
for encouraging women to grow tapioca as a substitute for rice, which 
was in short supply.43 
 Th ese women from the four ethnic groups were given an oppor-
tunity to create networks in carrying out the tasks given to them by 
the Japanese. Furthermore, their involvement in the association in-
directly gave them self-confi dence and some encouragement to become 
interested in politics even if they did not know the meaning of poli-
tics and being political. With this experience behind them, some of 
the women  —  and for our case here, Eberwein  —  took a further step 
to become politically active in the anti-cession movement in 1946.
Th e Life of Lily Eberwein Abdullah
Lily Eberwein Abdullah was born in 1900 and passed away in 1980. 
Her father, John Eberwein, a Eurasian of Dutch and Scottish descent 
from Cocos Island, was a relative of the Clooney Ross family, rulers 
of that island. He worked with the Straits Steamship Company as the 
captain of the Rajah Brooke. Like many other European businessmen, 
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Eberwein’s father looked for a local female partner when he was in 
Sarawak. Th e diff erence between John Eberwein and the others was 
that while the latter took local women as mistresses, John married a 
local Malay woman, Maznah bte. Ali bin Alang of Simanggang, and 
eventually brought her to live in Singapore, where they had two 
children, Lily and Edward. Although the family followed a Christian 
way of life in Singapore and the children had a Christian upbringing, 
Maznah continued to practise as a Muslim.
 Eberwein attended St. Mary’s Mission School in Kuching, Sarawak, 
until she was eight years old and then continued her studies at Raffl  es 
Girls School in Singapore. When her father died suddenly, however, 
she returned to Kuching with her mother and rejoined St. Mary’s 
Mission School, where she completed standard seven (equivalent to 
form three, age 15).44 
 Aft er John Eberwein died and the family returned to Kuching, 
their lifestyle changed completely. Eberwein had to adjust to a Muslim 
Malay upbringing, denoted by the addition of Abdullah to her name. 
In an interview, her daughter Hafsah Harun explained that her mother’s 
upbringing was diff erent from that of other Malay girls. Having had 
a European lifestyle in Singapore, when she returned to Kuching she 
missed her freedom and disliked being confi ned to the house. She 
had been accustomed to having male servants to serve her when 
her father was still alive in Singapore, but back in Kuching she had 
to serve her uncles. Furthermore, being an educated woman she 
was very outspoken and independent.
 Eberwein converted to Islam in 1913 when she was just 13 years 
old. She took her time in making this decision, wishing fi rst to learn 
about the religion. According to Hafsah, her friends in Singapore sent 
her papers and books to read on Islam, and she also learned from her 
immediate family members. Apparently her knowledge about her new 
religion impressed her neighbours, to the extent that many people in 
the village sent their sons to Eberwein to learn to read the Quran. 
Th is gesture showed how highly the people in the village trusted her 
and respected her, because at that time and in that setting, women 
were rarely consulted for religious teaching. Eberwein had become 
accepted, and identifi ed herself, as a Muslim Malay, terms that were 
seen as inseparable. Hafsah explained that acceptance by people in the 
village was not really an issue because Eberwein was related to about 
half of them.
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 In 1927 Lily Eberwein became the fi rst Malay woman to work in 
a government department when a Mr Tate, the director of the local 
telephone company, recruited her to work as a telephone operator (the 
telephone company was a government enterprise). She had an excellent 
command of both Malay and English, as was required of a telephone 
operator, and her father had been a family friend of Mr Tate’s. In 1929 
she resigned from this post when the Brooke government appointed 
her as the principal of the Permaisuri Malay Girls School, which was 
opened in Kuching in 1930. Th rough her educational activities, both 
religious and secular, she became known as Cikgu (teacher) Lily.
 She was over the age for marriage by that time. She was a single 
woman until 1938, when she married and proceeded to have three 
daughters, with the fi rst, Hasnah, being born in 1940. Her husband, 
Harun bin Haris, was ten years her junior, with only fi ve years of 
primary education, and worked in the Sarawak Police Constabulary. 
Hafsah recalled that her father was very supportive of her mother’s 
involvement in the anti-cession movement and her passion for educa-
tion. He respected her as a woman and as a wife. In Sarawak at that 
time, being married at a later age and having a much younger husband 
would defi nitely have been controversial. However, Eberwein seemed 
to be able to take it all in her stride. She was highly respected, espe-
cially among Malay people, because of her dedication to educating 
Malay girls.
Lily Eberwein as a Nationalist Woman Leader in the 
Anti-cession Movement
Lily Eberwein’s fi rst step into the overtly political arena came when 
the women’s wing of the Malay National Union, Kaum Ibu MNU, was 
established on 16 March 1947. Eberwein was elected the organisation’s 
chairperson at its inaugural meeting of more than 1,000 Malay women 
members. Reece later commented, “In pre-war times, Malay women 
never appeared in public without covering their heads and it must 
have seemed an extraordinary development that they should now be 
speaking on a platform and taking part in politics.” 45  Nonetheless, that 
platform was not new to Eberwein as she had led a public life for 
many years. An editor of Sarawak Tribune, describing the meeting as 
“History in the Making”, was struck by the range of topics addressed 
by the speakers, which included Malay nationalist movements, Sarawak 
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history, the backwardness of women in Sarawak and their demand for 
rights. Th e editor refl ected:
What a far cry the women of today are from their grandmothers … 
Th ere is no trace of bashfulness that so characterized a woman in 
the old days when making a public appearance, and the woman 
of today stands out on just as fi rm and equal a ground as that of 
any man, in full realization of the part they have to play in the 
country.46 
Reece stated that “like the younger group within the MNU, the leader-
ship of the Kaum Ibu represented a movement towards social change”.47 
 Eberwein appeared an obvious choice to be elected as the fi rst 
chairperson of Kaum Ibu MNU. She was well educated and had 
leadership experience in a women’s organisation established by the 
Japanese during the occupation. She also had full support from her 
husband and her family.48 
 As can be seen from the earlier description of political events in 
Sarawak, this was a highly charged period, when the British govern-
ment faced opposition to cession within Sarawak. Th e colonial 
government in Sarawak attempted to curb the activities of local anti-
cessionists by issuing an instruction (Circular No. 9) prohibiting all 
civil servants from getting involved in any way or being liable to in-
stant dismissal from their post. Th ose who could not comply needed 
to inform their respective head of department by 31 December 1946. 
Th e anti-cessionists refused to acknowledge Circular No. 9 and orga-
nised campaigns in Kuching and Sibu to obtain as many signatures 
as possible to protest against the circular. About 400 government 
servants, of whom three were non-Malays, were served three months’ 
notice till 1 April 1947 to quit when they made known their inability 
to comply with the circular to their superior.49  Most of them were 
Malay schoolteachers, and this caused the closure of one-third of all 
government Malay schools.50  On that day, all 56 teacher trainees of 
the Sarawak Malay Teachers Training College abandoned their studies 
in protest against the circular, and 500 other Malays working in 
schools and non-government occupations also took leave to manifest 
their displeasure.51 
 Eberwein as the headmistress of the Permaisuri Malay Girls 
School and her teaching colleague Ajibah Abol were among the Malay 
schoolteachers who resigned. Ajibah became Eberwein’s secretary in 
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the Kaum Ibu MNU, headed by the latter. Eberwein’s husband, who 
was a corporal in the Sarawak Constabulary, resigned soon aft erwards. 
In this case, Eberwein’s resignation was her own decision and not 
governed by her husband’s infl uence. According to Reece, for those 
who resigned it was a momentous personal decision as well as an act 
of political commitment, because there was very little prospect of 
obtaining employment outside government service. Among the 400 
who resigned, there were only nine women.52 
 As the anti-cession struggle continued, the closure of these Malay 
government schools became a serious concern as aff ected students 
could not fi nd places in other Malay schools. Four schools in Kuching 
and another in Sibu were established by those teachers who resigned. 
In order to assist children of resigned public servants who boycotted 
government schools, Eberwein helped to establish a religious school 
for girls and women (sekolah rakyat) in the premises of the Masjid 
Bintangor Haji Taha building.53  Eberwein and teachers who had re-
signed in protest against the circular taught in this and other schools 
without pay.54  Hence Eberwein’s actions appeared to be balancing 
two parallel concerns: fi ghting for Sarawak’s political destiny as a 
nationalist, and providing an education for Malay women to eff ect 
social change as an educationalist.
 In an interview with the Straits Times (Singapore) dated 21 July 
1947 55  on the anti-cession movement, Eberwein expressed her con-
cern for its impact on Malay education. In the article, titled “Education 
at a Standstill”, she stated that the protest against cession had had 
the most serious eff ect on education, which was virtually at a stand-
still. She emphasised that the position of education in Sarawak 
must remain a matter of gravest public concern “for as long as this 
unhappy controversy lasts”, referring to cession. She also stated, “We 
Malays, in conjunction with the other indigenous races, will fi ght with 
unwavering purpose for the redress of the wrong that has been done 
to our people in the extinction of our nationhood and independence.” 
In the article she clearly identifi ed herself as a member of the Malay 
community and with the cause of Sarawak’s national independence, 
but also expressed her concern about the eff ects of the nationalist 
struggle on education and thus on the people of Sarawak.
 In his memoirs, Anthony Brooke clearly recognised the impor-
tance of women’s role in the anti-cession movement. He specifi cally 
highlighted Eberwein’s eff ort, stating that “a new impetus was given 
to the movement due to the initiative of Chegu (head teacher) Lily 
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Eberwein, who formed a women’s branch of the movement. Th is met 
with considerable support from women of all ages from throughout 
the country.”56 
 Th e MNU sent a group of representatives to meet Brooke in 
Singapore in February 1947.57  Th e Kaum Ibu organised events by peti-
tioning the colonial government and taking part in demonstrations.58  
It also sent a three-member delegation, including Eberwein, to 
Singapore in July 1947 in anticipation of the arrival there of Kathleen 
Brooke (the wife of Anthony Brooke) before she proceeded to Sarawak 
in August 1947 for a tour of the state.59  Representing her husband, 
who was banned by the British from entering Sarawak, Kathleen was 
a force for support of the anti-cession movement. She was accompa-
nied by Eberwein as well as by male members of the MNU. Th e Kaum 
Ibu groups that had sprung up around the state since 1946 received 
Kathleen’s tour group with enthusiasm.60 
 Together with Kathleen Brooke, Eberwein and other male and 
female leaders carried out an arduous rural anti-cession campaign on 
foot and by boat, travelling to remote longhouses to explain to the 
longhouse chiefs and get their thumbprints as affi  rming their opposi-
tion to cession. Th ey also sold photos of Anthony Brooke and Sarawak 
fl ags to the villages to collect funds. Th e rural campaign managed 
to gain the support of 52 Iban penghulu, including Paramount Chief 
Temenggong Koh and Penghulu Jugah.61  However, the British adminis-
tration used its infl uence to get anti-cessionists, including the latter 
two, to withdraw their stand.62 
 Based on Hafsah Harun’s recollections of her mother’s activities 
during the anti-cession campaign, Eberwein to a certain extent had to 
sacrifi ce her time with her young children. Malay women in Sarawak 
at that time were groomed to be “famous for their skill in weaving 
sarongs, knitting”63  and they were expected to stay home taking care 
of the children. Malay women’s activities were all confi ned to the 
domestic domain. Th e anti-cession movement was an exceptional 
event for Eberwein and other Malay women at that time because they 
joined in the campaign along with their male counterparts, partici-
pating in demonstrations and petitioning the colonial government  — 
and Malay women had their own section in Kaum Ibu even though 
it was under the male-dominated MNU. Signifi cantly, Hafsah did 
mention that occasionally, aft er their meetings, Eberwein complained 
about her male colleagues, indicating that it was not always easy for 
her to deal with them.
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 It is diffi  cult to determine the source of the commitment of 
Malay women in general and Eberwein in particular to the anti-cession 
movement, because of the speed of events. Kaum Ibu was created in 
March 1947, and within a few months women were rallied and cam-
paigning against cession. Although the meeting with Kathleen Brooke 
in Singapore and her six-month visit to Sarawak until February 194864  
may have spurred on the Malay women of Sarawak, by that time 
Kaum Ibu had already been established, with more than 1,000 Malay 
women members at the inaugural meeting.
 Even for Eberwein, who had more exposure to the outside world 
than most other Malay women in Sarawak, political activity was not 
something she had dreamed of, according to her daughter Hafsah. 
However, she was accompanied to meetings by Ajibah Abol, and the 
two of them made a good team. Whether or not Eberwein saw herself 
as a political activist, she was committed to social change through 
education for Malay girls, as was shown by her lifelong leadership in 
teaching.
Eberwein’s Legacy
Aft er the failure of the anti-cession movement, Eberwein turned her 
attention mainly to education. In 1950 she established the Satok 
English School (SES). According to her daughter Hafsah, she started 
the school because she realised the importance of the English language 
as a medium of communication, especially in the government service. 
SES was a stepping stone for students to pursue their studies in 
government schools.
 Th e school never received any funds from the government, and 
this showed Eberwein’s true dedication to it. According to Hafsah, 
there were six classes up to form two, each having two sessions with 
fi ve or six teachers, and the school survived solely on the sale of 
handicraft s and collection of funds from former students. Th e students 
were taught not just the normal curriculum but to be disciplined and 
determined. Th e school was multi-ethnic, taking Malay, Iban, Bidayuh, 
Chinese and Indian students. Although mainly for girls, the school 
also admitted a few boys from the boys’ home who were sent to SES 
because they were too old to enter public school. Th e troublesome 
students from the boys’ home were made to feel important, and 
gradually they became well behaved.
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 Although Eberwein was a very active anti-cessionist, she never 
joined any political party. Nevertheless, in 1950 she became the fi rst 
woman to be appointed as a councillor of the Kuching Municipal 
Council —  another occasion on which she was a pioneer for women 
in public life in Sarawak. She participated actively in various voluntary 
organisations, such as the Prisoners’ Aid Society, Anti-Tuberculosis 
Association Sarawak and Red Cross. She remained the chairman of 
Kaum Ibu in the Malay National Union of Sarawak until 1960, when 
she also retired from her own school, Satok English School. Aft er 
that she occasionally assisted Hafsah, who replaced her as the school 
principal.
 In recognition of her services, Eberwein was given two Sarawak 
state awards aft er the Malaysian federation was formed, and she was 
named an exemplary teacher of Malaysia in 1977. Aft er being a dia-
betic for 20 years, Cikgu Lily Eberwein died in 1980.
 Although Eberwein was heavily involved in the anti-cession 
movement, her daughter claimed that from what she understood, her 
mother did not see herself as a politician and was probably unaware 
of being a nationalist leader: she just saw herself as a protester against 
the cession of Sarawak to British colonialism. According to Hafsah, 
Eberwein saw her role in the Malay National Union of Sarawak as 
participating in a non-governmental organisation, not a political move-
ment. Evidence of her unwillingness to belong to a political party 
is seen also in her later life. As Hafsah said, “When Sarawak joined 
Malaysia, she [Eberwein] did not get involved in any political parties.” 
Hafsah went on to point out that Eberwein’s colleague Ajibah Abol 
“was one of her former students who were active in politics but it was 
easier for her because she was single”, although she admitted that if a 
woman were single she could be subjected to gossip.
 In Sarawak there is still only a limited place for women in the 
public sphere, especially in politics. Although Eberwein herself did 
not participate in public political life aft er the anti-cession movement 
ended, she inspired the few women politicians Sarawak had soon aft er 
it joined in the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Ajibah, Eberwein’s 
former student and colleague whom she appointed as her secretary in 
Kaum Ibu MNU, became the fi rst woman to win a seat in the state 
parliament  —  a feat she accomplished in 1970 and again in 1974. She 
was appointed the minister of welfare and culture for Sarawak but 
died in 1976 aft er a short illness. Th e second woman who entered the 
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Sarawak political scene was Hafsah Harun, Eberwein’s daughter. In the 
1976 election Hafsah took over the seat left  empty by Ajibah’s death. 
Subsequently, in 1981 she was appointed minister of culture, youth 
and sport. Her last position as a minister, before she retired as a poli-
tician in 1987, was in the Sarawak Ministry of Social Development.
 Hafsah expressed fond memories of her upbringing and regarded 
her mother as an exceptional woman. She stated that her mother 
had instilled exceptional qualities in her and her sisters  —  to be inde-
pendent and outspoken, and to have determination. She brought her 
daughters to meetings and left  them in the next room. Hafsah claimed 
this experience caused her to perceive herself as a woman politician 
in the making. She had a very close relationship with her mother, 
especially aft er her mother established the Satok English School. Her 
mother was her role model. Hafsah was taught to speak her mind 
and was allowed to disagree on matters with a clear conscience. Her 
mother taught her daughters about religion. She was very strict, but 
at the same time she was more liberal than most Malay mothers in 
bringing up her daughters. Th ey were allowed to go out at night but 
had to come back at a certain time and be escorted at all times.
Conclusion: Refl ections on Eberwein’s Evolving Identity
Eberwein was born Eurasian, and when her father was still alive she 
had the opportunity to travel and experience a European home and 
Christian upbringing, as well as an English-medium school in 
Singapore. Back in Sarawak, her life and identity changed when she 
converted to Islam. She obtained Islamic knowledge that made her a 
respected Quran teacher in her village, which was rare for a woman 
at that time. Eberwein dressed in Malay clothing  —  the long skirt and 
blouse called the baju kurung  —  covered her head when she went out 
in public, read and taught the Quran to village boys at the request of 
their parents, married a Muslim man and lived a Muslim life, and 
spoke Malay. Th is behaviour showed that she had adopted a Malay 
identity, and for that reason the Japanese appointed her as the leader 
of the Malay section of the women’s association Kaum Ibu. Eberwein 
opened a religious school for Malay girls and women aft er her resig-
nation from Permaisuri Malay Girls School in 1947, and she started 
the Satok English School in 1950 upon seeing the importance of 
English as a language of communication. She was concerned about 
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Malay women’s education because she hoped Sarawak women could 
become educated and independent like herself.
 Th us, Lily Eberwein Abdullah’s life demonstrates her involvement 
in Malay society beyond her leadership of Kaum Ibu MNU in the 
unusual, brief and failed nationalist movement that was the anti-
cession movement in Sarawak. More generally, she earned a place 
in Sarawak history by inspiring Malay women of her generation and 
aft erwards to play a part in public life.
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“Minority” Women and the 
Revolution in the Highlands of 
Laos: Two Narratives
Vatthana Pholsena
This chapter focuses on two female war veterans of ethnic minority origin who conducted most of their revolutionary activities during 
the Second Indochina War (1961–75) in southeastern Laos along the 
“Ho Chi Minh Trail”.1  As women combatants from ethnic minorities, 
they are arguably the least-known participants of the Pathet Lao, the 
Communist movement that led the anti-colonial struggle in Laos in 
the second half of the 20th century.
 In recent years, gender has emerged as a fruitful research area in 
war studies focusing on Asia. In particular, the participation of women 
in armed independence struggles and/or Communist insurgencies in 
Southeast Asia has been the focus of remarkable research. Works on 
“women warriors” have broadened our understanding of the expe-
rience of war by exploring the private sphere of combatants’ lives, 
bringing to light the (oft en unattainable) balance female combatants 
sought between the traditional demands of their society, the sacrifi ces 
of a revolutionary life, and their own desire for freedom and inde-
pendence. Books by Vina Lanzona2  and Agnes Khoo3  studying Huk 
female insurgents in the Philippines and women Communist fi ghters 
in the Malayan anti-colonial struggle, respectively, tackle such issues. 
Pioneering works by Karen Gottschang Turner and Phan Th anh Hao,4  
Sandra C. Taylor5  and François Guillemot6  on North Vietnamese 
female Communist fi ghters involved with Viet Minh forces also come 
to mind.7  In fact, so important was Vietnamese women’s role during 
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the wars (especially in the struggle against the Americans) that Turner 
and Phan Th anh Hao claim that “an accurate history of the war the 
Vietnamese call the ‘American War’ must recognize Vietnamese 
women’s contributions to Hanoi’s victory in 1975”.8  Yet, Taylor notes 
in 1999 that “few books in English have mentioned the Women’s Lib-
eration Association, the Vietnam Women’s Union, the role of women 
in the National Liberation Front, or their participation in the war”.9  
Besides being essential for the writing of a more balanced and com-
plete history of the Indochina Wars, the inclusion of women’s voices 
is also important as these voices oft en refl ect diff erent perceptions of 
war to those of their male contemporaries.10 
 Th is chapter aims to go beyond conventional diplomatic and 
military histories of the Vietnam wars to examine war from below. 
It is concerned with how people were shaped by their wartime expe-
riences. To understand such processes, it is fi rst necessary to explain 
the strategic signifi cance of the highlands and the role of ethnic 
minorities on the anti-colonial side during the First (1946–54) and 
Second Indochina Wars, in conjunction with the Communist ethnic 
policy. In guerrilla warfare, the support of the local population is 
essential. Th e local population discussed in this chapter consists of the 
highland peoples of southeastern Laos.11  During the Indochina Wars, 
these highlanders were targeted as much by the Lao and Vietnamese 
Manivanh. Courtesy of History Museum, 
Savannakhet
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revolutionaries as by the French and, later on, the Americans. All the 
belligerents saw the mountain areas of southeastern Laos as of crucial 
strategic importance: the areas became a Viet Minh (the Vietnamese 
Communist-dominated nationalist front12 ) stronghold during the First 
Indochina War and, beginning in the early 1960s, the conduit for the 
Map 9.   Laos
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Ho Chi Minh Trail, also known as Duong Mon Truong Son.13  (For 
place names in this chapter, see map 9.)
Historical Context
Following the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II, the 
Lao Issara (Free Lao), the fi rst Lao nationalist movement  —  founded 
in 1945 and led by Prince Phetsarath  —  unilaterally declared the 
independence of Laos from France and formed a government. How-
ever, unable to curb the French military eff ort to regain control over 
Laos, the Lao Issara leadership fl ed to Th ailand within six months. 
Deep divisions in the ranks of the Lao Issara emerged rapidly in 
the late 1940s, between opponents and supporters of collaboration 
with France. Some Lao nationalist leaders adopted a policy of strict 
neutrality  —  among them was Prince Phetsarath, who until his death 
in 1959 opposed any foreign intervention in Laos’ internal aff airs 
and subsequently left  the country and lived in exile for ten years in 
Th ailand. Another member of the Lao royal family and a well-known 
nationalist leader, Souvanna Phouma (Phetsarath’s brother), conversely, 
returned to Vientiane aft er the disbanding of the Lao Issara on 25 
October 1949 to serve under Laos’ constitutional monarchy within 
the French Union. His half-brother, Souphanouvong, rejected the 
new political leadership in Vientiane and, in February 1949, formed 
another political front from the guerrilla forces under his command, 
which in the early 1950s took the name of Pathet Lao (Lao Nation).14  
Following the dissolution of the Lao Issara in late 1949, he travelled 
to meet Ho Chi Minh at his headquarters in Tuyen Quang (North 
Vietnam) to ask for his support. Th e fi rst congress of Lao Communist 
leaders was organised there on 13 August 1950, and it resulted in the 
election of a new resistance government. A subsequent meeting held 
in North Vietnam in November 1950 provided the Pathet Lao with 
a pro-Communist nationalist political movement, the Neo Lao Issara 
(Free Lao Front), which began building battalion-sized fi ghting forces. 
Th is was a broad-based movement designed to draw popular support 
to the radical faction of the Lao Issara that had abandoned exile in 
Th ailand for the struggle against the French on home soil. It issued 
a new political programme directed towards every Lao: equality of all 
races in Laos, unifi ed struggle against the French, and abolition of 
inequitable taxes.15  Adoption of this policy for the fi rst time also gave 
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the highland populations of non-ethnic Lao origin a role within a poli-
tical movement where their interests were considered and promoted.
 When the Viet Minh learned of Lao aspirations for indepen-
dence, it sought to play an important role in guiding and supporting 
early Lao anti-colonialist and nationalist fi gures, such as Prince 
Souphanouvong, Kaysone Phomvihane and Nouhak Phoumsavanh. In 
fact, in the aft ermath of World War II the Viet Minh had been active 
in recruiting Lao individuals along the western border of Vietnam.16  
Lao Communist-Nationalist Movement
1945 Formation of coalition of Lao nationalists, the Lao Issara, which 
creates a provisional government
1949 Prince Souphanouvong forms his own political movement in the 
north of Laos
1950 Creation of Neo Lao Issara and government of resistance of the 
Pathet Lao in North Vietnam
1953 Off ensive in Laos of troops of Neo Lao Issara, together with 
Vietnamese “volunteers”. Provinces of Huaphan and Phongsaly 
in the northeast pass under the control of the Pathet Lao. Total 
independence of Laos from France
1954 Signing of the Geneva Agreements and withdrawal of France 
from Indochina. Vietnam is divided at the 17th parallel. The 
independence and territorial integrity of Laos and Cambodia 
are reaffi  rmed. Pathet Lao forces are allowed to regroup in the 
provinces of Huaphan and Phongsaly while waiting for integra-
 tion into the country’s political system
1955 Creation of Lao Communist party, Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People’s 
Party)
1959 North Vietnamese Communists begin armed struggle to take 
 over South Vietnam by force via southeastern Laos
1968 Escalation of war: intensifi cation of US Army bombings over 
 northern and southeastern Laos
1973 Paris agreements between US and Democratic Republic of Viet-
 nam; ceasefi re in Laos; end of US bombardments
1975 Abolition of monarchy in Laos and proclamation of the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic. Kaysone Phomvihane, Lao Com-
 munist Party secretary general, becomes fi rst prime minister of 
 the new regime
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In the sparsely populated border regions of Laos and Vietnam, the 
political situation was extremely confused. Between the start of World 
War II and 1949, when the Lao Issara movement broke up, several 
small anti-French resistance groups operated in this area. Some of 
them were in close contact with the Lao Issara government-in-exile 
in Bangkok, while others, especially those led by highland chiefs, 
operated independently.17  What they all soon had in common was 
their dependence on Viet Minh support. In some cases, this assistance 
took the form of rice, money, arms and ammunitions. In others, 
Vietnamese advisers attached themselves to lowland Lao or high-
land groups.18 
 By late 1947, it had become evident that the war between the 
French army and the Viet Minh was going to be a prolonged confl ict. 
Th e Viet Minh had several reasons for intensifying their eff orts to 
build up military forces and revolutionary bases in Laos (as well as 
in Cambodia). First, in developing close military and political colla-
boration with the local Communist movement, the Viet Minh were 
creating a buff er zone to protect their western fl ank from attacks by 
the French troops (especially in southeastern Laos) and to enable their 
troops to intervene freely in Laos.19  Second, as in Cambodia, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam20  considered it essential that the 
Communist movement expand its membership in Laos and train local 
cadres so they could lead the struggle side by side with the Vietna-
mese, thus carrying out a genuine Indochinese revolution. While stra-
tegic factors played a crucial part in this decision, the Vietnamese 
Communists were driven also by an ideological and cultural impetus. 
Th ey felt a sense of belonging to a wider internationalist movement 
and believed they ought to play a role in spreading the revolution.21 
 Th us, anti-French resistance forces from late 1947 shift ed grad-
ually from western to eastern Laos, that is, away from Th ailand and 
closer to Vietnam. Between the end of 1948 and early 1949, they set 
up military zones in the highlands of eastern Laos. Here they began 
to launch armed propaganda activities with the aim of establishing 
“peoples’ power bases”.22  Once highlander support was secured, it was 
active, and oft en crucial, in the mountain areas.23 
 In some upland communities a legacy of resistance (some armed, 
others non-violent) to external control led them to be characterised 
and promoted as prime supporters of the patriotic revolution by the 
Communists.24  Th ere were a series of revolts in the highlands of 
eastern Laos beginning in 1896, reaching a peak between 1910 and 
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1916, and fi nally dying out in the 1930s, all of which expressed resis-
tance to aspects of the French administration. Members of a Mon-
Khmer group, the Loven, engaged in armed resistance against 
the French as early as 1901 led by their chief, Pha Ong Keo, in 
southeastern Laos. Th e latter was eventually killed in 1910, but the 
resistance sentiment was carried on by the Alak highland leader Ong 
Kommandan until 1937. Th e skilled chief was eventually shot by the 
French. However, his son, Sithone Kommandan, who would reach 
the rank of general in the Pathet Lao army, survived to rally armed 
opposition to French colonial rule aft er his release from the Japanese 
in 1945.25  Although most of these early rebellions failed because they 
were scattered and isolated, they showed a desire for freedom and 
autonomy among some highlanders, as well as their responsiveness to 
their leaders.26  Th e anti-colonial nature of these revolts was thereaft er 
exploited skillfully by Communist agents to demonstrate the timeli-
ness of their own anti-colonialist cause.
 Th e Indochina Wars were as much a political as a military strug-
gle. Th e Lao and Vietnamese revolutionaries understood that in order 
to carry through a war of independence, it was vitally necessary to 
mobilise the rural population by implementing immediate actions at 
the local level (for instance, providing medical care and schooling, 
and supplying staple foods) and making it clear through political 
training that the national revolution was the prelude to a wider social 
revolution from which the peasantry would largely benefi t. Hence 
the Communists’ strategy of involving the upland population in the 
war eff ort also included responding to local aspirations for concrete 
improvement in their general and material welfare. Moreover, the 
Communists’ ethnic policy was not merely a by-product of their war 
strategy. Th e policy of national equality and unity was to a great ex-
tent infl uenced by Lenin’s own prescriptions.27  For example, in 1934 
the External Direction Bureau of the Indochinese Communist Party 
warned the Laos section to remember Lenin’s strategy of encouraging 
full liberation for ethnic minorities and of fi ghting against two 
dangers, one of which was “regional, patriotic, or chauvinist ideology, 
since communism recognizes only the class struggle, not the struggle 
of races”.28  Based on the socialist ideology, the highlanders were 
expected to follow the path to “progress” by going through all the 
evolutionary stages  —  from primitive Communism to feudalism, then 
to capitalism and fi nally to socialism.29 
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War and Revolution: Personal Narratives and Historical 
Experience
Although memoirs and biographies of former revolutionaries (mostly 
in Lao) began appearing in bookshops and markets in Vientiane in 
the early 1990s, they overwhelmingly portrayed the lives of male Lao 
leaders. Only one biographical memoir of a (lowland) Lao woman 
revolutionary, Khampeng Boupha, has been published (in Lao and 
English) in the last 15 years.30  Khampeng Boupha, the fi rst woman to 
be elected as a member of parliament and to the Central Committee 
of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, was a Communist cadre who 
held mostly intellectual and political positions.31  In her memoir, she 
mentions several other Lao women revolutionaries32  who were awarded 
the highly prestigious Medal of National Heroes and Heroines for 
their military actions and courage. Unfortunately, their stories are 
unknown. To our knowledge, these women never published their 
memoirs, and none of them had their revolutionary lives narrated. 
Some of them no doubt died during the war: it is not uncommon for 
the title of National Hero to be granted posthumously as it is oft en 
associated with the sacrifi ce of one’s life for the country.
 Manivanh and Khamla33  are the two “minority” women fi ghters 
in the Lao revolutionary movement whose oral testimonies will be 
examined in this chapter. Th ese two militants belonged to the second 
generation of indigenous revolutionaries  —  the fi rst one was formed by 
resistant fi ghters who participated in the struggle against the French 
(see above)  —  who were recruited between the mid-1950s and the late 
1960s in Pathet Lao-controlled areas in southeastern Laos. Although 
their testimonies have historical value (they contain information on 
historical facts such as guerrilla-controlled areas, battle dates and 
guerrilla activities), this chapter is more interested in these revolu-
tionary fi ghters for what their stories reveal about their own under-
standing of historical events. Th eir subjectivity plays an integral role 
in the constitution of their past: that is, what they believed they 
were doing, and what they now think they did. In other words, their 
narrated past matters also because of its relation to the present.34  
Th ese two female war veterans’ remembrances of their past are, of 
course, selective and subjective, evoking only certain memories. Yet, 
by analysing what such inconsistencies reveal in terms of deeper 
psychological and emotional signifi cance, their narratives in the end 
unveil characteristics of the “good Montagnards (“highlanders” in 
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French)” that are not related in wartime propaganda literature and the 
carefully vetted memoirs of offi  cial leaders. Th e personal experiences 
of historical events and social changes that every personal narrative 
reveals in its own specifi c way are signifi cant. As the anthropologist 
Roxana Waterson has stressed, “it is the combination of the deeply 
personal, and the social and political, embedded as it is in the manner 
of telling, which can make the life history such a special kind of 
document”.35  It is this unique positioning of the subject-narrator  — 
linking the private and the public worlds of experience  —  that gives 
the narrative its authenticity, not some assessment of the individual’s 
story as being “representative” or “typical”.36 
Motivations
Manivanh was a very well-known revolutionary fi gure in Savannakhet 
province. She was indeed the only female revolutionary cadre who was 
awarded the regime’s highest military title of National Hero in the 
whole province (out of the total of three that were awarded to revolu-
tionary fi ghters in Savannakhet; the two other National Heroes  — 
both men  —  were Akum, a mobilising cadre of Bru Tri origin, and 
Sikhai, a Phuthai army offi  cer).37  Manivanh was born in a Katang vil-
lage a few kilometres from the district centre of Muang Phine around 
the mid-1940s.38  Aft er some formal introductions, she began to unfold 
the story of her revolutionary life:
I would like to tell you my story. Since I was 14, my parents  …  as 
I told you, I was an orphan  …  At the age of 14, I stayed with my 
uncles and aunts.… I was working for the revolution. Before that, 
to start with, soldiers, agents had been carrying out their under-
ground propaganda activities in the forests  …  At the very begin-
ning they were our agents, Issara agents. Before getting involved, 
my motivations were as follows: fi rst, I was an orphan  —  both my 
parents had died. I was living with my uncles and aunts. I wasn’t 
angry; I didn’t hold any sentiments of hatred. No, I didn’t. But on 
that day  …  at the age of 14, in 1957, on my way back from the 
hay [upland rice fi eld] I met my uncle. He was already working for 
the revolution. He was in hiding. He asked me: “Do you want to 
get involved? Do you want to study?” I then replied: “Yes, I want 
to study!” He took me to another agent and told him: “Write her 
down and take her to study politics, solidarity and all that!” My 
uncle warned me: “If you meet strangers, people that you don’t 
know, don’t tell them that visitors came around.” And that was how 
it really began! 39 
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Th e kind of motivation that pushed Manivanh onto the revolutionary 
path is not the stuff  of stories of heroism. What seemed to persuade 
her to join the struggle was the disarmingly straightforward prospect 
(yet exceptional in those circumstances) of going to school, studying, 
and escaping an ordinary life. “Anti-imperialist” feelings of anger and 
hatred would come later:
Later I understood, I refl ected, I clearly saw that I wanted to join 
the Revolution, that I wanted above all to study. Secondly, I under-
stood that  …  in the villages  …  the enemy was beating us, was 
threatening us.… I was full of hatred, of anger  …  and this is why 
I joined the Revolution.… My uncle, my brother were arrested 
in 1958, 1959. I wanted to go with the soldiers. In my heart, I 
hated the enemy! At that time, I wasn’t sure if they were French or 
Americans. But I was full of hatred. Th e date of my entry into the 
Revolution was around July 20, 1957.40 
Khamla was born in Muang Phine, in Savannakhet province, in the 
middle to late 1950s. She also came from an “ordinary” peasant family 
(khorp khoua pasason), did not go to school in her childhood because 
“there wasn’t any in the village”, and could not (as a member of the 
Bru Katang ethnic group) speak Lao. Her fi rst acquaintance with the 
Communist-nationalist movement, at the young age of eight, occurred 
when the area around her village was “liberated” around 1963–64. 
She was “restless as a child” and enjoyed helping with the collection 
of fruits and vegetables in the forest to feed guerrilla soldiers who 
entered the village to hold meetings and conduct their activities. As 
time went by, she gradually learned how to write and read in the 
company of revolutionary soldiers and cadres in makeshift  evening 
classes. In fact, she explained her proper “entry into the Revolution” 
(khaw hoam kan pativat) in 196841  as partly the result of a desire to 
get a better education (“I was an ignorant girl, could even not speak 
Lao”), since she hoped that leaving her village and joining the revolu-
tionary movement “out there” would help her in achieving this goal. 
Nonetheless, Khamla also linked her personal reason with a more 
collective motive: “resentment and hatred against foreign invaders”, as 
she put it, employing commonly used anti-colonialist idioms.
 Khamla and Manivanh’s narratives reveal the complex nature of 
their motivations. Th e reasons for their involvement in the revolution 
were fi rst personal (they came from underprivileged backgrounds, and 
they wanted to study) and subsequently collective (Manivanh fought 
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to take revenge against an enemy who arrested and probably tortured 
her fellow fi ghters two years aft er she joined the guerrilla forces). Th eir 
motives were not initially ideological. Th ey did not become revolu-
tionaries because of a faith in Communism or socialist ideals, nor 
even for the liberation of women. Th ese politically inspired reasons 
would mature progressively.
Revolutionary Activities
In its early days the Pathet Lao was a male-dominated organisation. 
Most of the women serving in the movement’s administrative organs 
were spouses or daughters of cadres. However, this does not mean 
that the party did not have a policy stance on the role of women in 
society, as it formed a Research Committee on Lao Women’s Activities 
in July 1955. In fact, many women were members of the party’s 
underground cells and conducted numerous missions on its behalf.42  
Women in the “liberated zones” also served as couriers and spies. 
Th ey were entrusted with the transmission of secret directives and 
took an equal share of the burden when carrying supplies on foot to 
military bases set up in the forest. Manivanh vividly remembers her 
fi rst mission:
I brought food and water to the agents. I was recruited into the 
women’s secret organisation.… [She later recalled the name of the 
organisation]  …  seup khao, song khao [literally, “information inves-
tigator”]. I was also recruited as an informant to check on the 
enemy’s movements in Muang Phine, Muang Phalane  —  how 
many were they? I went three times to the enemy’s military base 
of Muang Phine. Once I got the information, I gave it to Brother 
Khamla, who was a soldier. He’s now retired. He was a soldier for 
the enemy, for the French. But he was also working for us, and 
he was also working for the French! I was getting the information 
from him. As well as from Uncle Khemly  …  he’s now deceased. 
Information on their weapons, big, small, and on the number of 
the enemy troops. Th e enemy never suspected anything; I was only 
14 years old in 1957. I was collecting information on the enemy’s 
position, aft er which I’d go back and submit my report. My third 
task was to inform the Issara soldiers when the enemy was about 
to go into the villages. I then would run to the forests to inform 
the Issara soldiers. Th ose were my revolutionary activities at the 
village level, in 1957, 1958 and 1959.43 
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With the inclusion in 1957 of the Pathet Lao’s offi  cial political vehicle, 
the Neo Lao Hak Sat, into the government, supplementary elections 
were called to provide for representation of the new party in the 
Assembly and so complete the process of national integration that 
began at the fi rst Geneva Conference in 1954. Twenty additional 
parliamentary seats were created to this end, and elections were 
scheduled for May 1958. But as the elections approached, hostilities 
between the conservative Royal Lao Government (RLG) and the 
Pathet Lao deepened, with the political struggle on the ground getting 
increasingly violent. Th e Neo Lao Hak Sat, with its electoral ally, the 
left -wing Santhiphab (Peace) Party, won 13 of the 21 seats that were 
contested in the 1958 election.
 Th ese results proved enough to alarm right-wing politicians and 
their American allies in Vientiane and to subsequently force Souvanna 
Phouma, who pushed for the political integration of Neo Lao Hak 
Sat, to resign as prime minister in July following the suspension of 
US aid. In actuality, the electoral gains obtained by the left ist camp 
merely refl ected a reality already entrenched in some eastern parts of 
the country: the conviction among Lao Communist partisans (and the 
people sympathetic to their cause) of the existence of two opposed 
governments, the Vientiane-RLG side backed by the United States, 
and the Pathet Lao supported by the Viet Minh. Likewise, the eastern 
districts of Savannakhet province, where our two female protagonists 
originated, were then a disputed territory pitting Pathet Lao agents 
against RLG forces. By the late 1950s, the struggle between Commu-
nists and royalists had spread to the social and political sphere and 
had turned into a hide-and-seek pursuit where the Communist fol-
lowers remained an elusive target by blending into the population, 
exacerbating the RLG forces’ reprisals against civilians. In other words, 
Laos was turning into a politically and socially fractured country.
 It was during the early years of her revolutionary life that 
Manivanh (not her birth name) adopted the name “Manivanh”, which, 
signifi cantly, is a lowland ethnic Lao name. As the war intensifi ed 
and the Communists made territorial gains and won military battles, 
Manivanh moved up the ladder of responsibility and left  the physically 
demanding work of a porter to assume the more enviable task of a 
propaganda agent at the provincial level, again driven by both personal 
desire and collective purpose. It was at that moment of her life that 
she became aware of the wider political issues and struggles. Her nar-
rative clearly shows the intersection between her personal experience 
and historical events:
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In 1958, I sometimes stayed in the village, or when there was 
danger, lived in the forest. But 1959 was the most violent year.44  
My brother, my uncle were arrested. Th e enemy shot at my com-
rades, at our vehicles.… Th en we lost our cover  …  Th ey arrested 
and tortured people  …  I left  and went into hiding in the forest. 
Th en in 1961, it was the battles of Muong Phine and Muong Sepone. 
Th ese were fi nally liberated. I was in the village at that time. I was 
carrying out the same task, I was still a porter [lam lieng]. I was 
carrying rice, cigarettes, oil and so on, up to Muang Phine. Th en, 
in 1962, I left . My uncle and brother came to take me. At that 
point, I knew I wanted to leave! Because fi rst, I was full of hatred, 
I hated the enemy! And secondly, I wanted to study, I especially 
wanted to study! At that time, I even didn’t know to read [Lao]. I 
could only speak it. I sacrifi ced [sala] myself. I left  the family, the 
village, around June 20, 1962. I joined the mobilising group [korng 
kon kwai] in the province of Muang Phine. I followed my uncle, 
my brother.45 
Like other minority cadres’ narratives I had the opportunity of hearing, 
Manivanh’s is closely tied up with agency, refl ected in her strong desire 
to acquire a formal education. Th is was clearly a determining factor 
in her decision to join the revolution, though the weight of fate never 
completely disappears in her story. During the period of renewed 
political turmoil in Laos, which began in 1959 and ended  —  tempo-
rarily  —  with the second Geneva Accords of 1962, the Pathet Lao and 
North Vietnamese forces made signifi cant territorial gains, extending 
their control into new areas of the country. In January 1959, during 
the Fift eenth Plenum of the Vietnamese Workers Party’s Central 
Committee, the North Vietnamese leadership authorised the use of 
armed struggle in the south, to be headed by the National Liberation 
Front for South Vietnam.46  In early 1961, aft er negotiations with the 
Pathet Lao, Hanoi decided to extend the Ho Chi Minh Trail into 
Laos.47  Muong Sepone, which became one of the most important 
centres for the North Vietnamese transportation network, fell in 1961.
 Manivanh’s life, meanwhile, was not getting any easier. In the 
years that followed, she indefatigably contributed to the war eff ort, 
travelling to wherever her help was needed and living with the vil-
lagers, mainly women and children, who had fl ed the bombings and 
lived scattered in the forests.
I was sent with this group to the Tasseng Namchalo-Angkham 
[in the eastern region of present-day Savannakhet province]. I 
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followed the older sisters, they were more experienced. Th e people 
cultivated the upland rice fi elds, so did we! We were by their side. 
Th e people were pounding rice, so were we. Th e people went and 
fetched the water, so did we. Th ey were looking for food, and we 
helped them. We never stopped, never had a break, we were by 
their side, with the children, with the grown-ups. We kept going! 
We also went with the soldiers. We were looking for food, bamboo 
shoots, and so on. People were living in the forest  …  they were our 
informants, kids, women without their husbands, kept us informed 
on the enemy’s movements.… Th e orphans, the widows, single 
women, they were trustworthy because we liberated them  …  it was 
like that! In 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, I was on the road with the 
comrades.… Th en, in 1967–68, I sometimes went on my own to 
go and collect “rice for helping the nation”, as we called it then, 
“rice to help the country”.48 
In a sense, the tasks Manivanh undertook during wartime provided 
her with an independent life and a sense of adventure she would not 
have experienced had she stayed in her village: moving about as a 
propagandist and proselytising for the party. Having been recruited 
into the struggle, she in turn mobilised children to join the revolution 
and, in the same manner as her own recruitment, promised them a 
bright, though elusive, future:
I was mobilising the population. I was recruiting children. I per-
suaded them to go and study, to become teachers, soldiers, nurses, 
doctors. I wasn’t alone in my work, there were several of us. We 
worked together. We worked in the rice fi eld during the day and 
returned home in the evening. Aft er dinner, there were dances.… 
Th e youth in villages in Namchalo, we all went, girls, boys, to 
become agents, soldiers, doctors, students  …  that was my work 
in the emulation group.… Everyone was satisfi ed with my work. 
I was always the fi rst to be chosen to carry out the work. Because 
I was young and hard working, because I never stopped working. 
I lived with the people, I fetched the water, I looked for food, for 
wood. I lived in places where life was tough, with widows, single 
women, orphans, it was with them I shared my life. Th ose were 
my tasks in the propaganda group from 1962 to 1968.49 
In her exemplary narration, Manivanh never mentioned her personal 
suff ering. Th e harshness of her life during the war is perceptible, 
though  —  particularly in the middle to late 1960s, when villagers and 
revolutionaries alike lacked food and more or less everything else and 
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had to rely on the forest to subsist. Nevertheless, Manivanh never 
expressed anything other than collective ordeals. As an interesting 
comparison, when writing about war veterans and resistance fi ghters 
during World War II in Italy, Alessandro Portelli notes that “oft en, 
these individuals are wholly absorbed by the totality of the historical 
event of which they were [a] part, and their account assumes the 
cadences and wording of epic”.50  By these narratives of self, people are 
expressing the desire to impose an order, to form a “whole” out of 
“constituent parts” (that is, events), and thus to retain a sense of their 
life  —  past and present  —  that is refl ective, coherent and meaningful.51  
At the end of her interview, Manivanh modestly expressed her con-
tentment and gratitude towards the state for her house and her 
monthly war veteran’s pension. She kept her revolutionary virtues 
pristine until the end.
 Upon her “entry in the revolution” in the late 1960s, Khamla was 
immediately sent to carry out activities on the ground; she became, 
and remained for the duration of the war, a “foundation-laying cadre” 
(phanakngan pheunthan). As related in Manivanh’s testimony, Com-
munist cadres were assigned to accompany villagers  —  alone or in 
pairs depending on the size of the group  —  for periods of time from 
a few days to several weeks. One of the cadres’ tasks was to provide 
practical advice and concrete support: in other words, to “educate” the 
population. Under their instructions, the villagers learned, for exam-
ple, how to dig trenches covered with a steeply pitched roof of logs to 
defl ect bombs. Revolutionary agents were also instructed to work in 
the upland rice fi elds and help in daily subsistence activities, such as 
the cultivation of potatoes, a crucial vegetable that could replace rice 
in times of shortage.
 Th eir most important mission, however, was to keep mobilising 
the people in support of the revolution and war eff orts. For instance, 
every household under the Communists’ supervision had to pay a 
“rice tax”  —  although it was strictly forbidden to use this “counter-
revolutionary” term during the war  —  which in offi  cial language, or 
“political phraseology”, was known as “rice to help the nation” or, more 
concisely, “patriotic rice”. Th e quantity to be donated depended on 
each household’s production capacity. Every year, a cadre was tasked 
with assessing and monitoring the quantity of rice “paid” by each 
household. Khamla performed this work countless times, as she ex-
plained in detail:
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For instance, one household produced 100 meun [one meun is 
equivalent to 12 kilos] per year. Th en one counted how many 
members this household had and deducted accordingly the volume 
of rice needed for the family’s own subsistence. Th e latter’s share 
might be higher if the family included one or more revolutionary 
cadres. Th e remaining quantity of rice, if any and however small, 
was considered to be “patriotic rice”. It was very fair.52 
But the seemingly well-calibrated policy did not always go as smoothly 
as this and at times faced some (passive) resistance: “It happened that 
households, the richer ones, would lie to us and would declare a lower 
quantity. But neighbours would come and tell us the truth. We of 
course also carried out our own checks among households.” Khamla 
spoke spontaneously of these “un-revolutionary” behaviours; unlike 
Manivanh, who was a National Hero, she may have felt less compelled 
to maintain a fl awless narrative.
 Khamla remained a ground-level cadre, her desire to be “better 
educated” remaining unfulfi lled: “I never went anywhere. Th e ‘central 
level’ never sent me anywhere, neither in the North [of Laos] nor to 
Vietnam;53  only some training of one month or two here and there. 
I learnt everything by myself and with the help of friends and com-
rades.” Khamla’s hint of bitterness must be understood in the wider 
context of the Communist revolution in eastern Laos during the war. 
At that time the Pathet Lao leadership began the building of a proto-
socialist state. Th ousands of children living in Pathet Lao-controlled 
areas were thus sent to study in Sam Neua or in North Vietnam 
between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s. Th ese young boys and 
girls   —  many of whom were of ethnic minority origin  —  experienced 
various trajectories following the end of their studies and their return 
to Laos (for those who were sent to North Vietnam) in the 1970s: 
some went back to their home villages, while others became civil 
servants under the new regime aft er 1975. Others held, or still hold, 
infl uential positions within the state apparatus, while a few are mem-
bers of the political ruling class and even sit on the Central Committee 
of the party (the Politburo, the highest political body in a Communist 
regime). In spite of divergent paths, one can argue that the Pathet 
Lao’s recruitment campaigns in the highlands of Laos have produced 
a new generation of public servants: teachers, civil servants in minis-
tries and local governments, medical personnel, senior offi  cials, poli-
ticians (including members of parliament, provincial governors and 
Chap8 (198-225)   213 7/10/13   2:06:50 PM
214 Vatthana Pholsena
district heads), all of whom benefi ted during their youth from the 
Communist education system during the First and (especially) Second 
Indochina Wars.54  Meanwhile, on the ground, phanakngan pheunthan, 
such as Manivanh and Khamla, were the revolution’s foot soldiers, ful-
fi lling an oft en thankless and demanding, yet crucial, role in rallying 
and keeping villagers in line with the revolutionary cause and the 
party’s doctrine.
Aft er the Revolution
Manivanh never married and did not have any children. Towards the 
end of her life, unable to travel as much as she was used to because 
of declining health (she suff ered from diabetes), she lived in downtown 
Savannakhet with her adopted daughter in a one-storey concrete house 
—  a gift  from the state for her accomplishments during the “30-year 
struggle” (1945–75). During the interview, the revolutionary cadre 
hardly mentioned anything about her private life. According to other 
war veterans (including Khamla), Manivanh was granted the “National 
Hero” title because she never refused or showed the slightest sign 
of dithering when tasked with carrying out a mission, including the 
riskiest ones, such as spying in the enemy’s territories during the war 
or conducting political assignments in areas threatened by counter-
revolutionary forces that continued to operate well aft er the 1975 
Pathet Lao victory in some districts of the province. “She was so oft en 
away, carrying out an assignment, attending a meeting or following a 
political training. She didn’t even have time to look aft er her adopted 
daughter. It was another female cadre who brought her up; the child 
ended up calling the two women ‘mother’,” Khamla recalled. Th rough 
the lens of her personal narrative and life, Manivanh personifi es the 
model patriot whose life demanded a high degree of self-sacrifi ce, if 
not total abandonment to the revolution. Manivanh did not hold any 
prominent political position at the national or provincial level: in the 
aft ermath of the war she was elected as the head of a district-level 
offi  ce of the Lao Women’s Union. Th e rationale underlying Manivanh’s 
biography could concur with comments made by Sophie Quinn-Judge 
on the lives of early Vietnamese women revolutionaries: “For the 
generation of women who began the revolution in Vietnam, the tradi-
tional virtues of stoicism and self-sacrifi ce were the ones that domi-
nated their lives.” 55 
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 Manivanh passed away in 2007. A picture of her is displayed in 
the Savannakhet history museum, next to Akum’s portrait (the third 
National Hero, Sikhai, who is still alive, may get this honour only aft er 
his death). Th e setting is bare: only their names are mentioned in the 
captions below the portraits. Th e lack of any mention of the ethnic 
group of each revolutionary (Bru Katang and Bru Tri, respectively) 
seems to be a missed opportunity for a regime that has constantly 
insisted on the inter-ethnic solidarity of “Lao people of all ethnic 
groups”, a phrase oft en used in Lao offi  cial discourse to emphasise 
the multi-ethnic unity of the nation. Neither did ethnicity feature 
prominently in Manivanh’s interview, though it does not mean that 
her ethnic origins did not matter. In fact, they greatly infl uenced 
the course of her revolutionary activities, because it was common 
for mobilising cadres of ethnic minority origins to operate in areas 
where they could use their cultural and language skills and knowledge; 
in other words, they were frequently assigned to mobilise their own 
“people”. Khamla recollected recruiting “lots of soldiers”, especially in 
“ethnic minority villages”, because “parents [in those villages] were not 
keen on sending their children to school, whereas young men wanted 
to fi ght against the imperialists and to wear a nice military uniform!”
 Th e former revolutionary cadre candidly explained that she was 
taught which ethnic group she “belonged” to only aft er joining the 
revolutionary movement: “I couldn’t tell then the diff erence between a 
Makong or a Katang, I knew only that I was Bru. But my hierarchy 
told me that the name of my ethnic group was Katang, so the name 
stuck!” Despite accepting the offi  cial terminology, Khamla insisted that 
villagers, especially the elderly, in her native district would currently 
not be able to name any ethnic group and would still prefer to call 
themselves Bru (as she herself did at times, despite being told other-
wise). More specifi cally, these villagers would identify themselves to 
a large extent by their village’s name and territory. (According to the 
anthropologist Gábor Vargyas, “[the] word ‘Bru’ has two meanings: a 
narrow one, as autonym, and another broader one, meaning all the 
surrounding mountain people: ‘Bru Van Kieu, Pakoh Bru, Bru Tau-Oi’. 
… [T]he same ethnonym [therefore] could have two meanings: all 
these people being ‘forest people’, they can use it to refer to themselves 
and to designate other neighbouring ethnic groups of the ‘forest’.”) 56  
Khamla’s sense of ethnic belonging (or, more broadly, sense of ethnic 
distinctiveness from the lowland Lao majority) may be also partly 
explained by the regime’s ethnic policies.
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 Th e Communist leadership in Laos changed the discourse and 
policies on ethnicity. As against the policy of the Royal Lao Govern-
ment, they substituted a majoritarian logic built around the lowland 
Lao culture with a policy of equality dominated by the class issue 
and the diktat of progress. During the war in the “liberated” zones 
and the fi rst decade of Communist rule, the Communists attempted 
to create a loyalty greater than loyalties to particular ethnic identities. 
Th e ultimate goal for the Lao Communists, as it was for their Soviet, 
Chinese, and Vietnamese counterparts, guided by a historicist and 
evolutionist vision, was to eradicate “old” identities and replace them 
with a “Socialist” one.57  In other words, these regimes’ ultimate objec-
tive was not to build a society based on ethnic/national consciousness: 
the concept of class was thought to be the new society’s main axis of 
identifi cation. Antagonisms and mistrust between ethnic groups were 
to be dissipated by a period of national equality. Th is policy came 
to be known as “the fl ourishing of the nations”. It was predicated 
upon the Marxist belief that “nationalities” (ethnic minorities) would 
naturally move closer together. Th e new Communist regime in Laos, 
accordingly, explicitly recognised the “the hill-tribe question” from 
the early years of its leadership. Kaysone Phomvihane, the late presi-
dent of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, called for greater 
attention to be paid to promoting education among ethnic groups, 
improving their living conditions, and increasing production in 
remote minority areas. Furthermore, he insisted on respect being 
paid to the “psychology, aspirations, customs, and beliefs of each 
ethnic group”.58  Th e principle was to give every constituent group 
of the multi-ethnic state offi  cial recognition on an equal footing. In 
speeches, policies and textbooks, the Communists promoted a new 
image of the nation: from an apparent mono-ethnic portrait adopted 
under the “old regime” to a multi-ethnic representation of the national 
community in which equality, diversity and unity were now the new 
key parameters.
 However, a disturbing trend, from the perspective of state-
minority relations, is currently the government’s embrace of Buddhism 
as a marker of national identity. For example, the religious Buddhist 
monument Th at Luang in Vientiane, which was the centrepiece of a 
tribute ceremony to royalty under the former regime, has replaced the 
hammer and sickle as the national symbol. Th e annual Th at Luang 
festival has become the locus of the state’s representational project 
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of the nation, a crossroads between socialist ideals, Buddhist rituals, 
exhibition of the multi-ethnic national culture, and the politics of 
opening to the world. Th e confl ation of Buddhism and socialism 
is openly celebrated and benefi ts from extensive media coverage.59  
Symbols of nationhood are required to engender social cohesion by 
arousing a deeply felt sense of a shared community. Th ey encompass 
what are claimed to be the unique and distinctive values of society. 
Functioning as collective representations, they aim at producing 
homogeneity from heterogeneity and integrating what is fragmented. 
With respect to majority-minority relationships, however, the revival 
of a Buddhist-orientated polity may widen the gap between the domi-
nant Lao population (who are, in their vast majority, Buddhist fol-
lowers) and the ethnic minorities (most of whom are non-Buddhist). 
Th e distinction is not solely religious: it also encompasses social orga-
nisation and world view. Th us, from the perspective of non-Lao citi-
zens, the resurgence of state-sponsored Buddhist rituals as markers 
of national identity is troubling.60  Neither Khamla nor her husband 
is Buddhist, as they told me; nonetheless, they (and their children) 
participate in Buddhist religious ceremonies and gatherings, although 
(as far as Khamla and her husband are concerned) they do so only, 
as she stressed in her interview, “to conform to the majority’s urban 
social life”. In other words, former revolutionaries such as Khamla 
and her spouse, who once were told  —  and believed  —  that they were 
at the forefront of the new secular and egalitarian socialist society, 
having defeated the “feudal” regime, now have to fi t the culturally 
lowland Lao-dominated everyday urban life, as promoted by their 
Communist leaders.
 Khamla retired in her early forties during the 1990s. At the time 
of writing, she was a member of the Lao Front for National Construc-
tion (Neo Lao Sang Saat), the regime’s main mass organisation, which 
functions as an intermediary body between the party and the popu-
lation. Not dissimilar to her activities during wartime, Khamla is 
sometimes called upon to explain the government’s policies related 
to ethnic matters to villagers with whom she shares the same ethnic 
background. As during her revolutionary years, her relatively low level 
of education prevents her from undertaking higher-level assignments, 
which would require good (or better) literacy skills. Such was the 
explanation she gave me for her continuing grass-roots tasks, though 
a lack of good connections probably also accounted for the absence of 
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opportunities. She never expressed any feelings of regret or sentiments 
of dissatisfaction during the interviews, however, although she was 
somewhat aware that perhaps she could have expected a better out-
come from her years of devotion to the revolutionary cause. “My 
friends and colleagues keep saying that I’m stupid,” she told me, 
sounding rather upset. “Th ey think I could have asked for more with 
my revolutionary background. But I’m not stupid, I’m intelligent: I 
helped to liberate the country! I live in a state house,61  and I’m not 
asking for anything else.” Despite years of involvement in the revolu-
tion and in post-war reconstruction, Manivanh and Khamla barely 
saw any political career benefi ts from their self-abnegation.
 In truth, politically active women in general have not fared well 
under the Communist regime. Th e statistics for 2010 show that 
women are still poorly represented at the executive level. Th ere is no 
woman holding the post of provincial governor (one woman is deputy 
governor); two district chiefs (out of a total of 143) are women, as are 
146 of the total of 8,726 village chiefs. Th e representation of women 
in the National Assembly is slightly better, at 25 per cent (29 out 
of 115). Th e proportion of women in the Lao People’s Revolutionary 
Party’s Central Committee (the regime’s most powerful political organ, 
below the Politburo) is stagnating and has not increased from its peak 
of four members (out of 55 to 60) in 1982.62 
Conclusion
Manivanh and Khamla were both recruited as young girls, went 
through the wartime educational apparatus and ideological circuit, 
and became cadres within the revolutionary movement. Th ey both 
came from a materially poor and illiterate background. As guerrilla 
agents, these women broke from their own cultural and social norms 
to embrace socialist and nationalist ideals. Th ey lived exceptionally 
independent lives under extraordinary circumstances for women of 
their background and origins. Manivanh literally gave her life to the 
revolutionary cause and was awarded for her sacrifi ce with the title 
of National Hero. Khamla might have followed a similar path had she 
been born a dozen years earlier. Th e war was over when she was still 
in her twenties, and the end of the confl ict allowed her to regain a 
personal life  —  she got married and built a family (“During the war 
it was out of the question! You wouldn’t have time to raise children 
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moving around all the time like we did”). Neither woman went back 
to live in her village of origin. Both of them settled in Savannakhet 
town aft er the “liberation” in 1975 and carried on their duties as the 
regime’s loyal militants. Both women kept being assigned to the same 
task again and again  —  liaising between the party and populations of 
their own ethnic background in their native province. In a sense, they 
never grew out of their ascribed “ethnic” role, perhaps because they 
were never given the opportunity to do so.
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Bisoi: A Veteran of Timor-Leste’s 
Independence Movement
Sara Niner
“What is very upsetting is that the discrimination is from our own 
partners in the struggle  …” 1 
Rosa de Camâra is better known by her nom de guerre or code name of Bisoi, a sad reference to being discarded, or perhaps dis-
regarded (bi means “sister”, and soi [or soe] means “to throw away 
or discard”). Born in 1963, Bisoi is a political activist who fought for 
both the self-determination of her people and equality for women. She 
is one of the surviving women who served the armed wing of the 
nationalist movement of Timor-Leste as a combatant with the guerrilla 
army Falintil from 1975, when Indonesia invaded and occupied her 
homeland, until the UN-sponsored ballot of 1999, which delivered 
the territory’s independence. One journalist who interviewed Bisoi 
over a number of years described her as feisty, yet felt she hid her 
secrets and feelings behind a faint smile, dubbing her the “Mona Lisa 
in fatigues”.2  Today, Bisoi is a well-known member of the national 
parliament and continues to fi ght for women’s rights in Timor’s post-
confl ict society and for improved treatment of women combatants like 
herself. Th e treatment of women combatants is emblematic in the life 
of Bisoi because they have not been recognised or rewarded on a par 
with their male colleagues. Th is issue will be discussed here with some 
analysis about the implications for society in Timor-Leste today.3  
 Th is biographical chapter provides an exploration of Bisoi’s poli-
tical and military involvement from her own perspective, illuminating 
the experiences of women in the nationalist movement of East Timor, 
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a small country of about a million people. Th is chapter will trace 
her personal story along with supplying the historical context for her 
comments and including a gender analysis of this evidence. Bisoi sees 
three clear phases to her biography, and this chapter is organised 
accordingly:
I want to point out three phases of my life: fi rst, the Portuguese 
time, when women didn’t have the right to do anything; second, 
the resistance period, when women suff ered a lot compared to 
men; and third, the independence period, when some women are 
still not free, such as those who have no education.4 
Portuguese Timor (pre-1975)
In 1944 the anthropologist Mendes Correa described the Portuguese 
colony of Timor as a “Babel  …  a melting pot”, and a diverse mix of 
traditions is still strongly felt today. Although there are many dif-
ferences between the distinct ethno-linguistic groups, most share 
similar cosmological beliefs and social structures. Th e largest Malayo 
or Austronesian groups are the Tetum (100,000), the Mambai (80,000), 
Mana Bisoi and her uncle, Falintil Commander L7 Foho Rai Boot. Courtesy 
of Irene Cristalis
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the Tokodete (63,000), the Galoli (50,000), and the Baikeno or Antoni 
people who live in the western enclave of Oecussi (20,000). Th e main 
groups of Papuan or Melanesian origin include the Bunak (50,000), 
the Fataluku (30,000), and the Makassae (70,000) living in the eastern 
end of the island.5  Bisoi comes from a village near Ossu, in Vikeke 
District. (For place names in this chapter, see map 10.)
 Th e diverse indigenous societies and their kingdoms cross the 
spectrum of matriarchal and patriarchal organisation. Women are 
accorded a sacred status within Timorese cosmology, and the divine 
female element is prominent in much indigenous belief. Th e sacred 
world is dominated by female spirits, while the secular world is domi-
nated by men. Th erefore, while women may hold power in a ritual 
context they generally do not have a strong public or political voice. 
According to this indigenous logic, women and girls are consigned 
to the internal or domestic sphere rather than the external or public 
sphere. Consequently, domestic duties and care of children are the 
sole domain of women and may explain the formidable positions 
some women hold within households. Yet this position carries the full 
burden of domestic chores and child-rearing, excluding women from 
Map 10.   East Timor
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a place in the wider society and in leadership roles. While the roles 
of women and men in indigenous society are understood by anthro-
pologists as complementary and interdependent, it cannot be inferred 
that these roles are equal or equitable if we analyse them from a 
modern gender perspective. It is also an important observation that 
senior or elite women are powerful, and any gender analysis in Timor 
must be modifi ed with this class awareness. Class, or caste, is very 
strictly observed, even today, so that elite and middle-class women are 
invested with much more power and privilege than the men who fall 
below them in the social hierarchy. Women’s experience in the resis-
tance may also be defi ned by class,6  as illustrated by the experience 
of Bisoi.
 Timor’s Portuguese colonisers brought the Catholic Church to 
the island, and this had an enormous impact on Timorese culture. 
While other domains have been researched,7  it remains unclear how 
much Catholicism degraded women’s sacred power within indigenous 
religion and replaced it with its own more demure version of femi-
ninity and what impact it had on indigenous women’s status. Th e 
argument advanced here is that the late colonial-era status of women, 
which Bisoi was brought up with, had been altered by colonialism 
and Catholicism and was a weaker one. Th e Portuguese infl uence had 
done little to improve the lives of women.
 A famous Timorese rebel, Dom Boaventura, led an armed 
uprising against his Portuguese colonisers in 1911. One of his main 
grievances was over the sexual abuse and exploitation of Timorese 
women by Portuguese men. Due to such exploitation, the idea of pro-
tecting women and keeping them safe at home could only have be-
come more fi rmly entrenched. For most of the 20th century East Timor 
was ruled directly from Portugal by the fascist dictatorship of Salazar, 
and the colony remained neglected and closeted from any modern 
liberalising trends such as the feminism of the 1960s and 1970s.
 By the early 1970s, the Timorese independence movement 
Fretilin, inspired partly by Dom Boaventura, had begun opposing 
Portuguese colonialism and its racism and discrimination, while de-
veloping a revolutionary programme that included the emancipation 
of women. Rosa “Muki” Bonaparte was one of the founders of 
Fretilin  —  in fact, she was the only woman to hold a position on the 
Central Committee, which set political direction in the movement.8  She 
was also the leader of its women’s organisation, OPMT.9  A statement 
of Rosa’s from the early 1970s reads, “Th e creation of OPMT has a 
Chap9 (226-249)   229 7/10/13   2:08:09 PM
230 Sara Niner
double objective: fi rstly, to participate directly in the struggle against 
colonialism, and second, to fi ght in every way the violent discrimina-
tion that Timorese women had suff ered in colonial society.” 10 
 Bisoi recalled her early days and OPMT’s part in her political 
awakening: “During Portuguese times and because of Timorese cul-
ture, East Timorese women were not allowed to express their ideas 
and say what they wanted. It was a challenge for me to contribute to 
and fi ght for women’s rights ….” 11  Bisoi recalled that her childhood 
during Portuguese colonial times was aff ected by the lack of opportu-
nities for women. She said that Timorese indigenous culture combined 
East Timorese Nationalist Movement
1512 Portuguese explorers arrive in Timor
1912 Armed rebellion led by Dom Boaventura against Portuguese 
colonial control
Aug. 1975 Portuguese governor withdraws from territory amidst a civil 
war
Dec. 1975 Indonesia invades East Timor, and Timorese resistance move-
 ment is established
1978 Fall of last resistance base at Mt Matebian
1981 First National Council for Revolutionary Resistance; CRRN 
formed, and Xanana appointed leader
Mar. 1983 Regional ceasefi re agreed upon by Xanana and Indonesian 
military
Aug. 1983 Uprising in Vikeke and Kraras massacre signal end of 
 ceasefi re
Sept. 1983 State of emergency declared. New Indonesian off ensive 
launched
1991 Santa Cruz massacre of hundreds of East Timorese, bringing 
enormous international condemnation of the Indonesian 
occupation
1992 Resistance leader Xanana Gusmao captured in Dili amidst 
international protests
Aug. 1999 UN-sponsored referendum votes in favour of independence. 
After announcement, pro-Indonesian militias begin a massive 
campaign of murder and destruction
May 2002 Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste established
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with Portuguese infl uence precluded East Timorese women from ex-
pressing their ideas or from joining political parties:
Th e main problem is there was no opportunity or equality for 
women. I saw the existence of inequality for East Timorese women 
compared to men. Th is is from our ancestors. Our traditional cus-
toms mean that women can’t go out and achieve anything. Women 
and girls must marry even if they don’t love the person: the parents 
agree to an amount, and the daughter must marry. Political leaders 
[in 1974–75] were starting to talk about these issues, and I thought, 
“Th is is a good moment for me to join in their campaign and 
political activities.” From Indonesian times to the present, women’s 
participation in meetings has been limited because of lack of sup-
port from the family, especially for married women. Th eir husbands 
do not allow them or give them opportunities to participate.12 
Th e decolonisation period in 1974–75 was the fi rst time Timorese 
women became involved in political issues. Bisoi remembers it was 
still very diffi  cult for women to become involved in politics and that 
from her fi rst moment as a political activist she felt she was criticised 
by her community and her own family.13 
Invasion and Resistance: Th e First Phase of the Struggle 
(1976–79)
Aft er the Indonesian invasion of 7 December 1975, much of the popu-
lation of East Timor, including Bisoi, retreated to the mountains with 
Fretilin and became part of the resistance to Indonesian occupation. 
Th e ongoing confl ict shift ed women’s economic, social and political 
roles, as war has done repeatedly around the world, and many women 
were challenged to act more independently than they had previously. 
In East Timor the war forced many women to take up roles outside 
the domestic sphere for the fi rst time. Not only did women lose hus-
bands, fathers, brothers and sons to the war, making it necessary for 
them to provide for their families and enter an economic sphere pre-
viously closed to them, but they also became a signifi cant component of 
all the resistance fronts: military, political, civil and diplomatic.
 Bisoi was 12 years old when Indonesian forces attacked her vil-
lage in Vikeke and killed her mother.14  Her education was halted, and 
she is still saddened that she had the opportunity to reach only second 
grade of primary school. By her own account, Bisoi was involved in 
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the nationalist movement from the time of the Indonesian invasion.15  
She ran to the bush and ended up in the care of her uncle, the 
well-known Falintil Commander L7 Foho Rai Boot, and she eventually 
became a Falintil soldier also.16 
 From about 1977, when she was 14, aft er listening to campaigning 
by Fretilin activists she became more directly involved in the inde-
pendence movement and became a member of OPMT. Fretilin’s social 
and political programmes were predicated on an ideological revolution 
to overthrow colonial and traditional power structures, including 
gendered ones, in conjunction with mass mobilisation in a guerrilla-
style military resistance. Bisoi travelled around as a “barefoot” teacher 
to illiterate farmers.17  Women were encouraged to become part of 
OPMT rather than to take up roles within the Fretilin Central Com-
mittee, which was staff ed almost entirely by men. Revolutionary 
rhetoric had had little time to impinge on traditional male-dominated 
power structures. Many of OPMT’s roles were stereotypically gendered 
ones such as teaching, running crèches, and providing food and 
clothing, but the organisation was also committed to literacy classes 
for women and banning indigenous customary practices that it 
believed led to the oppression of women. In these fi rst revolutionary 
years women were also trained in the handling and fi ring of weapons.
 Bisoi says she “came down” to surrender in 1978,18  meaning she 
was one of the hundreds of thousands of East Timorese who surren-
dered aft er a systematic Indonesian annihilation campaign had en-
circled the remaining resistance leadership and 140,000 civilians on 
Mount Matebian, in the east of the island. Aft er three years of war, 
in November 1978 this was the last stronghold of Fretilin and Falintil, 
and these organisations were no longer able to protect civilians. 
Trapped and unable to retreat any farther, the weakened resistance 
advised civilians to surrender. Th e latter were placed in prisons and 
“resettlement camps” set up by Indonesian forces.19 
 Bisoi’s resolve to work towards the independence of her country, 
and particularly for the liberation of East Timorese women, continued.20  
She was one of a dwindling number of women who had worked 
with Falintil since the beginning of the war. Bisoi said the number of 
women who lived and worked directly with the resistance guerrillas 
in the mountains varied:
In 1974–1975, everyone was involved so it is diffi  cult to know the 
number of women, but from 1980–1990 it was more or less 130 
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people. By 1996, only 40 or 50 remained and by the time of the 
UN Referendum in 1999 there were only around 10 remaining. 
Perhaps 30 or 40 were captured and killed by the enemy. Every 
region knows well about their women who were involved in the 
war.21 
Reorganising the Resistance (1981–99)
Bisoi recounted that her involvement during the years following the 
destruction of the resistance in 1978 was in reviving resistance net-
works. She described being part of starting a new Milicia Popular 
de Libertacao Nacional (Miplin) group in 1980, in the Central East 
Region, where she had relocated. Th is group became part of the newly 
emerging resistance. One of Bisoi’s main objectives in establishing this 
group was to build links between Falintil and the Indonesian military 
and work towards a peace plan.22 
 Th e Fretilin network of Miplin had been created prior to the 
1975 invasion to assist Falintil and was slowly being revived.23  Unlike 
most clandestine groups, Miplin had a military-type structure. Re-
cruits were organised in unarmed teams and platoons. Taur Matan 
Ruak, a senior military leader in the Central region (currently the 
president of Timor-Leste), explained Miplin’s role:
Th e mission of those known as militia was usually to relay infor-
mation about spies in their midst to prevent [the spies] from doing 
any harm, and about Indonesian army movements. Normally that 
is what we called a militia. But it wasn’t necessary for them to carry 
weapons because there were no arms [to give them]  …  Miplin is 
a concept we created and it is diffi  cult to compare it to the classic 
understanding of the term [militia]  …  We did not have arms  …  we 
used [the militias] to motivate the population to remain alert.24 
In the early 1980s a new leadership was emerging, including Ruak. 
Most of the original Fretilin Central Committee leadership had been 
eliminated; and their revolutionary politics, including the ideal of the 
emancipation of women, disappeared along with them. Th e revived 
resistance of the early 1980s had no such programme and little capa-
city to think beyond basic survival. Th ey relied on traditional family 
and clan networks to survive and revive the resistance, and the posi-
tion of women in these networks remained very traditional and was 
based on indigenous gender roles.
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 Th e much more nationalist, rather than revolutionary, struggle 
was led by Xanana Gusmao, who established a series of national resis-
tance councils as platforms to unite various resistance factions to work 
together: CRRN from 1981, CNRM from 1986, then CNRT from 
1998.25  Like before, no women were to hold senior positions within 
these elite male hierarchies. Xanana’s attempts to accommodate other 
groups caused ongoing tensions with the surviving Fretilin leadership.26  
It is still not yet documented what eff ect these political tensions had 
on OPMT, which remained the women’s organisation associated with 
Fretilin, but it continued to operate locally and clandestinely to sup-
port the politically expanding resistance councils throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s.
 With the change to CNRT in 1998, a new women’s arm developed 
—  Organização Mulher Timorense (Organisation of Timorese Women, 
or OMT). Most OPMT women co-joined this organisation as well to 
demonstrate political solidarity at this crucial time of negotiating for 
a UN-sponsored referendum. By 1998 OMT claimed 70,000 members 
in 3,000 secretariats in every little village in the country.
 Women held political positions such as deputies, assistants and 
coordinators. Bisoi was one of them, rejoining the political front aft er 
1981. In addition to their accepted roles as mothers, carers, commu-
nity workers and educators, women performed a range of other roles 
during the occupation. Th ey played a large role in clandestine net-
works: they collected and couriered intelligence and documents; sup-
plied medicine, uniforms and ammunition; and hid guerrillas in their 
homes. One generally accepted estimate of women’s participation in 
clandestine organisations is 60 per cent.27 
 Despite the generalised conservative gender culture, and the 
disruption of war, Bisoi was able to circumvent restrictive roles and 
carve out a diff erent life for herself, though she avoided questioning 
outright traditional gender position. Bisoi spoke about what it was like 
for women balancing their political and domestic roles during resis-
tance times:
If I was organising OPMT activities, that was my responsibility at 
that time. But when I left  this activity and returned to my normal 
[family] life then I had to act as a normal woman. Th ese two lives 
were separate. When I did political activities I concentrated on 
those political issues, and when I was doing normal things I con-
centrated on that. I received support from my family: when I had 
an activity at night they always said, “Th at is her task, let her do 
this.” Th ey never intervened in my political activities.28 
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In March 1983 a regional ceasefi re was agreed upon by Xanana 
Gusmao and Indonesian military representatives. However, the nego-
tiations faltered by August and the ceasefi re was broken by the 
Timorese with an uprising in Vikeke. Hundreds of Timorese members 
of Indonesian-sponsored militias rebelled and deserted, taking their 
weapons up to the mountains and jungles, rejoining the few remaining 
guerrilla forces. Th e Indonesian military retaliated with the brutal 
Kraras massacre, killing the entire male population of that village. By 
September 1983 the Indonesian military had declared a state of emer-
gency and launched a new off ensive.
 Women, including Bisoi, also returned to the mountains with the 
rebel soldiers. Bisoi became a soldier again. “In the diffi  cult times 
there was no food,” she said, “but many refused to go back to the city 
—  they stayed put. We can be as patriotic as men, you know. We 
knew we could do as men did: we stayed. We wanted to show that 
women, too had a strong sense of duty.” 29  She recalled:
We returned to the forest on 8 August 1983 to join Falintil again 
and immediately got involved in all operations of Falintil. Th e 
situation became diffi  cult. Th e Commander [Xanana] released the 
statement [about the], “Guerra dura e prolongada” [the Long War] 
and announced that children and women should return to the 
town. Th e women all refused. Better to fi ght to the death in the 
forest. But the Commander’s decision was for the children. It was 
decided also that elderly and pregnant women should be sent to 
the town.
 In 1983 we again made contact with Indonesian army battalion 
713 and started to set our minds to delivering our small children 
to the battalion in Venilale. Th ere were 27 children, the eldest 
about fi ve years  …  Th is time was very diffi  cult. When the parents 
agreed, their children were handed over and [the parents] returned 
to the military battle. We only handed over the old and our chil-
dren. Th en we again set about trapping and shooting the Indonesian 
military.30 
Bisoi became the “second wife” to a senior Falintil commander and 
had a child with him during her time in the mountains. She said that 
while she was pregnant she was shot in the stomach, and she believed 
the later safe birth of her daughter was a miracle. She said when the 
baby was born the bullet was found to be lodged in her wrist and 
remains there today. As was the custom for guerrilla women, Bisoi 
placed her baby daughter, Lekas Susar (meaning “quite a handful”), 
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in the garden of a local convent, where the child was brought up 
by nuns.31  Th e women who made such heartbreaking choices for the 
nationalist movement and the resistance army they were part of have 
received little acknowledgement for their roles and sacrifi ces.
 Aft er the collapse of the Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia, B.J. 
Habibie was appointed president and agreed to let the Timorese de-
cide their future in a ballot. In the August 1999 referendum, nearly 
80 per cent of East Timorese voted for independence by indicating 
the CNRT fl ag on the ballot paper. Extensive military and militia 
slayings followed the announcement of the vote  —  an estimated 2,000 
East Timorese were killed and more than 200,000 forcibly displaced 
into Indonesia. Approximately 80 per cent of infrastructure was de-
stroyed. Following the massive violence, Timorese struggled to fi nd 
housing and food and look aft er their families while recovering from 
the mayhem.
 As part of the agreement to hold the ballot, Falintil was assigned 
to temporary quarters in several camps around Timor. Bisoi was living 
at the Uaimori camp with most of the senior leaders of Falintil, in-
cluding her uncle L7, who was to become marginalised in the Falintil 
hierarchy. In the camp she was the only woman active in political 
work and the only one to carry a weapon. All the other women in the 
camp worked in either the clinic or the kitchen.32 
Women’s Role and Discrimination in Falintil
During the Indonesian occupation OPMT provided women with a 
vehicle through which they could join the nationalist struggle, either 
militarily or as civilians. OPMT provided support and supplied the 
resistance with what it needed, as far as possible, and women in the 
main acted in these roles. It was clear to all that women made huge 
contributions under extraordinary circumstances. Th ey understood 
the dangers of their actions but persisted, and many died or were 
captured and tortured as a result. As Bisoi says above, “We can be as 
patriotic as men.”
 Although women fi ghters such as Bisoi were respected and appre-
ciated as OPMT members and gained a form of “second class” status 
within Falintil as military support and occasional combatants, they 
were not acknowledged as soldiers and there were no women in the 
Falintil command structure. Th ere was little thought among male 
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commanders about ideas of equality for women. Bisoi elaborated why 
she and other women did not lobby for change:
During the guerrilla war we never knew for sure whether we were 
going to live or die, and every single man and woman concentrated 
only on how to survive. We had lost everything, and because we 
were on the move we had to leave the kids behind and just keep 
going. When the enemy wounded us, man or woman, the conse-
quences were the same. We had to concentrate on surviving and 
continuing our activities to support and encourage Falintil, so they 
would not lose their spirit to fi ght for independence.
 Th e diff erence between the occupation and the independence 
period is that during the guerrilla war everything was limited, 
including information about equality and women’s rights. We did 
not receive any information about women’s rights during that time. 
At that time we didn’t care about these issues and concentrated 
only on how we would survive if the Indonesians attacked. For this 
reason women were put in a secondary role with specifi c tasks. I 
knew how to organise things, and everyone treated me well within 
the movement.33 
Th roughout the occupation OPMT was treated by Falintil as a 
women’s auxiliary for the war eff ort. Certainly no women were invited 
into senior positions in the resistance hierarchy. However, many moti-
vated women such as Bisoi exceeded these expectations. Th is signifi -
cant minority of women challenged the gender roles of women in 
Timorese culture. During resistance times, however, “at many levels 
these changes remained symbolic  —  the exception rather than the 
rule. In general women had no freedom to move and men continued 
to make the decisions.” 34 
 Bisoi believes that many male guerrillas have failed to acknowl-
edge the role of the OPMT women in the military struggle and that 
this is still a story that needs to be told: “Th is inequality existed 
in the resistance movement and Falintil. Th e contribution of women 
to Falintil is obscured by the male Falintil. Th ere were also women 
fi ghters, but the activities of the male fi ghters are more popular.” 35 
 A small number of women, such as Bisoi, served Falintil for most 
of the entire 24 years of the resistance. Many of the women engaged 
in armed confl ict acted as assistants to their guerrilla fi ghter husbands 
or partners in the military camps and sometimes took up arms if their 
husbands were disabled or killed. Bisoi recalled that they were taking 
care of what was termed “nucleos” of injured soldiers, the children 
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and the sick and were responsible for their security and food supply. 
Th ese women, like men, who were discovered by the Indonesian 
authorities faced imprisonment, torture and death with the added 
terror of sexual abuse.36 
 During Falintil military assaults, women were oft en part of the 
“second wave” and had the duty of recovering weapons and other 
valuable items such as uniforms. Th eir instructions were to shoot only 
if they came under attack. Th e situation during the confl ict was very 
fl uid, especially during military engagements. Duties were performed 
according to capacity and conditions. Women whose main duties may 
have offi  cially been logistics and support oft en switched to combat 
duties when conditions warranted.
 Bisoi spoke about one incident of killing several Indonesian 
soldiers at Mount Matebian. She was resting in a camoufl aged spot 
when she realised she had been surrounded by about 15 Indonesian 
soldiers. She believed the soldiers had been tracking her but had not 
realised they were so close. She shot at the soldiers with a machine 
gun, and said she must have killed up to fi ve of them but because she 
fl ed she would never know.37 
 Bisoi was wounded several times:
Th e worst phase was the second period [of the Indonesian occu-
pation, 1979–80s]. It was a black moment that has not really been 
covered until now. Women were killed and suff ered a lot. I was 
shot, eight bullets in my body and stomach and one in my foot. 
Only in 2002 did I have an operation to take out some of the 
bullets, but I am still suff ering a lot.38 
Yet the role played by women in these armed forces was undervalued. 
One clear indication that they were regarded as second-class soldiers 
was in the allocation of uniforms, as experienced by Bisoi:
Life was very basic  —  we were lucky to possess two changes of 
clothes each, and had a bath about once a month. We got our 
clothing quite oft en from the bodies of Indonesian soldiers we had 
killed. Uniforms were fi rst given to the male Falintils  —  they fi tted 
better, and in any case the men, especially the commanders, did 
not want to give us uniforms.39 
Hence, women were given political space and roles but only as dictated 
by the male leadership. Th e appreciation of their specifi c role and 
contribution in resistance was also skewed from the standpoint of the 
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masculine experience. Despite documented evidence to the contrary, 
the offi  cial position of much of the resistance leadership and veterans’ 
recognition bodies today is that women fulfi lled only civilian roles, 
with its attendant practical and material implications. Bisoi recounted 
her experience of discrimination in the national parliament in gaining 
access to state-sponsored medical treatment for her war wounds in 
comparison to the treatment received by male veterans:
In 2008 when I became a parliamentary member I used my own 
money to get medical treatment in Indonesia to take out bullets 
from my body. Th en I found that discrimination exists also in 
parliament. For example, parliament provides allowances of $1,500–
2,000 to parliamentary members to have medical treatment  —  but 
for me to have this operation to take out the bullets from the war 
I received only $500. I protested about this: I pointed this out 
at the plenary, but I was criticised by members of my own party 
[CNRT]. But I am trying to continue because these are my per-
sonal eff orts to get recognition as a resistance member. I made a 
strong protest to other parliamentary members and pointed out 
that others had received [more than the full allowance]. When 
I presented my case to [Parliamentary] Vice-President Vicente 
Guterres for consideration, they only provided the $500 and ad-
vanced my salary for four months. When I returned fi ve to six 
months later I wondered why that had happened, as there should 
not be a diff erence between the rights of parliamentary members.40 
Bisoi was also indignant at the lack of due recognition of the contri-
bution of female veterans in the demobilisation of Falintil fi ghters 
and spoke about her group’s futile struggle to fi ght for just treatment. 
UNTAET, the UN transitional administration of East Timor, oversaw 
the establishment of the Defence Force of East Timor, ultimately to be 
called the Falintil-Forças Armadas de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) 
in February 2001. Male Falintil fi ghters were off ered the option of 
joining the new Timor-Leste Defence Force or receiving the equivalent 
of US$100 along with language and computer training. Nothing com-
parable was off ered to women.41  Bisoi spoke of this new army in 
reference to the plight of a female comrade:
Inequality exists in F-FDTL as an institution. Our resistance colleaga 
is Biralin. Today she is attempting to be recognised by the state. 
She was also a captain in FDTL [around 2004]. However, they 
off ered positions to younger women and discontinued her duties 
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in the military because she was too old. She was replaced with 
younger women who had better capabilities [education and skills]. 
When they terminated her duties they didn’t provide any support 
or demobilisation for her. Th is happened at the Metinaro military 
base, in a phase when FDTL were trying to recruit younger soldiers 
to replace the older ones.
 Our women’s group has sent a protest letter to F-FDTL Colonel 
Lere in Metinaro and also to Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak 
in Tasi Tolu, because Biralin was a Falintil member. We received 
an answer from Taur that the war had fi nished now and we should 
go and work on our farms. He said we didn’t have rights any more 
because the army only needed women who were aged 25–35. We 
don’t have any good adviser or capacity to organise any further 
protest, and so this continues until today.…
 … We understand that now that we are independent, we must 
give the opportunities to the most highly skilled, those with the 
skills to take on responsibilities for the whole society. I can accept 
that to enter to the military today you must be young and skilled. 
But we who fought for the resistance shouldn’t be discriminated 
against. We recognise that we have very low formal education, and 
we feel hopeless because nobody listens to us.
 What is very upsetting is that the discrimination is from our 
own partners in the struggle.…42 
Men are culturally, socially and politically dominant in Timor-Leste. 
Th e experiences of male Falintil fi ghters are prominently displayed. 
Women are startlingly absent from the displays in the Timorese Resis-
tance Archive and Museum, which focus instead on the senior male 
leadership of the resistance, particularly those currently in power. 
Women important to the early struggle seem like ghosts: they appear 
occasionally in photos and documents, but mostly they are invisible 
in the telling of East Timorese history. Th ere seems little capacity to 
imagine women in the roles of soldiers or leaders; stereotypically these 
heroic roles are assigned or imagined as only male.
Post-Independence Politics 
Bisoi continued to be a member of Fretilin during the initial period 
of UN administration aft er 1999. She believed there was very little 
women’s representation within the central Fretilin hierarchy and 
lobbied for more recognition and specifi c responsibilities at senior 
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levels: “All of us who came from the hills [during resistance times] 
were illiterate and were not allowed to enter the main structure of the 
party.…” 43 
 On 30 August 2001, elections were held for a constitutional 
assembly. Fretilin won 57.4 per cent of the mandate and set about 
draft ing a new constitution for the country. Bisoi noted that some of 
the Fretilin women lobbied to become part of the government as it 
was envisaged that the constitutional assembly would convert into the 
fi rst parliament. As expected, Fretilin transformed into the fi rst consti-
tutional government of the new nation of Timor-Leste. Disappointed 
to be given no place in the new political structure, Bisoi resigned 
from the Fretilin party and withdrew from political life, starting a 
small business in Maubisse. She had been completely marginalised 
due to her protests:
Because we participated in the resistance movement we are disad-
vantaged now, and support from the government is minimal. Yet 
everything today is a result of the resistance movement eff orts: no 
one can deny it. My main problem now is my capacity, as I wasn’t 
educated and I have very limited options. What I feel is that it is a 
little bit unfair for us women who were in the resistance in com-
parison to those who got themselves educated during that time. 
We concentrated only on the resistance, and now in the indepen-
dence period we don’t feel we have as much opportunity as those 
who got themselves a good education. Th ey have more knowledge 
than us. We feel left  behind.
 Discrimination still exists, because the state doesn’t recognise 
or value women’s role in the resistance. And because of their lack 
of background and education, women don’t even have enough 
capacity to claim that they were resistance members. Th ey are suf-
fering, they don’t have enough knowledge, they don’t have enough 
capacity to represent themselves.44 
However, in 2004, at the invitation of the new president, Xanana 
Gusmao, Bisoi became involved in the Commission for Veterans, col-
lecting and assessing data on women veterans for their inclusion on 
commemorative lists and for veteran payments and access to resources. 
Th en in 2006 she was invited by Gusmao to join his new CNRT 
political party, which would compete in the upcoming parliamentary 
elections. Bisoi believes Gusmao asked her to join CNRT because 
he supported the political participation of women but also because 
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she was a well-known resistance and community activist who would 
attract supporters. Also, there was a quota for women representatives 
and every fourth name on party lists had to be a woman.
Gendered Recognition of Veterans
Involvement in the offi  cial veteran recognition process was an emo-
tionally disconcerting experience for Bisoi. Bisoi, like other female 
combatants, was not initially recognised as such even though she had 
clearly engaged in combat. Additionally, since women did not serve 
the armed struggle in ways recognised by male guerrilla leaders, they 
were initially invisible in the demobilisation process. Bisoi and a small 
group of other women were recognised only post hoc  —  and in this 
way women were treated as something of an aft erthought in the pro-
cess of veteran recognition and again only as second-class soldiers.
 Th e fi rst round of the offi  cial veteran recognition process was 
restricted to those who had been formally part of the armed structure 
—  and women, it was argued, had only been part of the civilian struc-
ture. Only 13 women registered for the combatant list, and their 
names were not included in the fi nal list of names.45  Other women 
said they had wanted to register but were advised by President Gusmao 
to wait for the second round, the clandestine civilian process.46  Several 
senior resistance women were appointed as commissioners in these 
processes, and one observer noted that while the women were oft en 
critical of the criteria devised for combatants they fi nally agreed to 
them. Th e observer felt that these women had to “tread a fi ne line 
between protecting the interests of women and not marginalising 
themselves in the veteran community”.47  Th e small yet signifi cant 
numbers of women such as Bisoi who served together with Falintil 
for all or most of the resistance period found this situation diffi  cult to 
accept. Aft er protests, Bisoi and some of these women who had regis-
tered as civilian clandestine veterans received the added designation: 
“located with the armed forces”. Later, during the process of recog-
nition and payment of pensions, these women successfully argued that 
they should be recognised in the same category as men who had 
served in the armed front.48  Bisoi too received some of these benefi ts. 
However, there is a feeling that this recognition was forced and 
grudgingly given. In addition, the women have never been recognised 
for the unique roles they played in Falintil, their sacrifi ce in giving 
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away their babies, their military logistical support roles, and their care 
and nurturing of male soldiers.
 In what can be described as a campaign for recognition of 
women’s actions during the struggle for independence, a series of 
documents has been published by Timorese women and their inter-
national supporters.49  Th e work is being continued today by women 
concerned that their experiences and service to the nation are un-
recognised, crimes against them remain unpunished, and their current 
needs and rights go unmet. Th e Timorese leadership has not pursued 
Indonesian military leaders for war crimes, due to pragmatic political 
considerations  —  and no international authority has the jurisdiction 
to pursue them.
 Th e predominantly male leaders of East Timor’s armed struggle 
were engaged in a brutal and bloody war for most of their adult life 
and suff ered a variety of ill eff ects, including displacement, imprison-
ment, torture, and the loss of family and fellow soldiers, close friends 
and colleagues. Th ey made dreadful sacrifi ces for their country’s inde-
pendence. It is these male elites who now head the government, mili-
tary and police, and the society they have shaped is heavily infl uenced 
by their experiences and prejudices. Th ese infl uential men have as-
serted their political dominance in Timor-Leste, which has precluded 
the full recognition of women’s roles during the war and in turn 
excluded “women from full and assertive participation in post-war 
public life”.50 
Gender Disparity in Timor-Leste Today
While most Timorese women and men still live in the rural poverty 
of a life devoted to subsistence farming, indicators for the health and 
well-being of women and children are oft en worse. Th ere is substan-
tial gender inequity, as illustrated by the 2004 Human Development 
Index (0.426) and Gender Development Index (0.369), meaning 
women had a 13 per cent lower standard of living than men. Women 
overall have lower participation in the work force  —  around 36 per 
cent of the non-agricultural sector  —  and are usually in lower-level 
positions, meaning lower salaries, fewer benefi ts and less possibility 
of advancement.51  In 2005, women represented around 25 per cent of 
the civil service but held only 2 per cent of the highest positions.52  
Th e gender wage gap is huge, with women earning one-eighth the 
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income of men.53  Disparity between men and women exists across the 
domains of landownership, political participation, access to education 
and economic activities, and domestic issues such as reproductive 
decision making.
 Bisoi feels strongly that women, and particularly women veterans 
like herself, have a long way to go before they are equal partners with 
men in East Timorese society:
Today my family or husband does not intervene in my political 
activities, but when I return home again I submit myself to the 
family structure. I have to listen to my husband. I recognise that 
in Timor-Leste it is like this. Some people do intervene in others’ 
lives, especially in women’s lives, and say she can’t do this or that. 
But in my experience it didn’t happen, from when I was young to 
when I was a married woman. Yet this conservatism still exists in 
East Timor. During the guerrilla war we never knew for sure if 
we were going to live or die, but during independence women are 
going to have their rights.54 
Th e beliefs Bisoi expresses here about women still “submitting” to the 
family structure, where men are dominant, are common among women 
in Timor, especially older women. It is still socially unacceptable for 
women to privately or publicly contest men’s power. Invisible social 
control is exerted using customary practices and by powerful people 
or institutions who defi ne socially restricted roles for women. It also 
works to limit participation psychologically through an internalised 
feeling of subordination, social exclusion and inequality and devalues 
the concerns of the excluded group, in this case Timorese women. 
Women have to be more muted and skillful in getting around these 
cultural norms, and the situation of the war off ered many women 
like Bisoi a way to do this. Post-independence politics too off ers this 
hope. In the home, however, older women still maintain their tradi-
tional roles.
Conclusion
Th e unfi nished life story of Bisoi is one of the lifelong struggle of a 
feminist nationalist. Her life journey was intertwined intimately with 
the fateful vicissitudes of her homeland and the nationalist movement 
fi ghting for its independence. Her relentless dedication to the cause, 
together with the sacrifi ce and commitment of thousands of her 
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comrades, contributed to the liberation of her country from foreign 
occupation. Women veterans in Timor are well known and generally 
highly regarded in their communities. Yet the enjoyment of the fruit 
of nationalist struggle was not shared equitably. Victory over foreign 
domination was overshadowed by the continuation of feminine subor-
dination and discrimination, not just in the domestic sphere but even 
in the veterans’ recognition exercise. We have discussed how women 
combatants such as Bisoi who served the nationalist movement for 
independence (1974–99) have been treated with discrimination his-
torically and received partial recognition as war veterans only aft er 
contestations by women activists. Th e prospects for female combatants 
such as Bisoi to be extended the same recognition and privileges as 
their male counterparts seems a long way off .
 In the contested world of modern Timorese history the crucial 
and unique role of women in the resistance has not yet been fully 
acknowledged, and this aff ects women’s full and active participation 
in the post-confl ict society. Th is is signifi cant because how a post-war 
society treats its female veterans is a powerful indicator of the current 
and future status of women in that society.55 
 It is understood that the struggle for women’s rights was not pos-
sible during the diffi  cult times of the war and was subsumed by the 
nationalist struggle, and women such as Bisoi accept this. However, 
this nationalist struggle created a pool of highly skilled and motivated 
women who no longer accept the status quo and who strive towards 
equity for women. Only now can women create and develop a separate 
identity alongside other international women’s movements. Yet this 
process is fraught. Separating the recently concluded struggle for inde-
pendence from the modern women’s movement fi ghting for women’s 
rights is still diffi  cult. Such a separation would necessitate a cleaving 
and the voicing of opposition to the men  —  the fathers, uncles, 
brothers and husbands  —  alongside whom women fought the war, 
and with whom they formed families and communities during these 
hard times. Such a separation and shift  in thinking, for both men 
and women, may well be impossible for the generation who suff ered 
together during such a long and troubled war.
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chapter 10
Karen Nationalism and Armed 
Struggle: From the Perspective of 
Zipporah Sein
Ardeth Maung Th awnghmung and Violet Cho
In late 2008 Burma watchers and members of Karen communities were taken by surprise when the Karen National Union (KNU), 
one of the oldest ethnicity-based organisations in Burma that has 
continued to engage in armed struggle against the current Burmese 
government, announced that Zipporah Sein would be its next general 
secretary. It was completely unprecedented for the historically male-
dominated organisation to elect a woman. At the time, Zipporah Sein 
was serving as the general secretary of the Karen Women Organisa-
tion (KWO), the women’s wing of the KNU. Who is Zipporah Sein? 
What are the circumstances that gave rise to her ascendance to one 
of the most important positions in the ethno-nationalist movement 
in Burma?
 In this chapter, we will describe the life of Zipporah Sein within 
the context of the emergence and evolution of the Karen nationalist 
movement and armed struggle in Burma.1  Particular emphasis will be 
placed on how Zipporah Sein perceives her role and articulates her 
political vision as a prominent civilian leader in an armed resistance 
organisation, how she believes her gender aff ects her relationships 
with her colleagues, and the role of women in the KNU struggle. Th e 
chapter is based mainly on interviews with Zipporah and her siblings 
and colleagues. A personal relationship between one of the authors of 
this article and Zipporah Sein has given us access to these primary 
sources of information, and allowed us to let Zipporah tell her story 
in her own way.
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Zipporah Sein (second from left ) with her mother, sister and nieces, 2009. 
Courtesy of Zipporah Sein
Zipporah Sein at KNU congress, 2009. Courtesy of Zipporah Sein
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 Th e armed resistance led by the KNU in 1949 emerged out of 
the desire to have genuine autonomy over Karen-populated areas and 
a distrust of the majority Burman population as a result of the com-
munal violence during World War II. Th e KNU has articulated the 
concept of “nationalism” (known in Sgaw Karen as hta eh kalu tha or 
“love for one’s nation”) through the four principles articulated by Saw 
Ba U Gyi, the late president of the KNU. Th ese four principles mainly 
emphasize the pursuit of an autonomous Karen State through armed 
revolt.2  Th is interpretation of Karen nationalism has not been shared 
by some Karens, who stress non-violent approaches to maintain Karen 
identity and culture and to promote social, political and economic 
development.3 
 Zipporah Sein adheres to the offi  cial KNU interpretation of Karen 
nationalism, but perceives her role diff erently from those who took 
up arms at the inception of the Karen armed revolution. Th is chapter 
shows that while Zipporah’s rise to power may have been a product of 
an internal power struggle within the KNU, her new leadership also 
refl ects the KNU’s broader strategy to adapt to current international 
trends and represents an attempt by second- and third-generation 
armed fi ghters to redefi ne the role of the KNU within the context of 
Burma’s evolving external and domestic political landscape.
Emergence and Evolution of Karen Nationalism and 
Armed Struggle in Burma
Contemporary Myanmar/Burma, with a population of about 54 mil-
lion, is made up of a diverse array of ethnic, cultural, religious and 
language groups, including Burman (the largest, constituting 68 per 
cent of the population), Shan (9 per cent), Karen (7 per cent), Ara-
kanese (4 per cent), Mon (2 per cent), and more than 100 smaller 
language groups.4  Burmans, along with Mons and pockets of Karens, 
live in lowland areas in the Irrawaddy Delta and central and southern 
Burma surrounded by minority populations inhabiting the highland 
areas bordering India, China, Laos and Th ailand.
 Th e term “Karen” is a polysemy for approximately 20 subgroups 
of the Karen language family that come from diverse religious, cultural 
and regional backgrounds. Th eir numbers in Burma are estimated at 
3 million to 10 million.5  Th e two major groups are the Sgaw (pre-
dominantly Christians and animists living in the hill regions) and the 
Pwo (mostly lowland Buddhists). About 15–20 per cent of Karens 
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are Christians, 5–10 per cent are animists, and the remainder are 
Buddhists.6  Th e Karens are spread all over lower Burma, from the 
Irrawaddy Delta region to the central Pegu Yoma mountain range and 
the eastern hills along the Th ai border. In precolonial times, interac-
tions between those who lived in the surrounding hills (including 
the Karens) and the majority Burman population were sporadic at 
best and hostile at worst. A popular Karen perception of precolonial 
history is that the Burmese monarchy looked down upon minority 
hill tribe populations as illiterate and uncivilised and occasionally 
employed them as protective shields against their enemies from neigh-
bouring countries.7 
Karen Nationalist Movement
1885 British occupy whole of Burma after waging three successive 
wars
1887 Founding of the Karen National Association, the fi rst Pan-Karen 
organisation
1945 Establishment of the Karen Central Advisory Board, which makes 
the fi rst demand to the British government to create a Karen 
 State
1948 Independence of Burma
1949 KNU takes up arms for a separate state
1950 Assassination of Ba U Kyi, the KNU president
1976 National Democratic Front is formed in Manerplaw, the “capital” 
of KNU-controlled areas, bringing together key ethnic resistance 
groups
1990 First multiparty elections since the military took over power in 
1962
1994 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army splits from the KNU
2004 KNU leaders engage in ceasefi re negotiations with former Prime 
Minister Khin Nyunt. Talks break down when Khin Nyunt is placed 
under house arrest
2008 Assassination of KNU General Secretary Padoh Manh Shah
2010 Military-controlled multiparty elections in Burma
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 Th e British, who colonised Burma in 1885, further separated 
Burmans from minority groups by resorting to a classic divide-and-
rule policy. Minority groups, such as Karen, Chin and Kachin, were 
deliberately recruited in the army and police. Many Karen people 
welcomed the British as a protector against the majority population 
and a source of opportunities previously denied them. Some accepted 
Christianity and became the main benefi ciaries of American and 
European missionaries who promoted literacy (in both Karen and 
English), education and healthcare for the newly proselytised popula-
tions. Under British rule, Karen Christians held a disproportionately 
large number of positions in the civil service, military and police.8 
 Th e resistance movement against British rule was initiated and 
dominated by Burman nationalists who secretly went to Japan and 
China in the early 1940s to get military training for their campaign 
against the colonisers. In 1942 the group formed the Burma Indepen-
dence Army, and returned to Burma at the head of the invading 
Japanese. Some members of ethnic minority groups, including Karen, 
remained loyal and fi ercely defended the British. Nearly 2,000 Karen 
(as well as Burman) civilians in Salween District in the east and in 
the Irrawaddy Delta were killed during communal violence, initially 
instigated by Burma Independence Army members who went aft er the 
local Karen population for their perceived privileged status and close 
association with the British.9  While this collective memory of perse-
cution had fuelled Karen nationalistic sentiment, Karen community 
leaders continued to uphold diverse views and approaches.10 
 Aung San and other nationalist leaders later turned against the 
Japanese and formed an anti-Fascist front in a secret meeting in 
1944. Th ey perceived support from Burma’s ethnic minority groups 
as crucial to national independence.11  Aft er the end of World War 
II, nationalist leaders eventually negotiated the country’s independence 
with the British government. Initially the Shan, Karen and Karenni 
preferred to keep their areas autonomous under British rule. However, 
aft er a series of meetings with the Burman nationalist leader Aung 
San at Panglong in Shan State, some ethnic leaders, such as from the 
Shan, Kachin and Chin groups, agreed to be a part of independent 
Burma on various conditions. Many Karen believed that their case 
for autonomy would be favourably considered due to the support 
they had provided to the British government and the sacrifi ces they 
had made in fi ghting against the Japanese army. It was a major blow 
for many Karen people when the British administration cancelled its 
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original plan to retain the frontier areas under its direct rule. Instead, 
it allowed for the immediate election of a constituent assembly, leading 
to the country’s independence.12  Th e constitution of 1947 created three 
new states within the borders of Burma  —  the Shan, Karenni and 
Kachin  —  and established frameworks for the creation of new states 
in post-independent eras. Th e territories and status of the govern-
ment’s territorial authority over three other major ethnic groups  —  the 
Mon, Karen and Arakanese  —  were left  open in the constitution, to 
be decided aft er independence in January 1948.13  Th e current Karen 
State, which came into existence in 1952, encompasses only a minority 
of the Karen population.
 From the very beginning of independence, the Burmese govern-
ment led by the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League party expe-
rienced internal dissension.14  Th e government was also unable to ac-
commodate demands by various ethnic groups for greater autonomy 
and independence. Towards the end of the 1940s, the Karen and Mon 
revolted. A decade later, the Shan and Kachin rebellions broke out. 
In 1962 the military took over power under the name of the Revolu-
tionary Council, ostensibly to prevent the country from disintegrating 
into various units. It soon launched the “Four Cuts” policy, which 
forcibly relocated villages in areas controlled by resistance groups to 
deny them a source of food, funds, intelligence and recruits.15  Th ese 
strategies succeeded in wiping out Communist and KNU resistance 
groups in the Irrawaddy and Pegu Yoma. General Ne Win, the leader 
of the military coup, imposed restrictions on civil and political free-
dom and established a one-party system led by the Burma Socialist 
Programme Party. He introduced a socialist economy, nationalised 
private enterprises (including the previously vibrant media), and put 
restrictions on internal and external trade. However, ethnic armed 
organisations continued to control extensive territories along the 
border areas, partly as a result of the abundant natural resources and 
taxes imposed on goods that crossed the borders between Burma 
and its neighbours. Th e KNU formed an alliance with other armed 
resistance organisations to establish a nine-party National Democratic 
Front in 1976, which agreed in 1984 to adopt a common federal goal, 
dropping any demands for separate independent states.16 
 In the meantime, the isolationist and state-controlled economy in 
Burma soon resulted in a scarcity of basic food and consumer pro-
ducts, and poverty. It eventually culminated in the nationwide popular 
demonstrations that brought down Ne Win’s regime in 1988. Th e 
Chap10 (250-275)   255 7/10/13   2:08:43 PM
256 Ardeth Maung Th awnghmung and Violet Cho
military ruthlessly repressed the anti-regime demonstrations and 
staged a coup d’état in 1988 to govern under a new name: the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Over 10,000 students 
and civilian activists fl ed underground into the resistance-controlled 
mountains, with many ending up in KNU-controlled areas.
 Th e SLORC removed a few restrictions on foreign trade and 
investment and held a multiparty election in 1990 to promote its 
international image. Th e main opposition party, the National League 
for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the 
leading nationalist Aung San who had been assassinated in 1947, won 
a landslide victory. Th e military junta refused to honour the results 
and instead cracked down on opposition parties. In the early 1990s a 
dozen NLD elected members of parliament fl ed into KNU-held terri-
tory, where they formed the exiled National Coalition Government 
Union of Burma.
 By the early 1990s, the geopolitical situation was no longer favour-
able to armed resistance groups. Th e Th ai government now adopted 
a “constructive engagement” policy towards Burma to secure lucrative 
logging, fi shery and gas pipeline deals off ered by the SLORC.17  Funds 
from this emergency sell-off  of natural resources to Th ailand enabled 
the Burmese junta to buy much-needed arms, ammunitions and 
aircraft  from neighbouring countries, particularly China. Th e SLORC 
was also able to conclude successful ceasefi re negotiations with 17 
armed groups by the mid-1990s, which enabled it to launch a stronger 
military campaign against the remaining armed resistance groups, 
including the KNU.18  Th e biggest setback to the KNU was a major 
split that led to the formation of the Democratic Karen Buddhist 
Army. Some attribute the cause of the split to the reaction of dis-
gruntled KNU soldiers, many of whom were Buddhist, against corrup-
tion, abuse and religious discrimination by the Christian-dominated 
leadership.19  Many KNU members blame the Burmese military for 
enfl aming these tensions to split the organisation. Th e formation of 
the Buddhist army organisation led to the collapse of the KNU’s head-
quarters in 1995. Th is was soon followed by a number of smaller KNU 
breakaway factions signing ceasefi re agreements with the Burmese 
military regime.20 
 By 2008, only four non-ceasefi re groups  —  the KNU, Karenni 
National Progressive Party, Shan State Army-South and Chin National 
Front  —  maintained military forces of any strength, on dwindling 
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economic and recruitment bases.21  Th e State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC), the new name for the SLORC, unilaterally proceeded 
with its “road map” by holding the National Convention, which drew 
up a new constitution that gave a dominant role to the military. Th e 
SPDC used a combination of coercive and incentive measures and 
outright manipulation of votes to procure a very high approval rate 
for the constitution and held nationwide legislative elections on 7 
November 2010. Th ree Karen political parties contested the elections, 
emphasising a non-violent approach to promote Karen nationalism 
within the legal boundaries. Th e Union Solidarity and Development 
Party, a pro-junta party, whose high level positions were dominated 
by retired military and government personnel, won an overwhelming 
majority.
 Former SPDC Prime Minister Th ein Sein was appointed the new 
president. He soon embarked on a series of reforms, including nego-
tiation with armed groups, releasing political prisoners (notably Aung 
San Suu Kyi), and relaxing control over the economy, politics and 
media. Suu Kyi’s party then offi  cially registered to participate in the 
by-elections in April 2012. She and 42 other members of her party 
won almost all the contested seats and have become the main opposi-
tion party in the parliament although they occupy only 6.8 per cent of 
the seats. Th e new government has adopted a more lenient approach 
towards ethnic armed resistance movements by signing provisional 
agreements with most of them, including the KNU but excluding 
those in northern Burma, where fi ghting recurred between govern-
ment troops and the Kachin Independence Organisation. Detailed 
arrangements to end confl ict with these resistance groups may take 
years, given their sheer numbers and the seemingly incompatible 
positions between them and the government.
 It is during these critical years of Burma’s history that Zipporah 
Sein has taken over leadership of the KNU. Th e decisions she and 
her movement make are likely to have a major impact not just on 
the future of the KNU and the Karen people but also on the nature 
of political reconciliation and institutional arrangements for Burma’s 
diverse population.
Zipporah Sein’s Childhood and Education
Zipporah was born in a hamlet called Saw Kha Der in Kler Lwe Htu 
(Nyaung Lay Bin) District on 27 March 1955, the fi ft h of eight children 
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of General Tamalar Baw and Naw Laurel. By then, the Karen armed 
revolt was in full swing. Her family members had to fl ee from one 
area to the next to accompany the father, who was a leading fi gure 
in the Karen armed resistance movement. Zipporah’s father joined 
the British Army at the age of 16 and took up arms against the 
Burmese government at the onset of the Karen armed revolt in 1949. 
Zipporah describes her precarious childhood growing up in a war 
zone as follows:
I do not have any special place I call my home because I have been 
living in so many places in my life, particularly in the mountainous 
jungle areas of eastern Burma. Because my father is an active 
member of the Karen revolutionary movement, our family mem-
bers constantly had to run for our lives to avoid Burmese govern-
ment soldiers.
 Villagers did not usually let us stay with them for fear of 
government retaliation, so they built shacks in the fi eld for us to 
stay outside the village. Quite a few of those in eastern Burma who 
knew nothing about the Karen revolution ultimately rejected us.22 
Zipporah recalled growing up missing the presence of her father:
I hardly saw my father, and I only knew a few things about him. 
When we asked for our father, my mother would tell us that he 
had to travel with a big mission to liberate his people. We were 
the happiest children when he came back, no matter how short 
the visit was. However, this happiness never lasted long because we 
knew that our father would have to go away again.
It was Zipporah’s resourceful mother who was single-handedly respon-
sible for the upbringing and early education of Zipporah and her 
siblings. As a soldier, Zipporah’s father was not paid a salary. Her 
mother worked as a schoolteacher and was provided food to feed her 
children. Sometimes Zipporah and her brother helped people harvest 
paddy in exchange for food. A devout Baptist, she and her family 
continued to pray together every morning and evening. Zipporah also 
mentions that her traditional Karen Christian family background has 
infl uenced her principles, such as honesty, kindness and generosity. 
She sees God as her “true friend” and has found comfort in prayer 
and communication with God to gain emotional and spiritual strength 
whenever she has encountered challenges.
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 Zipporah’s early awareness about Karen people and history came 
through her mother, who she says was a great night-time storyteller:
My mother would tell us about the Karen revolution and our 
father’s involvement in the struggle. She told us stories about 
Japanese colonisation, and how dominant Burmans oppressed 
Karen people, which led to the Karen armed insurrection. Th ese 
stories played a very important part in my life as they inspired us 
and infl uenced our thoughts. My mother also said that if Karen 
gained autonomy we would not need to run away again and we 
could live happily with our father. I even had a dream of living 
with my parents and other siblings in a village where we settled 
permanently and did not need to move any more. As a child, I 
was deeply hoping for that special day to come. I am still waiting.
Zipporah acknowledges the powerful infl uence of her mother, who 
instilled a sense of duty and responsibility in the minds and hearts 
of her children. Most of Zipporah’s siblings are currently serving in 
important leadership positions in the KNU as military personnel, 
teachers and administrators. In a 2010 interview with Violet Cho, 
Karenni National Progressive Party General Secretary Khu Oo Reh 
considered Zipporah’s background as a strength: “In my view, their 
family’s participation in the revolution has become a sort of ritual, 
that is passed down the generations. She has got a good background 
and foundation in the movement.”
 Zipporah and her siblings learned how to read and write the 
Karen language from their mother before going to formal primary, 
middle and high schools in the Karen-controlled area. In order to 
further her studies in a government university, Zipporah repeated 
her high school education in a government-controlled area. However, 
she gave up halfway when she heard that her friend who had sat 
for matriculation had to run for her life from local authorities who 
uncovered her familial connection with the Karen armed resistance. 
Aft er giving up her dream to pursue a university education, Zipporah 
decided to go back to the Karen “liberated” area and dedicate her life 
to teaching.
 Zipporah’s passion for teaching came at an early age, and she 
recalls fondly the fun she and her elder sister had when they occa-
sionally replaced their mother as teachers:
I was only eleven years old when I fi rst became a teacher. My 
older sister and I took over my mother’s teaching responsibility 
in the small school she’d set up, when she went secretly to a city 
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for medical treatment for her abdominal pain. It was really fun 
because we registered all the students who attended our school and 
we started teaching. Some students were my friends and some were 
older than me. We were supposed to take a 10- or 15-minute break 
during school hours but sometimes we would let it drag on for an 
hour. When we thought we had had enough playing we went back 
to the classroom to teach again.
From Teacher to General Secretary of Karen Women 
Organisation
While she was teaching in one of the districts controlled by the KNU, 
Zipporah began to get involved in a local women’s organisation that 
had been established to address the social and humanitarian needs 
of Karen residents. In 1985 she was elected general secretary of the 
Karen Women Organisation, a position she proudly accepted; but she 
soon realised that holding two jobs  —  as a teacher and the general 
secretary  —  was too much for her. She decided to leave the KWO and 
focus all her attention on teaching. Padoh Lah Say, Zipporah’s former 
colleague and a KNU offi  cer, remembered Zipporah as follows:
I have known Zipporah since 1986 when I came to work as a 
schoolteacher in Hway Baw Lu. Zipporah had a passion for learning 
and teaching. She was a hard worker, and a dedicated public ser-
vant. I found her constantly learning new things and asking ques-
tions. She was also very patient and treated others with respect. 
Most people, including her colleagues, students and myself, loved 
her and enjoyed working with her.23
Zipporah’s teaching career came to an end in 1995, when the KNU’s 
main headquarters were overrun by government forces. Along with 
many Karen civilians who were now displaced, Zipporah and her 
family moved to Mae Ra Mu refugee camp, on the Th ailand-Burma 
border. It was at the camp that she focused her attention on women’s 
and children’s issues.
Th e Refugee Camp: Working for Women and Children
By the time Zipporah got to the refugee camp the KWO was barely 
functional, due to the fall of the KNU’s headquarters and the ongoing 
war and displacement of Karen residents. Some leaders went back to 
Burma, while others resettled overseas. Zipporah recalled that it was a 
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challenging time for the KWO amidst many urgent needs that had to 
be fulfi lled. In 1999, she quit teaching to dedicate herself to the KWO:
When I came to live in Mae Ra Mu camp, I saw that it was neces-
sary to reorganise the women’s organisation to address the needs 
of refugee families. We used to live in the jungle, where we had 
unlimited space and freedom of movement. However, the refugee 
camp was cramped and crowded so we need to change our living 
style. I set up a women’s group in each section of the camp to 
make a list of their needs in the household and coordinated collec-
tion and distribution of essential items for pregnant women, new 
mothers and infants. I opened nursery schools and summer schools 
for children to learn basic reading and writing skills as well as to 
educate them with necessary health and hygiene knowledge. 
She was also concerned with the prevalence of indiscriminate corporal 
punishment towards children:
Th ere is a need to change our traditional perception about the role 
of children in our society. I was disturbed to see, while living in 
the camp, how children were punished physically, regardless of the 
severity of their mistakes. Th ere were no rules and guidance for 
child-rearing. So while in the camp, I also organised training and 
education for parents on child psychology and development and 
how to raise children.
Financial need was the most challenging part of the KWO activities. 
Th e then treasurer fl ed with all the KNU money to government-
controlled areas in Burma, and collection of dues from local women’s 
units was hampered due to the war situation. Zipporah began to 
send applications overseas to get fi nancial aid to run activities for the 
camp and slowly reorganised the KWO offi  ce. She was later invited 
overseas to talk about the situation of Burmese women and refugees, 
an experience that exposed her to new perspectives and ideas:
My fi rst overseas trip was to Norway, where I made a presentation 
at the World Women’s Conference. It was something I had never 
dreamt of. I started travelling regularly to Th ailand. I worked very 
hard to speak, write and research in English in order to give pre-
sentations at international conferences. I did not turn down the 
off er to go for an EU lobbying trip to advocate for my people, even 
though I didn’t understand how lobbying and campaigning worked. 
Aft er coming back from that lobbying trip, I set up lots of pro-
grammes under the KWO.
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Zipporah set up a women’s rights school and other learning centres 
to train young women to work with local women’s groups. Th eir pro-
grammes continue to encourage Karen women to participate in major 
decision making, empower them to be self-confi dent and outspoken, 
make them aware of their rights, and encourage them to get involved 
in the movement against the military government. Noting the low rate 
of political participation of women in nationalist struggle in the late 
1990s, Zipporah tries to send her women staff  for further training and 
education whenever opportunities arise. She believes that education 
is key to women’s participation in politics.
 Zipporah spent most of her time as KWO general secretary 
promoting education, health, family welfare and women’s rights. She 
fi rst attended the KNU congress in 2000 as a women’s representative. 
When she attended the congress as a women’s representative again 
in 2004, she was elected to serve on the KNU Executive Committee, 
which had 11 members consisting mostly of the highest-ranking 
authorities in the organisation. She nevertheless continued to devote 
much of her time to the KWO.
From the KWO to the KNU
On 14 February 2008, the charismatic KNU General Secretary Padoh 
Manh Shah was gunned down at his home in Mae Sot. He had fl ed 
to the KNU area in 1966 at age 22 aft er graduating from college with 
a major in history. He worked his way up to the highest level of the 
KNU political machinery by fi rst serving as a soldier, like other KNU 
male leaders. As a Pwo Karen Buddhist, Padoh Manh Shah repre-
sented an anomaly within the KNU leadership dominated by Sgaw 
Karen Christians. Speaking fl uent Burmese and advocating for a 
federal union in Burma, he was highly regarded for his diplomatic 
skill in building trust among disparate members of the resistance. 
However, his uncompromising “politics-fi rst demand” policy towards 
the Burmese military regime was at odds with the “peace-through-
development policy of mutual trust building” strategy adopted by 
other ceasefi re groups.24  Th is alienated some segments of the Karen 
population within and outside the resistance movement. Th e “politics-
fi rst demand” policy put political issues such as equal rights, the right 
to self-determination, and moves towards federalism as a precondition 
before negotiating a ceasefi re arrangement.25 
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 Th e KNU holds elections every four years for president, vice-
president, general secretary as well as executive members. At the 
14th congress in November 2008, Zipporah attended as a member of 
the executive committee. Tamalar Baw, Zipporah’s father, became the 
president of the KNU, and Zipporah Sein was elected general secretary. 
Th is new development came as a surprise to many, including Zipporah 
herself. Th ough she felt unprepared for the responsibility, she grace-
fully accepted the mandate given by her supporters, with the hope to 
inspire more women to take up leadership positions.
 Numerous accounts were off ered as to how and why Zipporah 
was elected to the highest position in the KNU. A member of KWO 
who attended the KNU congress recalled that approximately 100 dele-
gates voted for candidates in the election through a series of screening 
processes.26  Zipporah Sein was one of the two most favoured candi-
dates for the position of general secretary. Th e other candidate was 
reportedly Padoh David Taw (d. 2012), a former secretary of the KNU 
Foreign Department. Th e voting for David Taw and Zipporah was 
close, and therefore another round of elections had to be held, in 
which Zipporah emerged as a clear winner.
Zipporah and the KNU
It is diffi  cult to uncover the motivations of delegates who voted for 
or against Zipporah Sein. Some suggested a possibility of vote rigging 
and manipulation by the KNU establishment, which was dominated 
by her relatives, while others speculated that she may have genuinely 
earned the votes due to her past accomplishments, experience and 
role as an internationally recognised humanitarian worker, which 
could potentially help the KNU’s image and raise its international 
profi le. In the view of some male delegates who voted for her, it may 
have been in the best interest of the KNU to have a KWO woman 
activist within its leadership.
 Burma activists, members of the Karen community, and foreign 
scholars and experts have off ered a number of reasons for Zipporah’s 
ascendance to the KNU’s dominant position, which had previously 
been held by men. Most pointed out the role of “dynastic” politics, 
since many of Zipporah’s siblings occupied leadership positions in 
the KNU. Some common criticisms of Zipporah are that she lacks 
fi rst-hand experience in politics; that she is the puppet of her father 
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or brothers or other leaders; and that she is merely reactive, and not 
proactive enough to develop new and pragmatic visions and strategies 
for the KNU in accordance with the changing nature of Burmese 
domestic politics.27
 Zipporah is well aware of these criticisms against her and her 
family. She said:
Some people think that I got this position because of my father. 
I may not have a lot of experience with KNU work, but I have 
so much experience working with grass-roots populations in pro-
moting education and health, and in working with international 
organisations. All of these should be counted as strengths, but 
nobody seems to acknowledge them. People elected me because 
of my work with KWO, not because I’m the daughter of a KNU 
leader.
Zipporah also claimed that her father did not vote for her to become 
general secretary of the KNU. In fact, she mentioned that her father 
strongly objected when she became a member of the KNU Executive 
Committee in 2004, reasoning that women in general and Zipporah 
in particular should continue to work for the women’s organisations 
and help promote political awareness among women.
 Th ere are nonetheless others who view her victory in a positive 
light. Khu Oo Reh, general secretary of the Karenni National Progres-
sive Party, for instance, thinks highly of her: “She became popular 
and gained recognition from ethnic armed groups, democracy forces 
and the international community since she was working with the 
Karen Women Organisation. As a single person with no familial 
responsibilities, she can devote her time to political work more than 
typical women.” 28
 Others comment that Zipporah’s gender and rich experiences at 
the grass-roots level helped improve the image of the KNU among 
the Burmese opposition movement as well as the international com-
munity. Ehna, the head of the KNU Dawei District Information 
Department and the editor of Kwekalu, said:
…  the perception of women needing to be involved in the political 
movement is infl uenced by outsiders. Th e promotion of women’s 
rights is very popular these days. People will applaud and show 
their admiration for an organisation that appoints a higher propor-
tion of women in leadership positions. Th e KNU leadership added 
an additional constitutional amendment to establish a quota for 
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women’s participation at every level of political leadership.…  Since 
Zipporah was elected as KNU general secretary, the KNU’s image 
has become good again, and the Western media really likes that. 
She is a role model for other women, and she can inspire women 
to be aware of and promote their rights.29
Khu Oo Reh also pointed out Zipporah’s positive infl uence on women 
in the resistance movement and her impact on the image of the KNU: 
“She is a guiding star for women who want to be involved in political 
leadership. I’m really proud of her  …  I also think that the KNU will 
get more support and recognition from the international community 
and from ethnic and democracy groups for being open-minded and 
giving women opportunities to become a leader.” Zipporah speaks 
English and communicates well with the outside world, and she is 
the founder of the Women’s League for Burma, which has brought 
together women of diff erent ethnic groups. Her good relations with 
other ethnic groups in the resistance movement and her ability to 
communicate with foreign media and NGOs may have put her in a 
good position and made her a preferred candidate to serve the KNU 
now that its international links are so important for funding and 
diplomatic strategy.
Gender and Politics
It is diffi  cult to generalise about gender relationships in Burma, as 
they vary across generational, cultural and religious groups and within 
individual households. Buddhism (the religion practised by the major-
ity of Burmese) prescribes a superior status for men and states that a 
person can attain enlightenment or become a Buddha only aft er going 
through the life cycle as a man.30  Although Christianity (mainly the 
Baptist Church) in Burma does not practise institutional discrimina-
tion against women leaders, there have so far been only a handful of 
ordained women ministers. Legal practices in Burma recognize equal 
inheritance between sons and daughters, but the Burmese government 
has exercised various forms of gender discrimination in higher educa-
tion by setting a higher bar against women candidates for professional 
schools such as medicine and engineering. Women still occupy a 
minute proportion of high-level government and professional posi-
tions, and a greater degree of respect has continued to be accorded to 
men as heads of household in the majority of Burmese families.
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 Zipporah off ered an explanation for the existing political apathy 
among Karen women:
Th e majority of Karen women grew up in a society where politics 
is not openly discussed. Even in village-level meetings, women 
don’t really get a chance to speak out. Th ose who attend commu-
nity meetings are oft en husbands. Th ere is also a popular Karen 
maxim that discourages women from participating and engaging 
in political organisations. Consequently, women in our community 
have less interest in politics.
 Th ose who live in rural areas and refugee camps always have 
to focus and think about their survival, so that stops them from 
getting involved in politics. When both wives and husbands work 
for the opposition movement it becomes diffi  cult for the family to 
fulfi l their basic needs. So it is diffi  cult for a woman to be an active 
nationalist. Male politicians in the movement today don’t need to 
think about that because they know that their wife will take full 
responsibility for the family. If we look back in Karen history, most 
politicians including my father are supported by their wives. I 
believe that women would do equally well in politics if they were 
encouraged and supported by their husbands. I have a colleague in 
KWO who got full support from her husband. She travelled regu-
larly for her work, and left  her child with her husband. Th is kind 
of practice is growing in the Karen community, but it is still rare. 
For example, men can listen to the radio every morning but most 
women can’t do that because they have to prepare food early in the 
morning and do other stuff  for their family, so they miss listening 
to news. It will be easier for young women to work in politics 
because they are free to make a decision and set goals.
Zipporah’s active involvement in social and political fi elds is helped by 
the fact that she has never married. Following the death of her fi ancé 
during a military operation, she vowed to remain single to honour his 
legacy. Zipporah also acknowledges the diff erent ways Karen women 
have contributed to the nationalist struggle:
Throughout the history of the Karen armed revolution, many 
women have been directly and indirectly involved in the struggle 
for freedom and self-determination. Women try to hold the family 
together while their husbands are supporting the movement as 
soldiers. Th ere are so many women who are actively involved in 
the education sector by inspiring young people to love their people 
and become Karen nationalists. Th ere are also women who work 
in the health, transportation and communication sectors, carrying 
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and delivering messages. In the past, a lot of women were involved 
in military operations and some even became offi  cers and colonels. 
In addition, Karen women demonstrate strong interest in the com-
munity and social work.
Padoh Lah Say, a KNU offi  cial, also pointed out the crucial role of his 
wife, which enabled him to participate in armed revolution:
When I was elected to work in the Karen education department, 
the KNU could not fi nancially support me. However, my wife 
raised pigs and chickens and sold them for money, which she used 
to support my work. I can travel and work with the money she 
saved for me. So in this way, she is supporting the Karen move-
ment as well. If a Karen woman says she loves her people and 
wants to work for them, even if she is not actively involved in the 
movement, she can stay home and support her husband, which can 
be counted as a way of working for her people.31 
Zipporah, however, felt genuinely disadvantaged by her gender in her 
workplace, and expressed her frustration as a female general secretary:
Th ere are some male colleagues who hold the traditional views that 
women are not as competent as men, which really undermined 
my confi dence. I felt like if I were a man I would be treated dif-
ferently, with more respect. Most of the people who came and con-
gratulated me on the day I was elected were women. A few male 
leaders came and congratulated me, but almost all of them just 
passed by without saying a word. I was very upset. Is that male 
culture that they don’t know how to compliment women?
Zipporah said the use of a secret ballot during the election for the 
general secretary prevented her from identifying her supporters, but 
she seemed quite sure that most of the people currently working with 
her in a high position did not vote for her. Th e fact that another can-
didate came very close to winning the position also explains her lack 
of popularity among some segments within the KNU leadership.
I oft en feel the superior attitudes held by some of my male col-
leagues even though they would not openly express their opinion. 
Th ey demonstrated signs of unwillingness to work with me, or 
deliberately remained silent when I talked, raised and presented 
issues during our meetings. I don’t feel good about this, but I can’t 
do anything about it; all I can do is express my feelings. Some-
times male Karen leaders say that men and women have equal 
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opportunities and equal rights, but based on my experience, some 
still don’t want to agree and accept female leadership.
 I despair sometimes. But I don’t want to give up because this is 
a duty and responsibility that I couldn’t stop doing. I always think 
that I’m working for all Karen people. Of course I know that every-
thing I do won’t be perfect, but I have a motto that if people give 
me a duty, I will do my best. Sometimes when I’m feeling down, I 
pray to God to give me strength, intelligence to make good deci-
sions. I also keep my own diary to write when I’m feeling upset. 
Fortunately, there are some people who understand me, respect me 
and try to work closely with me.…  Because I have confi dence and 
believe in myself, I can overcome whatever problem I encounter.
While gender may be an important factor in infl uencing the negative 
perception of Zipporah’s male colleagues in the KNU, other factors, 
such as her lack of experience in politics and disagreement over her 
political orientation among the committee members, could also con-
tribute to the prevailing animosity towards her leadership. She 
encounters great resistance against her position from some segments 
within the KNU leadership who do not share her vision.
Zipporah’s Political Vision
As the general secretary of the KNU, Zipporah has the daily duties 
of addressing reports from the frontlines, responding to requests for 
information, fi nance and training, hosting members of allied resistance 
movements and journalists, attending meetings, and coordinating 
plans and urgent tasks. Unlike her predecessors and other KNU top 
leaders, she did not have any fi rst-hand experience or involvement in 
KNU military operations. Zipporah has never fi red a gun in her life, 
and would not give orders or suggestions related to KNU military 
operations. Professing her belief in non-violence, she nevertheless 
defends the Karens’ armed struggle as a mechanism for self-defence 
against authoritarian rule, while admitting the importance of other 
political and peaceful means of struggle. She interprets Karen nation-
alism as follows:
I don’t really think of myself as a nationalist who focuses on the 
interests of my community at the exclusion and expense of other 
communities. I believe in equal treatment of all ethnic groups, 
including Burman. As a Karen, I respect my culture and traditions. 
I also want people to respect my culture and traditions. At the 
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same time, I also respect other people’s cultures and traditions. 
I don’t want Karen people to disappear one day. Th ere are a few 
traditions and cultural practices that are not good to practise 
nowadays, and they should be discarded, but many good cultural 
practices should be maintained. Of course dominant groups have 
oppressed us for so many years, and their culture infl uenced some 
of our Karen people as well. When I talk about culture, I don’t only 
mean clothing, music, literature, etc.  …  but values like honesty, 
sharing and hospitality, which should be maintained. Th is is a 
unique culture, but it has nearly disappeared. For example, in rural 
areas and refugee camps, people are losing the culture of hospitality 
because of continuing repression and hardship. Before, if you went 
to a Karen village, you’d be given food, but now it has become 
rare. I don’t want this to become something that only exists on 
paper or in the national anthem. Th e main thing I want to see in 
my life is seeing my people develop and progress.
Zipporah measures progress for the Karen community through the 
protection of children and empowerment of women, equal rights, and 
the promotion of education, health and culture to improve overall 
living standards at the grass-roots level. She perceives and describes 
her role in the armed resistance movement not as an armed fi ghter 
who leads the battle, but as an educator who is responsible for pro-
moting awareness about the adverse consequences of civil war:
Good soldiers should not only be good at fi ghting, they should also 
have political views and they should make themselves understand 
contemporary politics. I always suggest and initiate the inclusion of 
political awareness training when there is a military training. We 
educate soldiers and offi  cials to make them fully aware of inter-
national law, particularly related to landmines and child soldiers.
She disseminates information and conducts awareness training about 
landmines and child soldiers among Karen National Liberation Army 
soldiers.
Ceasefi re Negotiations with the Burmese Government in 
the Post-2010 Period
A stalemate that characterised the relationship between the KNU and 
the government during the latter years of the SPDC regime came to 
an end when the new government made eff orts to reopen negotiations 
Chap10 (250-275)   269 7/10/13   2:08:49 PM
270 Ardeth Maung Th awnghmung and Violet Cho
aft er 2010. Th e KNU’s army chief of staff  led the fi rst round of cease-
fi re negotiations with the government team in January 2011 in Karen 
State, Burma. Th is was followed in April by a high-profi le second 
round of negotiations where the Karen team was led by Zipporah 
Sein to work out detailed arrangements for the ceasefi re agreement. 
Zipporah recalled her encounter with Burmese government repre-
sentatives as follows:
I was greeted by a crowd of ministers, uniformed military offi  cers, 
and civil servants. I shook their hands, but I stopped smiling when 
I saw uniformed military offi  cers and skipped them. Th eir ap-
pearance brought back so many painful memories to me. Most 
of the ministers I met in fact were former division commanders 
and battalion commanders who fought in major battlefi elds against 
the KNU. And I feel the head of the Burmese negotiation team 
treated me diff erently than he treated my male counterparts in the 
KNU. He seemed to be more at ease, friendlier, and tended to 
share detailed information with my male counterparts. I think we 
have mutual distrust towards one another.
Th e second round of negotiations nonetheless resulted in a tentative 
agreement to establish a code of conduct for soldiers from both sides 
as well as international and local monitoring mechanisms to form 
peace-building groups, to set up liaison offi  ces in various cities inside 
Burma, and to resettle and rehabilitate internally displaced people and 
refugees. Th e talks also covered demining, citizenship, implementation 
of rule of law and “sustainable development”, land issues, and the 
release of all Karen political prisoners. Th e KNU team then travelled 
to the capital and Rangoon to meet with the president and Aung San 
Suu Kyi as well as Karen civil organisations.
 Despite this progress, signifi cant disagreements remain and mutual 
distrust persists. President Th ein Sein, for instance, proposed a three-
step plan that would begin with a ceasefi re truce and ultimately 
bring various armed opposition groups (presumably without having 
to disarm) to participate in the “all inclusive political process” within 
the framework of parliamentary politics to begin building mutual trust 
and confi dence for a long-term political solution. Th e KNU, on the 
other hand, perceives the ceasefi re negotiation as an integral and ini-
tial step towards political dialogue that should take place outside the 
parliament to resolve outstanding issues such as economic opportu-
nities and social equality. Th e KNU also advocates for a nationwide 
ceasefi re, especially an end to hostilities and fi ghting in Kachin State.
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 Zipporah commented:
While I personally welcome the government’s initiative on the 
ceasefi re agreement, I am deeply concerned that their action is 
economically driven. I believe that the government’s motivation to 
end civil war in the country is based on their desire to entice 
foreign investment and to promote economic development in areas 
occupied by ethnic populations. I feel they do not understand 
the roots of ethnic armed struggles nor care about aspirations of 
minority ethnic groups. Th ey seem to neglect the very fact that we 
are struggling for equal rights and opportunity.
Zipporah also commented that they still have to work out detailed 
arrangements on the withdrawal of Burmese military troops from 
areas previously occupied by civilians and villagers who are currently 
internally displaced.
 According to Zipporah, the role of the KNU (perceived by the 
government as an illegal organisation) remains uncertain under the 
current constitution, but it could be transformed into a parliamentary 
political party. Zipporah concluded, “We will seriously consider if our 
people think that the KNU should be a political party representing 
Karen people in Karen State or the entire Karen population in the 
country. If my people want, I am ready to represent Karen and be a 
member of parliament.”
Conclusion
Th e KNU has modifi ed some of its offi  cial policies to respond to the 
changing international and domestic environments and dwindling re-
sources over the 60 years of its existence. For instance, it has soft ened 
its demand for an independent separate Karen State and instead cam-
paigned for an autonomous Karen State within a federal union in 
Burma in a bid to win both international and Burman-majority sup-
port. Th e new government itself has taken a more accommodating 
stance towards armed resistance groups by reopening dialogue with 
the KNU and facilitating preliminary ceasefi re agreements. Out-
standing disagreements have yet to be resolved between the two sides 
in terms of steps to be taken towards national reconciliation.
 Zipporah’s rise to power may have been a combination of her 
gender, her past accomplishments, the broader strategy by the KNU to 
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show that it is pursuing a more peaceful negotiating strategy, and/or 
the result of factional struggle within the organisation which was won 
by those who were close to her. However, she has brought along her 
unique experiences to the KNU and redefi ned the means of pursuing 
Karen liberation. She may be perceived as part of the conservative 
and establishment force within the KNU, but she has continued to 
wage other equally important battles that are not necessarily defi ned 
in militaristic and militant terms. Th e KNU defi nitely is at an impor-
tant crossroad where it will need to continuously redefi ne its role 
and strategies to position itself as a legitimate body representing the 
majority Karen populations in the new and evolving political land-
scape in Burma.
Postscript
At the KNU congress in December 2012, Zipporah Sein was elected 
vice-chairperson. It is debatable whether this means increased power 
for her in the organisation. Saw Kwe Htoo Win, a well-known 
“moderate” member of the KNU leadership, replaced her as general 
secretary, while General Saw Mutu Sae Poe, the KNU’s commander-
in-chief, replaced Zipporah’s father, Tamalar Baw, who retired as 
chairman of the organisation. As of early 2013, the KNU continued 
its ceasefi re negotiations with the Burmese government.
Notes
1. In 1989 the military junta replaced the existing English names for 
the country and its divisions, townships, cities, streets, citizens and 
ethnic groups with what it considered to be more authentic Burmese 
names. Th us, “Burma” became “Myanmar” and its citizens “Myanmars”; 
“Rangoon” became “Yangon”; and ethnic groups such as the Karen were 
renamed “Kayin”. Th e choice to use the old or new names has become 
one method of indicating one’s political stance towards the Burmese 
junta. We use the pre-1989 terms to avoid confusion, as these terms are 
commonly used in English-language publications, including the books, 
 journals and other sources cited in this study.
2. Th e four principles of Ba U Gyi are as follows: (1) Surrender is out of 
the question; (2) Th e recognition of the Karen State must be completed; 
(3) We shall retain our arms; (4) We shall decide our own political 
 destiny.
Chap10 (250-275)   272 7/10/13   2:08:50 PM
 Karen Nationalism and Armed Struggle 273
3. See, for example, Ardeth Th awnghmung, Th e “Other” Karen in Myanmar: 
Ethnic Minorities and the Struggle without Arms (Lanham: Lexington 
 Books, 2012).
4. Central Intelligence Agency, Th e World Factbook: Burma, 2011, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html, ac-
 cessed 6 May 2011.
5. Ardeth Maung Th awnghmung, Th e Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse 
Voices, Uncertain Ends, Policy Studies 46 (Southeast Asia) (Washington, 
DC: East-West Center, 2008), 3. Zipporah Sein commented that at-
 tendees of the Karen Unity Seminar, an annual gathering of key Karen 
groups, estimated the Karen population in 2011 to be between 8 million 
and 10 million (Zipporah Sein 2011, personal correspondence). 
6. Ibid.
7. Karen National Union, History of the Karens and the KNU, n.d., 
http://www.karen.org/knu/KNU_His.htm, accessed 15 Mar. 2009; Harry 
Marshall, “Th e Karens: An Element in the Melting Pot of Burma”, Th e 
 Southern Workman 56 (1927): 26–33.
8. John F. Cady, A Modern History of Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1958).
9. Andrew Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945”, Modern 
Asian Studies 20, 3 (1986): 491; Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and 
the Politics of Ethnicity (Bangkok: White Lotus; Dhaka: University Press; 
 London and New York: Zed Books, 1999), p. 82; Dorothy Guyot, 
“Communal Confl ict in the Burma Delta”, in Southeast Asian Transitions: 
Approaches through Social History, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven and 
 London: Yale University Press, 1978).
10. Th awnghmung, Karen Revolution, pp. 6–7; Josef Silverstein, Burmese 
Politics: Th e Dilemma of National Unity (New Brunswick: Rutgers Uni-
 versity Press, 1980), p. 115.
11. Th akin Tin Mya, Fascist Taw Lan Yay Ta Na Chot Nhin Taing Seh Taing 
[Th e Headquarters and Ten Divisions of the Fascist Resistance] (Yangon: 
Kyu Pyoh Sa Pay, 1968), pp. 17–8.
12. Th awnghmung, Karen Revolution, pp. 5–6.
13. Smith, Burma, p. 82.
14. Michael Charney, A History of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp. 84–6.
15. Smith, Burma, pp. 258–9.
16. Martin Smith, State of Strife: Th e Dynamics of Ethnic Confl ict in Burma, 
Policy Studies 36 (Southeast Asia) (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 
2007), p. 37.
17. Maung Aung Myoe, Neither Friend Nor Foe: Myanmar’s Relations with 
Th ailand since 1988: A View from Yangon, IDSS Monograph No. 1, 
 Singapore, 2002.
Chap10 (250-275)   273 7/10/13   2:08:50 PM
274 Ardeth Maung Th awnghmung and Violet Cho
18. For an assessment of the ceasefi re process and conditions in ceasefi re 
areas, see Zaw Oo and Win Min, Assessing Burma’s Ceasefi re Accords 
(Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007); and Mary Callahan, Political 
Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation and 
Coexistence, Policy Studies 31 (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2007).
19. Th awnghmung, Karen Revolution, p. 30.
20. Ashley South, “Governance and Legitimacy in Karen State”, in Ruling 
Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to General Elections, ed. N. Cheeseman 
et al. (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010), pp. 63–89.
21. Smith, State of Strife, p. 48.
22. All interviews with Zipporah Sein were conducted between 15 and 30 
May 2010 by Violet Cho via Skype. Cho was in Melbourne, Australia, and 
Zipporah Sein was in an undisclosed location in the Burma borderlands.
23. Interview with Padoh Lah Say conducted by Violet Cho by telephone 
on 12 August 2010. Cho was in Canberra, and Padoh Lah Say was in an 
undisclosed location in the Burma borderlands. 
24. Martin Smith, “Burma: Th e Karen Confl ict”, in Encyclopedia of Modern 
Ethnic Confl icts, ed. J.R. Rudolph Jr (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003), 
p. 20.
25. Interview with Padoh Mahn Shah by Ardeth Maung Th awnghmung, 
 Mae Sot, Th ailand, 2006.
26. Th e KNU organised itself into seven administrative districts (Th aton, 
Toungoo, Nyaunglaybin, Mergui-Tavoy, Papun, Dooplaya and Pa-an), 
which were further sub-divided into townships and tracts. Each of the 
districts administered by the civilian wings of armed resistance groups 
was also controlled by a corresponding brigade, a parallel military for-
 mation of the KNLA (Karen National Liberation Army). Th e KNU 
constitution stipulates that only offi  cial representatives from all seven 
districts and general headquarters (both administrative and military) 
can vote. Offi  cial delegates from the KNU district and KNLA brigades 
who attend the KNU congress nominate and vote for KNU’s central 
committee members. Th e 35 candidates who receive the most votes form 
the central committee, with the next fi ve becoming alternate members. 
Th e central committee members then vote for an executive committee 
(11 members), which in turn decides within itself by secret ballot the 
fi ve main positions: chairman, vice-chairman, general secretary and two 
 joint secretaries.
27. Th is criticism also comes from some low-ranking, district-level KNU 
offi  cials who have had tensions with the central KNU leadership. Some 
KNU district leaders perceive Zipporah’s father as authoritarian and a 
hardliner.
Chap10 (250-275)   274 7/10/13   2:08:51 PM
 Karen Nationalism and Armed Struggle 275
28. Interview with Khu Oo Reh conducted by Violet Cho by telephone on 
8 August 2010. Cho was in Canberra, Australia, and Khu Oo Reh was 
 in an undisclosed location in the Burma borderlands.
29. Interviews with Ehna were conducted by Violet Cho by telephone on 
10 August 2010. Cho was in Canberra, Australia, and Ehna was in an 
undisclosed location in the Burma borderlands.
30. Melford Spiro, Gender Ideology and Psychological Reality (New Haven: 
 Yale University Press, 1997).
31. Interview with Padoh Lah Say by Violet Cho, 2010.







This book examines individual women’s experiences in nationalist struggles in Southeast Asia. A sceptical reader may wonder about 
the value of taking a biographical rather than a broader historical 
approach. Does it achieve anything more than just adding women into 
the equation? How can examining the life stories of individual women 
constitute a step towards a better knowledge of women’s involvement 
in nationalist movements? If those women we study represent the 
exceptions rather than the rule, how can the biographical approach go 
beyond focusing on mere personalities to linking their life stories with 
the social and collective aspects of history?
 Shift s in theoretical concerns and attention to new historical 
questions have led to renewed academic interest in biography and to 
changing approaches in writing biography.1  Th e biographical approach 
off ers a window into what Roxana Waterson described as “that space 
where history intersects with personal experience”.2  Th ere is a growing 
eff ort “not only to understand the social and political contexts in 
which individuals lived but also to explore in much more detail the 
complex ways in which individuals relate to the worlds they inhabit”.3  
Th is captures the intention of our biographical studies of individual 
women nationalists, within the limits of availability of information. 
Indeed, to look at life stories without the knowledge of their historical 
context impoverishes much of our understanding of their experiences.
 Besides adding to our knowledge regarding women’s role in 
nationalist movements in Southeast Asia, the underlying theoretical 
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concern that inspired this book is to understand their political and 
personal trajectory from the point of view of identity and agency. To 
what extent and how did the ideas and perspectives of these women 
nationalists bear the imprint of the sociocultural context of their time, 
which was at the confl uence of colonialism, patriarchal traditions and 
modern4  ideals of national and personal emancipation? Despite being 
“products” of their eras and being women, how did they overcome 
the odds to push for new norms and practices and challenge existing 
structures through their sociopolitical involvements?
 Th eoretical discussions on the relations between identity and 
agency, structure and individual autonomy have always stimulated 
engaging debates and lie at the heart of our understanding of social 
change. It could be readily agreed that the identity of a person is 
shaped by the larger social and historical structures, notwithstanding 
the individuality of each person’s life trajectory. How is this shaping 
manifested in the lives of our women nationalists? Conversely, to 
what extent is each of the women free to make her own decisions 
or to rise against structural forces such as colonialism and patriarchy? 
Nowadays it is fashionable to describe identity as fl uid and situational. 
To what extent is the identity of our female protagonists changeable 
or rigidly determined by larger structural forces; and if their identity 
did evolve, how did that happen? Th ese are the theoretical questions 
this short essay attempts to explore based on the preceding life narra-
tives of our 12 heroines.
Historical Structures as Resources and Constraints
Many life events of the women nationalists described in this book 
were shaped by larger social forces, what Waterson described as the 
“intrusion of history”5  into their lives. Various chapters illustrate how 
historical structures “intervened” as a process, in the form of providing 
resources or opportunity on the one hand and imposing social con-
straints on the other. Some of these historical events, such as growing 
up in a war zone, may have had dramatic consequences, while others, 
such as schooling, may seem to readers to be routine life experiences.
 Th e life story of Bisoi from East Timor presents a case of how 
powerful larger structural forces brought her schooling to a premature 
end. Th e eruption of generalised armed confl ict forced her to fl ee into 
the jungle and drew her into a Falintil squad in the footsteps of her 
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uncle. In Laos, the impacts of the international and national socio-
historical processes in the shadow of the Cold War were heavily con-
sequential on the lives of highlanders such as Manivanh and Khamla. 
Laos during the 1950s and 1960s was embroiled in civil war, a victim 
of violent attempts by various international forces to infl uence the 
outcome of the political future of the country. Manivanh and Khamla 
decided that joining the Pathet Lao, which seemed to promise a better 
life through education, presented the best option to them.
 Similarly, the life trajectory of Zipporah Sein simply cannot be 
understood without referring to the Karen people’s historical struggle 
for autonomy from the Burmese state. More tragically, Zipporah recalls 
that she does not even have a place to call home, due to the nomadic 
life her family led fi ghting against the Burmese state. Her pursuit of 
higher education was blocked due to the problem of getting recogni-
tion from hostile state institutions of her schooling qualifi cation ob-
tained in the Karen-controlled area.
 Anticipation of the eruption of an international confl ict, in the 
shape of World War II, also led to the interruption of the education 
of Shamsiah Fakeh in Sumatra. Her return to Malaya led to her early 
marriage, which was a common practice then. As a consequence, she 
was not able to complete her high school education. Aishah Ghani 
would have suff ered the same fate of being married off  in her early 
teens, if not for the vehement opposition she staged, including a 
few days of hunger strike. She found an ally in the person of her 
Sumatran brother-in-law who was infl uenced by modernist Islamic 
thinking: he managed to persuade her parents of the importance of 
educating girls.
 Historical structure also operated in the form of class relations. 
In the Philippines, historical confl icts between the landless and the 
landowners were carried over into the struggle for political indepen-
dence, as illustrated by the struggle of Salud Algabre and her Sakdal 
peasant movement. Landlords maintained their grip on political power 
and were unsympathetic towards the eff orts of peasants to fi ght for 
their welfare and improve their livelihood via anti-colonial struggle. 
Th e social position of the landlord class in Philippine society provided 
resources for this group’s political dominance before and aft er inde-
pendence. Th e impoverishment of Salud’s initially landowning family 
bears witness to the exploitative impact of the larger socio-economic 
forces of the land tenure problem, leading to Salud’s integration into 
the Sakdal peasant movement.
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 In many of the chapters, the education system represents an 
important institution of cultural reproduction, which may be part and 
parcel of the colonial project, or a creation of an indigenous socio-
political movement, such as the case of the Th awalib school system in 
Sumatra based on a modernist understanding of Islam. Dissatisfaction 
with colonial education also led to the emergence of the “national 
education movement” in Burma, which emphasised Burmese language 
and literature as the rallying point for Burmese nationalism.
 From the outset, the choice of the type of education experienced 
by our protagonists was oft en, though not always, a refl ection of the 
socio-economic background and outlook of their parents and family, 
and constituted an important baseline in determining the subsequent 
life trajectory of these women. Th ere is also the empowering dimen-
sion of having an educational qualifi cation as a form of symbolic 
capital. Aishah Ghani from Malaya, who studied initially in Malay and 
Arabic, was unusual in her determination to further her studies in 
the English medium, which aff orded her greater sociopolitical mobi-
lity. In the same light, the well-regarded Dutch education of Suyatin 
Kartowiyono diff erentiated her social position from that of Rasuna 
Said, who was a product of the Islamic reformist schooling system. 
Accordingly, it seems logical that Suyatin developed a secular political 
outlook while Rasuna inclined towards the Islamist groups.
 Under Independent Daw San’s pen, the Buddhist parents of the 
main character in her novel Khin Aye Kyi debated whether to send 
their child to the American Baptist mission school, and situated the 
debate at the level of the importance of female education to the na-
tionalist struggle. Daw San no doubt appreciated the empowerment 
she gained through her Western education, herself belonging to the 
early generation of Burmese women who benefi ted from its expansion, 
eclipsing the role of Buddhist monastic schools. Th is illustrates the 
contradictory impact of colonisation, which may well favour one 
particular social group over another, be it based on gender, ethnicity, 
religion or class. More oft en than not, colonial education has historic-
ally been responsible for the emergence of the male political elites 
who became the leaders of the anti-colonial movement, while the fi rst 
generation of educated women became the catalyst for the emancipa-
tion of women. In eff ect, without the expansion of female education 
during the colonial era, most of the women we studied would not 
have become teachers, writers, journalists and activists, taking the 
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roles in nationalist movements that they did, except perhaps for Bisoi, 
Manivanh and Khamla, who lacked such educational advantages.
Nationalist Movements as Sites of (Re)Production of 
Cultural Forms
Th e previous section discussed how historical structures and processes 
intruded into our individual protagonists’ lives, shaping their life tra-
jectories, but also how the protagonists were the product of socialisa-
tion of their respective families and educational systems. Th is implies 
that they saw the world through the lenses of their parents, teachers, 
peers or signifi cant others, appropriating and applying the existing 
norms, concepts, categories, idioms and practices that they were ex-
posed to, what we may call “cultural forms”.6  Cultural forms are the 
medium through which we meaningfully carry out our daily activities 
and, through the process of doing so, become who we are and assume 
our identity.
 We have read that Bisoi acquired her critical gender awareness 
as well as anti-colonial perspective from the nationalist movement 
she joined. In her autobiography, Shamsiah also credited the Malay 
Nationalist Party for her initiation to anti-colonialism, and traced the 
origins of her awareness of women’s oppression to nationalist struggle. 
Just as family and school could be important vehicles of identity 
formation, the nationalist movement provided a social milieu where 
alternative ways of thinking that challenged the status quo were arti-
culated, affi  rmed and propagated. In order for this social milieu to 
develop, appropriate cultural forms such as alternative political dis-
course and social practices needed to be developed and disseminated.
 As a journalist and prolifi c writer of nationalist (and feminist) 
writings, Burmese Daw San played an active role in the creation of 
literary medium and public discourse (one type of cultural form) to 
interpret and infl uence popular thinking on what constituted the 
“protection of the interests of the nation” as well as the “woman ques-
tion”. Her fi rst major publication, Khin Aye Kyi, was a pioneering eff ort 
to articulate a feminine model of the Burmese patriot. Refl ecting the 
larger Burmese nationalist thinking of her time, she linked the survival 
of the Burmese nation to the revival and propagation of Buddha’s 
teachings and Burmese language and literature. As was common in 
anti-colonial movements, Burmese traditional culture, language and 
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religion served as a powerful mobilising force to demarcate the 
boundary with the “enemy” colonialists, who were Christian and 
English-speaking.
 Nationalist movements did not invent their ideology and prac-
tices from scratch. Th e mode of organisation of the Viet Nam Quôc 
Dan Dang (VNQDD) is said to resemble Communist organisations, 
adopted through mimicking the Chinese nationalist party, Guomin-
dang, which at one point received strategic advice from Soviet Union 
advisers. VNQDD began by establishing study groups and a bookshop, 
which eff ectively were means to spread their anti-colonial ideas. 
Modelled aft er the Guomindang, VNQDD leaders  —  unsurprisingly  — 
derived their revolutionary inspiration from Sun Yat Sen and the 1911 
Revolution in China. Th e VNQDD leader Nguyen Th ai Hoc even 
drew a strategic comparison between the Vietnamese sociopolitical 
situation in 1929 and that of the 1911 Chinese Revolution in deter-
mining or justifying that the time was right to prepare for the general 
insurrection.
 Th e case of the Philippine Independent Church, which united 
the Sakdalistas, is a good example of the transformative evolution of 
religious practices from the traditional Catholic Church. Its attraction 
to the masses was attributed to the similarity of its liturgy to the 
Catholic faith, minus the institutional control and link with Rome. 
Salud’s home became a regular meeting place of the movement, where 
Mass was celebrated in the morning followed by prolonged political 
discussions. Salud described it as “exciting”: “Religion in the morning 
and politics all day.”
 According to Salud, the Sakdalistas believed that independence, 
“as the United States had promised”, was part of the answer to the 
plight of the peasants: that independence would render “the people” 
powerful and free, while the leaders would “cease to be powerful”. Her 
perspective indicates that the Sakdalistas integrated the concept of 
democracy and nationalism as professed by the Americans themselves. 
In eff ect, Salud credited her American elementary education, which 
taught civics lessons for citizenship training, as contributing to her 
sense of patriotism and civic consciousness. In other words, nation-
alists have at their disposal not only those cultural forms derived from 
their local tradition and religion, but also those off ered by other socie-
ties and cultures.
 In the chapter on Rasuna Said, the Sumatran Th awalib school 
system and the Diniyah Putri School are fruits of the endeavour by a 
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social movement to popularise new cultural forms, that is, to promote 
alternative ways of understanding and practising Islam. Th ey emerged 
out of the attempts by young Islamic scholars to revitalise and mod-
ernise Islamic practice in the face of what was perceived as Christian 
colonialism at the beginning of the 20th century. Th ey derived their 
inspiration from the Islamic modernist school of thought in the 
Middle East and were vehemently resisted by local traditionalists. Th e 
Th awalib and Diniyah schools also integrated selective organisational 
aspects of the Western schooling system, such as the introduction 
of secular subjects, graded classes, the use of textbooks, and more 
modern methods of teaching and curriculum. Refl ective of Marxist 
infl uence, the methods of Th awalib schools encouraged students to 
analyse their social and political circumstances. Th ere was also inno-
vative thinking with regard to the importance of female literacy. Th e 
Islamic reformist movement argued that women were entitled to reli-
gious education in order to pass on their faith to other women and 
their children, and by virtue of the fact that they were answerable to 
God, just like men.
 Th e Sumatran Islamic school reform represents a historical case 
of “localisation”,7  whereby outside ideas were progressively and eclec-
tically integrated into educational institutions and successfully brought 
about signifi cant social changes. Th e Th awalib school was instru-
mental in shaping a generation of religiously educated leaders who 
formed Permi, one of the nationalist organisations Rasuna joined. 
Th ese reformist schools became the crucible of identity formation not 
just for Minangkabau Rasuna Said but also for Shamsiah Fakeh and 
Aishah Ghani from Malaya.
 Th e ultimate case of localisation here, of course, is the idea of 
nation (and of reclaiming sovereignty in the name of the people) by 
nationalist movements. Liah Greenfeld described national identity as 
an empty conceptual framework, providing “an organising principle 
applicable to diff erent materials to which it then grants meaning, 
transforming them thereby into elements of a specifi c identity”.8  Th e 
raw materials used by nationalist leaders were existing symbolic re-
sources such as historical narratives and cultural practices in colonial 
society, as well as collective identities, be it ethnic (Burmese, Karen, 
Malay), territorial (Indonesia), provincial (Timor-Leste), or even social 
class (Sakdal Movement). Th ey bore the imprint of prior layers of 
localisation of outside ideas and norms that were then regarded as 
an integral part of local social practices and “indigenous” tradition. 
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Nationalism thrives on historical nostalgia and the impulse to restore 
precolonial order, but the truth is that colonialism participated intri-
cately in the very creation and formation of the nation.
 As a territorial and political entity, the form of nation-states that 
nationalist movements in the various chapters envisaged owed much to 
the boundaries and social divisions carved out by colonialists. In the 
chapter on the Javanese Suyatin, it was suggested how revolutionary 
the idea of an Indonesian nation was, to unite the hundreds of dis-
parate islands of the archipelago whose only point in common was 
Dutch colonialism. Suyatin stated that she was attracted to the idea as 
a means “to fi ght the Dutch”. Ideas of nationalism among those Dutch-
educated youth were picked up through their reading, from nationalist 
leaders who returned from their higher education in the Netherlands, 
as well as through the infl uence of nationalist movements.
 We have also noted in the preceding paragraphs how nationalist 
movements, in their articulation of the idea of a nation, made innova-
tive use of existing cultural forms, at times giving them new meanings, 
in their attempts to forge a collective sense of belonging and to mobi-
lise the common people behind their nationalist struggle. Vatthana 
Pholsena in her chapter on Laos explained how the historical legacy 
of resistance to external control by highlanders was exploited by 
Communist propagandists to rally popular support among the former 
for the anti-colonial cause of the latter.
 Th e outcome of the shape and content of a national identity is 
the fruit of negotiation with historical identities.9  In eff ect, at the for-
mation of new nation-states, historically existent social structures and 
divisions could also maintain some form of colonial continuity  —  as 
clearly illustrated in the case study of the Philippines and Malaysia  — 
provided that the dominant social group was on the winner’s side of 
history. Hence at independence, traditional norms and colonial prac-
tices were rarely evacuated of their infl uence once and for all, while 
the cultural and political transformation brought about by the process 
of localisation of the ideals of nation-states set off  new powerful dyna-
mics that might coexist, or at a later time come into contradiction, 
with “old” customs and practices.
Identity Formation as Social Practice and Process 10 
Th e life story of Lily Eberwein in Sarawak presents a striking case of 
how identity formation is not given once and for all, but developed as 
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a social process whereby the changing cultural environment can bring 
about a radical personal transformation. Born Eurasian, and the reci-
pient of an English-medium education, Eberwein became completely 
identifi ed with the Malay ethnicity, despite her Eurasian complexion 
and name. Th e death of her Christian father in her early teens brought 
an end to her European lifestyle in Singapore. Following her Malay 
mother back from urbanised Singapore to a rural Malay social milieu 
in Sarawak plunged her into a completely alien cultural environment. 
We are told that young Eberwein had a hard time switching from 
being served by men servants to serving her uncles. But her mother 
was her window to the new social context, helping her to adjust and 
adopt new cultural practices and norms and to gain social acceptance. 
Eberwein embraced Islam soon aft er her return to Sarawak, adopting 
Malay etiquette and attire. Her appointment to head the Malay section 
of the women’s group during the Japanese occupation is indicative 
of the general social acceptance of her Malay identity. Her intimate 
involvement with the predominantly Malay anti-cession movement 
could also be interpreted as her complete identifi cation with the Malay 
ethnic group’s perspective and interests in Sarawak. Eberwein’s assimi-
lation as a Malay woman, however, represents an unusual and extreme 
case of identity change. Inadequacy of information does not allow us 
to go very far in our understanding of Eberwein’s identity transforma-
tion process, in particular the operation of agency on her part.
 On the other hand, we can clearly see the exercise of agency in 
the case of Aishah Ghani in British Malaya. Her strong resistance to 
early marriage was crucial in opening up other life chances, such as 
enabling her to acquire higher educational qualifi cations and be ex-
posed to political initiation and participation. Her choice to switch to 
a diff erent strand of nationalist group eff ectively constituted a turning 
point in the development of her political identity.
 Nonetheless, agency never worked in a straightforward way. In 
many cases, the initial motivation of the protagonists examined in 
various chapters to get involved was not even political in nature. We 
spoke about the more dramatic “intrusion” of historical process in the 
form of war and crisis into some of the protagonists’ lives; for others 
it was a spontaneous response to a mundane opportunity, such as an 
employment off er at the Malay Nationalist Party offi  ce in the case of 
Aishah. Manivanh, the Laotian revolutionary cadre, explained clearly 
that she fi rst decided to join the guerrilla forces because she wanted 
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to study. Th e “hatred” and anger against the imperialist forces de-
veloped only later, aft er she joined the movement. Her revolutionary, 
anti-colonial identity developed over time, as the product of a social 
process of participation in the movement.
 In the case of East Timorese Bisoi, we saw evidence of her dis-
tancing herself from the social norms in which she was brought up. 
When Bisoi stated in an interview that she perceived the source of 
gender inequality in East Timor as “from our ancestors”, that “tradi-
tional customs” dictated how women should behave, she was referring 
to gender norms that were prevalent in her society. Th is was evidence 
of her looking back from a distance at her initial stage of “political 
awakening” aft er joining OPMT, the women’s wing of Fretilin. 
Women’s emancipation constituted one of the founding aims of 
OPMT, and Bisoi embraced the discourse and acquired a critical 
gender consciousness from it.
 Bisoi described how she was criticised by her community and 
her own family for her participation in political activism. She subse-
quently came to a form of compromise with her family, by acting as a 
“normal woman” when she was at home. She won the support of her 
family for her political activities by avoiding the outright rejection of 
the traditional gender position, at the price of leading “separate lives” 
in the respective social realms. Currently, as a married woman and a 
parliamentarian, she continues with this compromise of convenience, 
acting independently in the public realm of politics but submitting 
herself “to the structure of family” and deferring to her husband’s 
wishes in the domestic realm.
 Attentive reading of the various chapters uncovers evidence, for 
Manivanh and Khamla, Aishah and Shamsiah, as well as Bisoi, that 
the identity of these women as anti-colonial fi ghters developed over 
the course of their increased participation in the nationalist move-
ment they joined. Susan Blackburn, in her chapter on Suyatin, notes 
that “becoming a nationalist meant taking on a new identity, identi-
fying with a huge archipelago rather than just one’s own ethnic group, 
and learning what was for most people an entirely new language”.
 It was perhaps not a coincidence that the fi rst responsibility as-
signed to many of the women when joining the nationalist movement 
was the role of “propagandist”. To be successful propagandists, they 
had to be convinced of the aims and perspective of their nationalist 
struggle before they could persuade others to join or mobilise popular 
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support. Th e more they did so, the more they themselves internalised 
the movement’s perspective and identifi ed with the movement. On 
the other hand, in order to stamp out the development of a “counter-
revolutionary” perspective, armed nationalist movements facing high 
security risks also imposed heavy sanctions to punish those members 
construed to have committed acts of betrayal, as we have seen in the 
case of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD).
 If we understand identity formation as a dynamic and inter-
subjective process of practice, the role of nationalist movements as a 
site of reproduction and reinforcement of the political identity of 
our protagonists should be foregrounded. Th e women nationalists we 
studied in the preceding chapters devoted a signifi cant part of their 
lives, if not the whole of their adult lives, to the nationalist cause. Not 
only did they persist in their commitment to the nationalist struggle, 
most of them displayed bold determination in carrying out their mis-
sions, ready to risk imprisonment or give up their lives for the cause. 
Behind such supreme adherence to the cause, which Craig Calhoun 
described as bordering on “apparent foolishness”, these women per-
ceived their personal integrity and honour in the eyes of their com-
rades to be at stake: the participation of these persons in the course 
of action “has over time committed one to an identity that would be 
irretrievably violated by pulling back from the risk”.11 
Discordance among the Nationalists: Open-endedness of 
the Localisation Process and Identity Formation
Th e chapters on Rasuna Said and Suyatin Kartowiyono help us under-
stand how the anti-Dutch nationalism in the early 20th century, during 
what was referred to as “the age of pergerakan (movement)”, was far 
from monolithic, even contradictory. Not only were there multiple 
strands of competing and overlapping ideologies, purported “nation”-
wide organisations such as Muhammadiyah and PSII-manifested varia-
tions when transplanted from Java to Sumatra. Th is illustrates how the 
idea of “nation”, when appropriated by a local society, may generate 
a whole spectrum of diff erent articulations and interpretations, based 
on the specifi city of local groups and the social processes they were 
involved in. Th e expulsion of Rachmany from the Indonesian Com-
munist Party in Sumatra, the formation of Permi following the tension 
within Muhammadiyah, the controversies over the public role of 
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Muslim women, and responses to the controversial Marriage Ordi-
nance tabled by the Dutch authorities are some examples of tension 
arising from such diff erences.
 Th e political trajectory of Rasuna herself exemplifi es an eclectic 
integration of political ideas from a variety of ideological sources, 
combining Islamic modernism, nationalism and socialism. Her public 
statements during her famous trial in 1932 reveal her creative combi-
nation of anti-colonialism and Islam, arguing that her nationalist 
party’s struggle for a free nation was sanctioned by Islam and hence 
even if it was unsuccessful, “paradise still awaits”. Her perspective 
against the 1937 Marriage Ordinance in defence of Islamic marriage 
laws, including provisions for polygamy and divorce which disadvan-
taged Muslim wives, put her in the camp of the Islamic women’s 
movement and set her apart from the secular women’s movement. 
(However, in subsequent years, Rasuna apparently became more 
closely associated with organisations with left -wing orientations as 
well as the secular women’s organisation Perwari). Secular women’s 
movements had been seeking marriage law reform and rejected the 
ordinance only because they saw it as a colonial device to drive a 
wedge between the Islamists and others, as noted by Susan Blackburn 
in her chapter. As a matter of fact, the success of the nationalist strug-
gle depends on the eff ectiveness of bringing together diff erent strands 
of nationalist groups under a common anti-colonial front or even 
suppressing brutally those whom others judge as “inadmissible”, failing 
which the deep hostility of ideologically incompatible groups may be-
come its gravest obstacle. Hence the battle line of confl icts (determi-
nation of who the enemy was) was more oft en than not multifaceted, 
and generally not as simplistic as just anti-colonial versus colonial.
 In Burma, the historical emergence of the Karen National Union 
and its ongoing struggle against the Burmese state for an autonomous 
homeland is testimony to the ambivalent and contested nature of na-
tionalist struggle. Despite helping Burma gain its independence from 
the British, the Burmese nationalist movement was not able to hold 
together competing, even incompatible, ideological and ethnic factions, 
and this led to prolonged armed confl icts that still continue today.
 In the Philippines, at the heart of the struggle of the Sakdal 
peasant uprising was the sense of despair among landless peasants 
that their plight was overlooked by the dominant bourgeois nationalist 
movement led by Manuel Quezon, who negotiated with the American 
colonialists for independence. At times, it is even deemed desirable to 
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collaborate with one colonising power against another. Th e strategic 
collaboration of Salud and her group with the Japanese during World 
War II, just as Rasuna’s in Hahanokai and the political struggle of Lily 
Eberwein for the retention of White Rajah dynastic rule against the 
British takeover, manifested the ambivalent nature of ascertaining the 
“colonial enemy”.
 In Malaysia, due to the hegemonic and continued dominance of 
political power of UMNO in the federal government since indepen-
dence, the historical recognition of the anti-colonial role played by 
the Malay Nationalist Party and, to a greater extent, the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP), remains hotly contested. Th e Malaysian 
offi  cial historical narrative regarded UMNO leaders as nationalists, 
while the MCP leaders were labelled simply as “terrorists”. History 
textbooks even make allusions to the MCP as a potential “coloniser”.12  
Th is continues to fashion offi  cial and popular perceptions of Shamsiah 
Fakeh and Aishah Ghani. Offi  cial historians and MCP fi ghters clearly 
do not share the same view of the role of the latter, and MCP leaders 
in turn claimed that Malaya did not attain real independence as the 
British continued to maintain their military presence aft er indepen-
dence. Th e dispute was over the very meaning of “what was going 
on”.13  Th is complexity of nationalist struggles on the ground is not 
unique to Malaysia, and cannot always be captured simply by drawing 
a clear line between a pre-categorised “oppressor” and “oppressed”, as 
at times those who fi ght against a common oppressor may not see eye 
to eye with  —  or even acknowledge  —  one another.
 Th e divergence of the political orientation of some of our prota-
gonists appears to confi rm Ranchod and Tétreault’s statement that 
“there is no single ‘woman’s view’ of the nation”:14  in the contrasting 
ways secular Suyatin and Islamic Rasuna articulated their nationalist 
discourses; the participation of Shamsiah and Aishah in antagonistic-
ally positioned factions of the Malayan nationalist movement; and 
fi nally, the commitment of Burmese Daw San and Karen Zipporah to 
the struggle for diff erent forms of nation.
Th e “Woman Question” and Gendered Experience of 
Nationalist Struggles
Th e ideals of human autonomy, equality and emancipation inspire 
nationalist struggles as well as feminist movements. A number of the 
subjects of this book, such as Daw San, Zipporah, Shamsiah and Suyatin, 
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expressed a strong conviction that the “woman question” went hand 
in hand with the “national question”. In her autobiography, Suyatin 
explained that her parents had inculcated in her a strong sense of 
egalitarianism and passionate opposition to discrimination. She saw 
feminist struggle as “especially stimulated by the spirit of nationalism 
and the sense of justice”. Her keen sense of justice was also consis-
tently applied to her acceptance of people of all faiths and ethnic 
groups. To maintain her autonomy, she made clear that she chose 
a husband who truly respected her socio-political engagement. An 
interesting adaptation of her idea of gender equality was her reversal 
of the local concept of leadership roles in the household and in the 
public sphere: according to her, her husband was the head of the 
household while she was the leader in the public sphere.
 Burmese Daw San also tried to hold together nationalism and 
feminism. In her writings, she stressed that the “protection of the 
interests of the nation” was inextricably linked to the liberation of 
women from inequitable gender relations in society and at home. She 
argued that female education was a crucial yardstick in the assessment 
of the readiness of a people for national self-determination. Th e most 
controversial position she took in gender terms was her declaration 
of personal rejection of married life aft er divorcing her drunkard 
husband, equating marriage with the subjugation and exploitative 
nature of colonisation and wage labour.
 Shamsiah in Malaya, like Bisoi in East Timor, claimed that she 
became conscious of the oppression of women through her participa-
tion in the left ist nationalist movement that critiqued the feudalist, 
capitalist and imperialist systems as sources of women’s oppression. 
She described her negative experience of marriage as an example of 
oppression in the name of traditional customs and religious rules. She 
reasoned that achieving political independence for her homeland con-
stituted the fi rst step towards the liberation of women. On a more 
ambivalent note, Shamsiah experimented briefl y with a polygamous 
marriage arrangement, which she appeared to condone as permissible 
in Islam and justifi ed as being for the furtherance of the nationalist 
cause. Th e struggle against female subordination did not seem to in-
spire all our protagonists in the same way as the nationalist endeavour, 
perhaps due to the selectivity and specifi city of our focus here. A lack 
of sources, particularly in the case of Nguyen Th i Giang of Vietnam, 
did not allow us to ascertain the experiences and perspectives of all 
our protagonists on the women’s situation, nor to discover how they 
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imagined the nation for which they struggled, suff ered and sacrifi ced 
their lives. Some chapters, however, do allow us glimpses into gender 
issues as confronted by these women in their participation in nation-
alist movements.
 Bisoi’s bitter post-independence experience is testimony to how 
her male comrades perceived women’s role in the East Timorese armed 
struggle diff erently from women. Th e male-dominated leadership 
appeared to have decided on the criteria for recognition and compen-
sation of war veterans based solely on masculine experience in the 
armed forces, overlooking the equally crucial though diff erent roles 
played by women soldiers. Th e fact that Bisoi had learned from the 
nationalist movement that independence would bring women’s libera-
tion would have accentuated her disappointment and frustration. Sara 
Niner notes how the “revolutionary” and gender-emancipative agenda 
of the Fretilin was progressively lost in the succession of leaders and 
the challenging eff orts to reorganise and unify various factions of the 
nationalist movement.
 Given that the gender orientation of the nationalist movements 
involved was not examined in all the chapters, we are not in a posi-
tion to discuss in depth or verify Kumari Jayawardena’s contention 
that “revolutionary” nationalist movements were more receptive to 
the feminist agenda than “bourgeois” nationalist movements.15  Th e 
East Timorese case nonetheless illustrates the practical diffi  culty of 
categorising nationalist movements as “revolutionary” or “bourgeois”. 
It shows how a movement’s ideology may evolve over time and ac-
cording to historical circumstances, especially if a longer time frame 
is involved.
 Contrary to the metamorphosis experienced by the Fretilin, 
the 60-year-old Karen National Union is confronted with a diff erent 
dilemma. Its founding nationalist principles, which have remained 
unchanged, are now subject to contestation and blamed as an obstacle 
to the search for a viable peace settlement with the Burmese state. 
Th e KNU is aff ected adversely by the current modifi ed international 
and domestic geopolitical context and evolving evaluation of past 
military practices such as the recruitment of child soldiers and the 
use of landmines. Th e unprecedented election of a civilian woman as 
its general secretary was probably made possible by the increasing 
importance of international lobbying and foreign funding as a means 
to achieve the KNU’s nationalist cause. But the macho militaristic 
culture among Zipporah’s male colleagues remains. Zipporah barely 
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concealed her frustration as she shared her fi rst-hand experience of 
the condescending attitude of her male colleagues who purportedly 
professed their belief in equal opportunity and equal rights.
 Th e 1937 Dutch Marriage Ordinance controversy is an example 
of how nationalist and feminist agendas may sometimes appear 
incompatible. Between her nationalist and feminist commitments, 
Suyatin had to decide where she put her priority. Interpreting the pro-
posal as a means to split the nationalist movement, Suyatin supported 
Sukarno’s suggestion to defer marriage law reform until aft er inde-
pendence. Th is was to delay it for almost four decades to come. Th e 
episode is a good illustration of how, in a particular context, women 
nationalists may have to prioritise the nationalist cause over feminist 
struggle.
 In the same light as our discussions on political identity, the 
development of feminist consciousness and critical gender identity by 
these women may also be understood as a social process, at times in 
tandem with other aspects of social identity. Divorcing her alcoholic 
husband must have been a defi ning moment in Daw San’s life, as 
indicated by her declaration, through the naming of her paper as 
Independent Weekly, that she would never return to the shackled life 
of a married woman. Aishah and Shamsiah both experienced family 
pressure to be married off  as young teenage girls; while Shamsiah 
docilely obeyed her father, Aishah rebelled. Shamsiah learned the hard 
way to recognise the vulnerability of women’s position in traditional 
gender relations. Bisoi, in her interview by Sara Niner, summarised 
her life as a journey in three progressions: “fi rst, the Portuguese 
time, when women didn’t have the right to do anything. Second, the 
resistance period, when women suff ered a lot compared to men; and 
third, the independence period, when some women are still not yet 
free, such as those who have no education”. It is interesting that she 
spoke of her personal life as refl ective of the overall East Timorese 
women’s experience.
 Th e localisations of nationalism and feminism, despite their 
common source of inspiration, do not in reality always share the same 
trajectory in their interaction with local norms. As a whole, we saw 
how female rights to education and universal suff rage were less con-
tested, while domestic relations remained murky and subject to nego-
tiation, as illustrated by the variable strategies deployed by Suyatin, 
Shamsiah, Daw San, Zipporah and Bisoi. Over the long term, the gen-
eralisation of female literacy should in principle have an empowering 
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eff ect. On the other hand, the evolution of gender relations need not 
be linear and unidirectional. Th e struggle of feminists in pushing the 
frontier of women’s emancipation against the tide of gender conserva-
tism continues, and the obstacles they face in building a united front 
is diff erent but no less challenging than those of nationalists.
Conclusion
Biographical studies of women leaders are not meant to replace con-
ventional historical studies of women’s participation in nationalist 
movements on a larger scale. Th ey are complementary in helping us to 
understand better the issues at hand.
 Th e relevance of biographical studies in understanding historical 
change has always been recognised with regard to important historical 
personalities. What is new is an increased awareness of how posing 
thoughtful questions about life stories of ordinary people could also 
help scholars understand historical process and human agency.16  Th is 
book certainly does not exhaust the potential off ered by biographical 
studies of diff erent women’s lives in understanding women’s involve-
ment in nationalist movements in the region. Comparison of diff erent 
women’s lives focusing on a specifi c subject of enquiry, such as iden-
tity issues, diff erences in gender perspectives, leadership styles or the 
strategy in pursuit of women’s rights can be fruitfully carried out. One 
can make comparative biographical studies within the same move-
ment, among diff erent movements, among those living through the 
same era, across a geographical region, and so forth. Th rough careful 
examination of individual lives in their larger social and political con-
texts, we can gain insights into the subject of enquiry as well as both 
the individuals’ lives and the eras they lived through.
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Abbreviations
AWAS Angkatan Wanita Sedar, women’s wing of MNP
BWA Burmese Women’s Association
CNRM Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere 
(National Council of Maubere Resistance)
CNRT Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense 
(National Council of Timorese Resistance) 
1998–2001; also Conselho Nacional da 
Reconstrucao Timorense (National Council of 
Timorese Reconstruction) from 2007
CRRN Conselho da Resistência Revolutionário 
Nacional (National Council for Revolutionary 
Resistance)
GCBA General Council of Burmese Associations
ICP Indochinese Communist Party
KNU Karen National Union
KWO Karen Women Organisation
MCP Malayan Communist Party
MNP Malay Nationalist Party
MNU Malay National Union (Sarawak)
MPAJA Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army
OMT Organização Mulher Timorense (Organisation 
of Timorese Women, CNRM/CNRT)
OPMT Organizacao Popular Mulher Timorense 
(Popular Organisation of Timorese Women); 
women’s wing of Fretilin
PSII Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian 
Islamic Union Party)
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PUTERA-AMCJA Th e fi rst multi-ethnic alliance formed in 
Malaya. Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA) 
was a coalition of several Malay grass-roots 
organisations as well as the MNP; the non-
Malay AMCJA stood for All Malaya Council 
for Joint Action.
SDA Sarawak Dayak Association
UMNO United Malays National Organisation
VNQDD Viet Nam Quôc Dan Dang (Vietnamese 
Nationalist Party)
YMBA Young Men’s Buddhist Association




a myo nation, race, kin, lineage (Burmese)
bada Burmese language and literature
cedula poll tax (Philippines)
cikgu teacher (Malay)
Dobama Asiayone Burmese Association
Falintil Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de 
Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the National 
Liberation of East Timor)
Fretilin Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste 
Independente (Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor)
Kaum Ibu MNU Women’s wing of MNU
Issara see Lao Issara
kaum muda young group (Indonesian)
kaum tua old group (Indonesian)
Lao Issara “Free Lao” nationalist movement
Muhammadiyah Indonesian modernist Islamic organisation
Pathet Lao “Lao Nation” pro-Communist guerrilla 
movement in Laos
perabangan Malay aristocratic elite (Sarawak)
Permi Persatuan Moeslimin Indonesia (Union of 
Indonesian Muslims)
Perwari Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia (Union 
of Women of the Indonesian Republic)
Sakdal Philippine radical peasant organisation
Sakdalista member of Sakdal
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sasana teachings of the Buddha
thakin master (Burmese); term employed by members 
of Dobama Asiayone to refer to themselves, 
not the British, as the rightful masters of 
Burma
Th awalib West Sumatran radical Islamic education 
organisation
Viet Minh Vietnamese Communist-dominated nationalist 
front
wunthanu protector of national interests (Burmese)
wunthanu athin patriotic associations (Burmese)
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Books on Southeast Asian nationalist movements make very little — if any — mention 
of women in their ranks. Biographical studies of politically active women in South-
east Asia are also rare. Women in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements makes 
a strong case for the signifi cance of women’s involvement in nationalist movements 
and for the diverse impacts of those movements on the lives of individual women 
activists.
Some of the 12 women whose political activities are discussed in this volume 
are well known, while others are not. Some of them participated in armed struggles, 
while others pursued peaceful ways of achieving national independence. The authors 
show women negotiating their own subjectivity and agency at the confl uence of 
colonialism, patriarchal traditions, and modern ideals of national and personal 
emancipation. They also illustrate the constraints imposed on them by wider social 
and political structures, and show what it was like to live as a political activist in 
different times and places.
 Fully documented and drawing on wider scholarship, this book will be of 
interest to students of Southeast Asian history and politics as well as readers with 
a particular interest in women, nationalism and political activism.
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